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ABSTRACT  
This research seeks to identify and evaluate the influences of the ‗personal 
characteristics‘ and ‗attitudinal behaviour‟ of Black African and Caribbean 
Entrepreneurs (BACEs) in London when seeking finance and business support from 
banks and other external agencies. The reason for this choice of research was to try 
and understand whether some of the personal characteristics of BACEs had an 
influence on the barriers they often reported when accessing business finance from 
formal sources in London, notably High Street banks.  
In particular, this research examines the influences of different aspects of human and 
social capital, cultural factors and generational differences on the attitudes of BACEs when 
seeking external business finance. The empirical research coincided with the onset of 
the  „credit crunch‟ and the tightening of credit rationing by the banks, so that BACE 
experiences of accessing finance need to be considered in this context.  
The use of mixed data sources including both quantitative and qualitative data adds a 
new and original dimension to this study. Thirty (30) purposely selected BACEs, five 
(5) main High Street banks, six (6) enterprise agencies and one (1) public sector 
organisation were interviewed over a two and a half year period. The field work 
involved in-depth interviews to obtain information from the respondent BACE 
owner managers. The quantitative dimension involved analysis of the London 
Annual Business Survey (LABS) dataset to compare the experiences of BACEs in 
accessing finance with those of other ethnic businesses.   
This study found that the ‗attitudinal tendencies‘ and behaviour of BACEs were closely 
related to their levels and types of human capital attainment. Results also suggested 
that the ‗cultural orientation‟ of BACEs and their concentration in certain communities 
described as ‗ethnic enclaves‟ were significant factors influencing their behaviour and 
attitudes when seeking finance and dealing with mainstream business support 
services. The views of some of the BACEs about discriminatory practices by banks 
can be largely attributed to their ‗perceptions‘ and ‗self-imaging‟ as little empirical 
evidence was found to support such claims.   
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The lack of data on BACEs is a problem which requires attention by policy-makers if 
the myths around perceptions are to be managed. Many of the challenges of BACEs 
reported in research are submerged within data relating to SMEs as a whole, thereby 
making it difficult to focus on the particular needs of BACEs. This research found 
that a small but significant number of interviewed BACEs considered themselves to 
be the subject of ‗discrimination‘. However, these attitudes could be largely 
attributed to various ‗human capital‘ shortcomings.  Some respondents may be also 
using the alleged discrimination to mask their own business failures.   
The thesis makes recommendations for improved re-engagement between the three 
principal agents and areas for future research are highlighted in the concluding 
chapter. Some of the main recommendations are geared towards fostering a better 
understanding and relationships between BACEs and finance providers as well as 
the need to promote good practices. The need for developing a database for Black 
businesses is long overdue.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5  
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
I would like to express my gratitude to my director of studies, Professor David 
North and my second supervisor, Dr Ignatius Ekanem of the Middlesex 
University Business School for their close supervision, mentoring, understanding 
and priceless insights and encouragement throughout the research process.   
I also acknowledge the support from Pam Macaulay of CEEDR, for the 
contributions towards formatting this thesis. Finally, I acknowledge the support of 
my family for their understanding through the long but worthwhile learning 
experience. Finally, I dedicate this research to my mother and Adeyinka, my 
sibling.  
 
 6  
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENT  
TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................................. 1 
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ......................................................................................... 2 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................... 5 
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS & DIAGRAMS ........................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 12 
1.0 Research Rationale ................................................................................................................ 12 
1.1 Background & Context ......................................................................................................... 12 
1.2 Trends and Statistics ............................................................................................................. 13 
1.3 Defining BACEs .................................................................................................................... 15 
1.4 Research Context .................................................................................................................. 17 
1.5 Research Focus ...................................................................................................................... 19 
1.6 Research Objectives .............................................................................................................. 21 
1.7 Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 23 
1.8 The Research Structure ........................................................................................................ 23 
Chapter 2: Literature review ..................................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 3: Methodology ............................................................................................................ 24 
Chapter 4: Secondary data analysis ......................................................................................... 24 
Chapter 5: BACE perspectives: Primary Research Findings (1) .......................................... 24 
Chapter 6: Bankers & Intermediary Perspectives: ................................................................. 25 
Chapter 7: Conclusions & Recommendation .......................................................................... 25 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................... 26 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 26 
2.2 Structure of the literature review ....................................................................................... 27 
The literature review covers three main areas: ...................................................................... 27 
2.3 BACEs (Demand-Side) ......................................................................................................... 28 
2.3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 28 
2.3.2 The Concepts of Human & Social Capital ...................................................................... 28 
2.3.3 Social & Human Capital: A Measure of Entrepreneurial Success .............................. 30 
2.3.4 Overseas Qualification ...................................................................................................... 32 
2.3.5 Returns on Educational Investment ................................................................................ 32 
2.3.6 Discrimination or Skills Gap ............................................................................................ 33 
2.3.7 Unique Characteristics of BACEs .................................................................................... 34 
2.3.8 Customer & Market Profiling of BACEs ........................................................................ 35 
2.3.9 BACE Skills Acquisition ................................................................................................... 37 
2.3.10 Economic Activities of BACEs ....................................................................................... 38 
2.3.11 Perceived Barriers of Accessing External Finance ...................................................... 39 
2.3.12 Alternative Explanations for 'Disadvantage Variation' ............................................. 41 
2.3.13 Summary - Demand Side ................................................................................................ 42 
2.4 Banks (Supply-Side) ............................................................................................................. 43 
2.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 43 
 7  
  
2.4.2 Sources of Business Finance ............................................................................................. 44 
2.4.3 Alternative Funding .......................................................................................................... 47 
2.4.4 Lending Practices of Commercial Banks ........................................................................ 48 
2.4.5 Impact of Loan Processing Framework .......................................................................... 49 
2.4.6 Collateral Requirements & Credit Scoring ..................................................................... 50 
2.4.7 Information Asymmetry ................................................................................................... 53 
2.4.8 Banking & Credit Facilities for BACEs ........................................................................... 58 
2.4.9 Alleged Discriminatory Practices .................................................................................... 59 
2.4.10 Policy Implication for lenders ........................................................................................ 60 
2.4.11 Summary: Provider Side ................................................................................................. 61 
2.5 Intermediary: Business Support ......................................................................................... 62 
2.5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 62 
2.5.2 Context for Business Support Usage ............................................................................... 63 
2.5.3 Business Support Usage .................................................................................................... 65 
2.5.4 Business Support Needs of BACEs ................................................................................. 66 
2.5.5 Gaps in Business Support for BACEs ............................................................................. 68 
2.5.6 Policy & Strategy Intervention ......................................................................................... 69 
2.5.7 Impact of Personal Attributes on Business Support Usage ......................................... 70 
2.5.8 Policy Intervention for Support Agencies ...................................................................... 71 
2.6 Literature Review Summary & Key Points ....................................................................... 72 
2.6.1 Key Points from Literature Review ................................................................................. 73 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 76 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 76 
3.2 Research Philosophy ............................................................................................................ 80 
3.3 Adopted Techniques for this study .................................................................................... 82 
Stage I: Exploratory study ......................................................................................................... 83 
Stage II: Quantitative Data: Analysing Secondary Data ....................................................... 83 
Stage III: Qualitative Data - Analysing Interview Data/Primary Research ....................... 84 
3.4 Design Considerations & Process Map.............................................................................. 87 
3.4.1 Participant Selection and Recruitment Process ............................................................. 88 
3.4.2 Data Gathering & Reliability ............................................................................................ 90 
3.4.3 Data Quality Issues ............................................................................................................ 91 
3.5 Analytical Approach ............................................................................................................ 92 
3.6 Ethical Issues ......................................................................................................................... 94 
3.7 Negotiating Access ............................................................................................................... 95 
3.8 Summary ................................................................................................................................ 96 
CHAPTER 4: SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................... 98 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 98 
4.2 Objectives of the LABS Programme ................................................................................... 99 
4.3 Presentation Approach & Methodology ........................................................................... 99 
4.4 LABS Result Analysis ......................................................................................................... 101 
4.4.1 Characteristics of BACEs ................................................................................................ 103 
4.4.2 Influence of Qualification and Management Practices .............................................. 105 
 8  
  
4.4.3 Investment & Access to finance ..................................................................................... 106 
4.4.4 Experiences and Attitudes (Relating to Access to Finance) ....................................... 109 
4.5 Summary .............................................................................................................................. 118 
4.5.1 Influence of Qualification and Management Practices .............................................. 118 
4.5.2 Capital Investments ......................................................................................................... 119 
4.5.3 Experiences and Behaviour of Black Owned Business Owners ............................... 120 
4.5.4 ‗Behaviours‘ and ‗Attitudes‘ towards External Business Support Usage ............... 121 
4.6 Limitations of the LABS Analysis .................................................................................... 121 
CHAPTER 5: BACE PERSPECTIVES: PRIMARY RESEARCH ......................................... 123 
FINDINGS (1) ............................................................................................................................ 123 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 123 
5.2 Research Objective 1: Influence of Human Capital on accessing external ................. 127 
finance ........................................................................................................................................ 127 
5.2.1 Summary - Relevance of Human Capital ..................................................................... 132 
5.3 Research Objective 2: Effects of Cultural and Generational Differences on .............. 134 
Attitudes ..................................................................................................................................... 134 
5.3.1 Findings and Analysis ..................................................................................................... 136 
5.3.2 Generational Influences .................................................................................................. 138 
5.3.3 The extent of ‗Attitudinal‘ influences ........................................................................... 142 
5.3.4 Influence of Generational & Cultural Characteristics on Attitudes ......................... 142 
5.3.4 Impact of ‗Human Capital‘ on Entrepreneurial Behaviours ..................................... 143 
5.3.5 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 145 
5.4 Contextual Influences: The Impact of the ‗Credit Crunch‘ on BACEs ........................ 145 
5.4.1 Findings and Analysis ..................................................................................................... 146 
5.4.2 Summary: The Credit Crunch & Key Issues for BACEs ............................................ 151 
5.4 Research Objective 3:  The ‗business support gaps‘ identified in this study ............. 153 
5.4.1 Summary (Business Support)......................................................................................... 159 
5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 162 
CHAPTER 6: PERSPECTIVES OF THE BANKS & BUSINESS SUPPORT 
ORGANISATIONS:  PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS (2) ............................................ 163 
6. 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 163 
6.2 Supply Side Findings ......................................................................................................... 164 
6.2.1 Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in dealing with BACEs ................................... 165 
6.2.2 Knowledge gaps between ‗demand‘ and ‗supply‘ sides ........................................... 177 
6.2.3 Policy dimensions: Bankers Perspectives ..................................................................... 183 
6.3 Intermediary Perspectives - Business Support Gaps ..................................................... 187 
6.3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 187 
6.3.2 London Development Agency (LDA):  Findings ........................................................ 188 
6.3.3 Enterprise Agencies ......................................................................................................... 196 
6.3.4 Mentoring & Referrals by Enterprise Agencies ........................................................... 198 
6.3.6 Existing Business Support Framework ......................................................................... 201 
6.3.7 Effectiveness of Standardised Business Support ......................................................... 201 
6.3.8 Ethnicity & Cultural Relevance ..................................................................................... 202 
 9  
  
6.3.9 Financing Specialist Support providers ....................................................................... 204 
6.4 Underutilisation of Business Support .............................................................................. 205 
6.5 Summary – Intermediary & Support Organisation Perspectives ................................ 206 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS ............................................................. 208 
7.1 Gaps in Literature ............................................................................................................... 209 
7.2 Summary Findings & Implications .................................................................................. 210 
7.2.1 Human and Social Capital .............................................................................................. 210 
7.2.2 The influence of Cultural Factors and Generational Differences on Attitudes ...... 211 
7.2.3 Impact of the Credit Crunch .......................................................................................... 213 
7.3 Supply Side Perspectives ................................................................................................... 215 
7.4 The Gaps Identified in Business Support Sources and Usage ..................................... 218 
7.5 Contribution of the LABS Review .................................................................................... 219 
7.5.1 Contribution to Knowledge ........................................................................................... 224 
7.6 Policy Implications & Recommendations ....................................................................... 226 
7.7 Limitations and Areas for Future Research .................................................................... 231 
8. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 235 
 
 10  
  
 
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS & DIAGRAMS  
Figure 1: Risk Category Model  57 
Figure2: Information asymmetry in small firm  58 
Figure 3: The traditional notion of owner-manager characteristics & Influence on 
finance constraints 
71 
Figure 4:  Conceptual framework 78 
Figure 5: Research process 88 
Figure 6: Interactive model for data management  94 
Figure 7: Triangulation pathways  222 
Table 1: Sources of start-up finance (%) – over a 12 month period  45 
Table 2:  Use of selected external agencies for advice & support by BACEs in a  
12 months Period (%s)  
64 
Table 3: Awareness & use of support providers in a 12 months period (%s)  65 
Table 4: Broad Ethnicity Freq. Stats. Rounded Variables (SPSS  Output)  102 
Table 5: Owner managers with some form of qualification  105 
Table 6: Capital investment at site in a 12 month period  107 
Table 7: Whether respondents approached any external sources for investment  
or other finance in a period of 12 months  
109 
Table 8: Whether respondents experienced any problems in accessing external  
funding in the 12 month period  
110 
Table 9: Where respondents experienced problems and reasons  111 
Table 10: Types of external sources of finance approached in a 12 month period  113 
Table 11: Whether successful in gaining finance from sources approached  114 
Table 12: Decisions and actions considered resulting from previous experiences – 
discouragement influences 
115 
Table 13: External Organisation used for business advice in 12 months period. 117 
Table 14: BACE Respondent profile summary 123 
Table 15a: The BACE owner managers ‗fit‘ into set parameter    126 
Table 15b: Generational & gender composition of BACE owner managers 126 
Table 16a: Significance of Human Capital to securing finance 127 
Table 16b: Level of education and its significance on seeking/accessing 
 external finance 
131 
Table 17 a: Influence of cultural & generational characteristics  135 
Table 17b: Impact of attitudes as a function of Generational and Gender  
Characteristics(1)  
135 
Table 17c: Impact of attitudes as a function of Generational and Gender  
Characteristics(2)  
136 
Table 18: Reasons cited be the BACE respondent - Credit Crunch concerns  146 
 11  
  
Table 19b: Actual usage of business support & advice as a function of 
Educational attainment 
156 
Table 20: Comparison of the Banks decision making processes 173 
Table 21: Respondent Banks view on ‗Adverse Selection‘.178 
 
178 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES  
  
(1) Enterprise Agency: Functions & gaps  
(2)  Interview Instruments (Demand, Supply & Intermediary) 
(3) Interview transcripts (Selected cases)  
 
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
  
BACE – Black African Caribbean Entrepreneur  
CEEDR – Centre for Enterprise & Economic Development Research  
BoE – Bank of England  
SME – Small Medium Enterprise  
EMB – Ethnic Minority Businesses  
ONS – Office of National Statistics  
BPE – Business Population Estimates  
BBA – British Bankers Association  
LDA – London Development Agency  
BIS – Business Innovation & Skills  
DBE – Discouraged Borrower Effect  
OFT – Office of Fair Trading  
BBV – Brent Business Venture  
ACBS – African Caribbean Business Support  
ELSBC – East London Small Development Agency  
HBDA – Haringey Business Centre  
PBC – Portebello Business Venture  
 
 12  
  
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.0 Research Rationale    
1.1 Background & Context   
The difficulties for Black African Caribbean Enterprises (BACEs) in accessing 
bank finance and appropriate business support is the focus for this study. 
Several studies (Jones et al. 1994; B0E, 1999; Smallbone et al. 2003; Fraser, 2005; 
2009) have reported that Ethnic Minority Businesses (EMBs), especially Black 
businesses (notably, African and Caribbean) face greater problems in accessing 
finance. Following on from the Bank of England study (1999), which found no 
evidence that banks were practicing ethnic discrimination, subsequent studies 
supported this notion to a large extent. However, there are several studies 
(many of which will be looked at in Chapter 2) which suggested that the issue of 
attitudes among EMBs is a significant concept and forms a major research theme 
for investigation.   
 This study sets out to explore some of the issues that may be attributed to the 
reasons why BACEs portray negative attitudes towards formal sources of 
finance. Previous studies apply ‗econometric methods to dispel the ‗mistaken‘ 
perceptions among BACEs, but this study approach the problem from a new 
perspective, applying predominantly ‗qualitative‘ methods to investigate 
reasons why BACEs behave as such.   
Certain attributes of the BACE owner manager such as their ‗human capital‘,  
‗attitudinal behaviours‘ and the effects of these factors on judgement, 
interrelationships and the wider misinformation between them, the banks and 
the ‗intermediaries‘ such as business support providers are areas of focus for 
this research.  Three key players are looked at as the basis for investigations: the 
BACEs (owner managers) referred to as the ‗demand side‘, the banks referred to 
as the ‗supply side‘ and the intermediaries which include agencies providing 
business support. These are studied with a view to ‗triangulate‘ their 
perspectives in order to try and explain the underlying reasons behind the 
reported difficulties allegedly faced by BACEs concerning access to finance.  
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There is increasing research focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 
but little on BACEs despite the growing interest about their potential impact on 
the UK economy. Official statistics are generally inconsistent and may be 
viewed as being unreliable, hence the difficulty in obtaining accurate data on 
Black businesses. The justification for this research points to the poor or 
insufficient understanding of the reasons why BACEs behave in certain ways 
leading to them holding views that can exacerbate their difficulties in accessing 
bank finance. Many of these attitudinal issues arise from their historical 
experiences in the labour market and their tendency to concentrate in ‗ethnic 
enclaves‘ that can further marginalise their market and growth potential.   
1.2 Trends and Statistics  
Locating BACEs in the SME group is a difficult proposition partly due to some 
of the issues aforementioned. The 2011 national statistics (national statistics web 
page) on minority ethnic population trends provide a limited description of the 
specific BACEs in terms of population, economic activity etc. It is therefore 
difficult to make a more realistic analysis of how much information is available 
on BACEs. Some statutory authorities including Companies House do not 
record diversity data and the same applies to high street banks. In essence, there 
is little data that can give a reasonable estimate of the numbers and types of 
BACEs in England. All too frequently researchers lump the various EMB groups 
together making it difficult to understand the unique proportions of particular 
groups.  
The subject of small businesses is vital to the UK economy and has stimulated 
considerable debate amongst academics, policy makers, practitioners and the 
finance sectors in general over the last three decades. Ethnic minorities account 
for eight per cent of the British population (Census of Population 2011) but in 
some parts of London it is reported that ethnic minorities account for more than 
fifty per cent of the local population. This geographical concentration has an 
impact on their economic contribution to the local economy.    
 14  
  
Whilst there is no single database containing all private sector businesses in the 
UK, the main source for estimating the business population is via the Inter 
Departmental Business Register (IDBR), administered by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS).  The Business Population Estimates (BPE) data show that there 
were an estimated 4.9 million private sector businesses in the UK at the start of 
2013, an increase of 102,000 over the previous (2012) year. However, the 
estimated increase is largely due to the inclusion of the ‗zero‘ staff (sole trader) 
category that was omitted from the 2011 statistics. The private sector businesses 
employed an estimated 24.3 million people and had an estimated annual 
combined turnover of £3,300 billion.   
Nwankwo et al. (2005) argue that the estimated annual turnover may be grossly 
underrepresented (this is based on the presumption that Black businesses are 
inadequately captured in the statistics). For example, in London, it was 
estimated that a more accurate combined turnover estimate in 2005 (all 
businesses) could have been in the range of about £12 billion. The Nwankwo et 
al. (2005) report suggested that owing to the possible flaws in the 
methodological problems in collating Black business data in the UK, coupled 
with inadequate census protocols for measuring the actual size of the Black 
business economy in UK, official statistics might have misjudged the scale of 
Black business contributions to the economy. They also suggested that the size 
of the ‗informal‘ Black business economy (especially the self-employed) is huge 
and often escapes capture in official statistics. Contextually, ‗informality‘ does 
not depict underground illicit activities but encompasses those enterprises 
where ‗some or all their transactions are not declared to the state for tax 
collections and social security purposes‘ (Williams & Round, 2009)  
 Almost all (99.9%) of businesses recorded at the start of 2013 were small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), but recent records, including the 2011 census have 
not accurately captured micro-businesses (1-9 employees) statistics. The SME 
data, including micro-businesses, are generally accurate but the various 
categories; particularly the BACEs are rarely presented and quite difficult to 
ascertain the true picture of its representation in the SME statistics. A careful 
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review of the BPE, 2013 statistics show that 99.9% of all businesses were small 
(1-49 employees) of which 0.6% were medium-sized (50 – 249 employees). The 
category of Black businesses being studied in this research, the BACEs fall in the 
micro businesses (1-9 employees) category which is included in the 1.2 million 
(or 24.7%) of the total EMB businesses at the start of 2013. The ‗no employee‘ 
categories (i.e. those comprising sole proprietorships or only the self-employed 
owner-manager and/or employee directors) are about 75% (3.7 million of all 
businesses). For the purpose of this research, it is those BACEs which fall into 
the micro businesses (i.e. 1-9 employees) category which are the primary focus.   
For clarity, there are three tiers from which BACE statistics and representations 
were traced. The small and medium-sized enterprise (SMEs) provides the 
broader reference point for assessing the significance and contributions of small 
businesses to the wider UK economy. This is then disaggregated into the 
various categories (specific groups that make up the SMEs). The BACEs is the 
subject of interest, which is represented within the micro businesses because of 
their heterogeneous characteristics which creates a gap in the official statistics 
that serves as focus for investigation in this research.    
1.3 Defining BACEs   
Black African Caribbean Enterprises are regarded as one component of the 
wider Ethnic Minority Businesses. There is a conceptual debate within the 
literature about the definition of what constitutes an ethnic minority business. 
BACEs, for the purpose of this research refers to the first, second (and to a lesser 
extent, the third) generations of Black Africans and Caribbean Enterprise 
business owner-managers.  The focus for this research are BACEs which 
characterise ‗micro size businesses‘ that have between 1 – 9 employees and 
usually have a niche in the local communities within which they operate.   
The fundamental problem under investigation is the widely held view that 
BACEs face disproportionate barriers when it comes to accessing finance from 
formal sources, such as High Street banks. More than two decades ago, Ward 
and Reeves (1980) carried out what was the first systematic interview survey of 
the relationship between African-Caribbean entrepreneurs and their banks. One 
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of the most significant findings was a widespread perception of discrimination 
amongst the entrepreneurs themselves, with numerous aggrieved respondents 
claiming to have been rejected for business loans despite, in most cases, being 
able to offer the required capital and references.   
As stated earlier, several studies have dispelled this notion as a misperception 
(Fraser, 2009), because econometric analysis indicates that ethnic differences in 
denial rates and interest rates can be explained by variations in non-ethnic risk 
factors such as missed loan repayment and overdraft excesses. Empirical 
interpretations therefore suggest that there is no ethnic discrimination in credit 
markets (Fraser, 2009).  This thesis tries to find alternative explanatory factors 
(apart from the ethnic orientation) such as the ‗attitudes‘ and ‗human capital‘ of 
the owner manager to try and explain why they exhibit such behaviours, which 
presumably presents them with difficulties in accessing finance from formal 
sources.  The author suggests that the barriers faced by BACEs are not 
significantly different to those faced by other small business owners, but 
believes there may be some alternative explanations and reasons for the 
perceptions reported, and this forms the basis for this research.  
There has been extensive research on EMBs in recent years, but less on the 
BACEs in particular. Ram and Deakins (1995), some of the pioneering 
researchers in this field, confirmed that BACEs have a particularly low 
propensity to access bank finance at start-up. Instead, they rely mostly on 
personal savings, trade credit and internal sources of finance such as 
community loans and family contributions. Fraser‘s (2008) findings were similar 
to this and in fact suggested that there are longstanding concerns about access to 
finance amongst all types of small firms due to capital imperfections (Graham, 
2004). An important reason for these imperfections is that finance providers may 
find it hard to assess creditworthiness of small firms due to information 
asymmetries and not racial bias per se.   
Contributions to the economy by small businesses in general has been 
highlighted by many researchers: Ekanem (2005) made references to the 
importance of SMEs to the economy as a source of innovation (Ochieng and 
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Kalantaridis 2001; Anderson et al., 2001,) a source of employment (Keeble, 1990, 
Smallbone, 1994; Dale and Morgan, 2001) and as seed corn from which much 
larger companies can grow (Storey et al., 1987, ACOST 1990). The potentials of 
the majority of BACEs are still relatively little researched, but their role in the 
London economy has been documented. Clearly, economic policy is being 
formulated without sufficient understanding of the real problems faced by 
BACEs and the likely impact of the actions of their external environment upon 
them (Ekanem, 2005).    
1.4 Research Context  
A pilot study completed in November 2007, as part of the MSc Research 
Methods programme attempted to explore and separate ‗perceptions‘ from 
‗reality‘ concerning the reported barriers of accessing business finance by Black  
African and Caribbean Entrepreneurs (BACEs) in London (Babayemi, 2007).  
The rationale was to evaluate the characteristic profiles, knowledge, and 
perceptions of BACEs concerning access to business finance. A qualitative 
approach was adopted, employing semi-structured in-depth interviews. This 
involved a small number of purposefully selected Black African and Caribbean 
business owners that were running their own business or planning to set up 
one. Their accessibility to business finance was the primary focus of this study. 
The pilot study provided a basis to uncover the extent to which the perceptions of 
both the ‗demand‘ and ‗supply‘ sides of business finance influenced access to 
finance from external sources.  
The insights gained from the in-depth interviews suggested that human capital in 
terms of the relevant qualifications and experiences of BACE owner managers can 
be a key factor affecting their ability to access business finance from formal 
sources. Given the limited size of the sample covered in the pilot study, the 
influence of these human capital factors needed to be examined for a larger 
sample of BACEs. An extensive literature review was conducted and evidence 
presented in the review highlights the disproportionate (with reference to small 
firms with similar features apart from ethnicity) barriers faced by BACEs, 
accessing business finance. Comparison was made with other Ethnic Minority 
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Business owners and the control white groups with similar characteristics in 
terms of size (1 – 9 employees).   
The principal purpose for conducting this research was to further explore and 
develop the themes that emerged from the pilot study conducted in 2007. The 
aims and objectives were set to identify and examine the underlining effects of 
the human capital of the BACE owner manager and to investigate if a 
‗knowledge gap‘ existed in relation to accessing external finance. Knowledge 
gap in this instance is a function of the grasp of the owner managers 
understanding of the financial market place, options and alternatives to 
business finance. The shortage of human capital amongst some of the BACE 
owner managers interviewed during the pilot study was noticeable and 
provides the basis to further investigate the concept.   
This is supported by the notion that the shortfall of relevant qualifications, 
opportunities and knowledge, predisposes BACEs to form ethnic-based enclave-
markets and this may be a major factor affecting their chances of success in 
accessing formal sources of business finance.  Ethnic communities provide a 
range of business opportunities in ethnic-based enclave-markets. Since an 
enclave economy is bounded by the size of the community, there is a 
demographic constraint on the further development of BACEs. Given the 
limited depth of the enclave economy, BACEs need to develop strategies in 
order to deal with competitive pressures and market saturation by reaching 
mainstream or better rewarded markets.  
The gaps in literature highlight the lack of evidence or direction for identifying 
the specific reasons to explain why BACEs face particular difficulties when 
seeking and accessing external finance. This emerging theme, therefore, set the 
scene for this research, to explore the interconnection between human capital 
and the knowledge gap as it relates to accessing sources of formal finance.    
The timing of this research coincides with the onset of the credit crunch and 
economic downturn in 2007, leading to many SMEs experiencing increased 
difficulty in accessing external finance, particularly debt finance from banks 
(Fraser, 2009; Cowling et al., 2012) The credit crunch of late 2007 resulted in 
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increased ‗credit rationing‘ i.e. a tightening of credit availability, making it more 
difficult for younger and microbusinesses in particular to access bank finance. 
Given the impact of these economic circumstances on the small business 
community, this research needed to set the issues of BACE access to finance 
within this historic context by also considering the adaptability of BACEs to the 
harsh market place during this period.  
 
1.5 Research Focus   
The justification for this study is to demonstrate how the human capital of 
BACEs may have some bearing on the success rate for accessing business 
finance from High Street banks. Research (CEEDR 2008; Fraser 2008; Law 2007; 
Smallbone 1994, BoE, 1999) has generally identified access to finance as one of 
the major difficulties affecting BACEs in particular and SMEs in general. The 
study will seek to explore and evaluate the extent to which attitudes create a 
‗knowledge gap‘ for BACEs. The proposition is to apply the human capital of 
the BACE owner manager as an explanatory factor for understanding 
underlying behaviour relating to their perception of being discriminated against 
within the market place for accessing business finance.  This may add a new 
perspective to the body of knowledge pertaining to BACEs and access to 
finance.   
Human capital in this context focuses on the economic behaviour of the BACE 
owner manager, especially in the way their education, previous experience, and 
accumulation of knowledge and skills influence their chances of accessing 
external finance – and in so doing, to increase the performance of their 
businesses. The underlying implication of the human capital perspective is that 
the relevant qualification and experience acquired has an impact on the chances 
they have in accessing finance from external sources.  
Cultural and social concept are interlinked and embedded in the human capital 
of the BACE owner managers. The publication of the Macmillan report (1931) 
and the Cruickshank (2000) report, presents a heightened awareness of the 
problems small firms have traditionally encountered when seeking formal 
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sources of bank finance. In a ‗perfect market‘ setting, where full information is 
available to both the finance provider (bank) and the business owner, a finance 
gap or market imperfection would not arise. The next chapter offers some 
detailed discussions on this concept.     
Cultural capital in the context of this research relates to the ideas and 
knowledge that the BACEs draw upon as they interact with the agents, 
specifically ‗finance providers‘ and ‗intermediaries‘ providing concerning access 
to external finance. This concept focuses on the possible effects of the 
generational characteristics of BACEs in areas such as language, knowledge of 
the system, source and credence of qualification. There is a possibility that there 
may be significant variations in the human capital for first, second and third 
generations. One of the research questions is to consider to what extent the 
generational effect impacts on access to external finance. For the purpose of this 
study, social capital will focus on networks: the relationships within and 
between them, and the norms which govern these relationships.    
There is a lack of systematic, integrated knowledge about the choices and 
options explored accessing external sources of finance.  Therefore, this research 
aims to contribute to the understanding of the difficulties BACEs experience in 
accessing bank finance by considering the influence of factors not covered 
previously in other research. Furthermore, the recent financial climate referred 
to as the ‗credit crunch‘, makes this research particularly interesting for 
understanding the real issues attributed to the barriers BACEs face accessing 
business finance. The logic behind this view is that the ‗behaviours‘ of BACEs in 
terms of options of finance sought and the decisions of investment, seeking 
business support and perceptions is more exposed due to the market conditions 
which becomes more challenging for all businesses in general.  Those 
behaviours – mind set, innovative tendencies, knowledge of the finance market 
and the survival strategies required to survive and compete in the market - 
become a subject of focus which may contribute adversely or positively to the 
chances of accessing finance or survival in the market place.    
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However, this research still presents an opportunity to explore BACE 
behaviours in terms of reacting to external stimuli. In other words, this research 
coincides with an era where external finance becomes increasingly more 
difficult for SMEs irrespective of ethnic orientation, size or sector. It may have 
been possible that small businesses have had to adopt survival strategies at the 
peak of the ‗credit crunch‘ rather than seek growth avenues. It is also possible 
that the underutilised alternative sources of finance (such as Government 
guaranteed loans and community focused finance initiatives) may become 
increasingly popular, with the hope that BACEs would consider these as an 
alternative source of finance and therefore increase their chances of accessing 
finance.  
1.6 Research Objectives  
The objectives of this research are as follows:  
  
1. To analyse the influences of different aspects of human capital on the 
difficulties of BACEs access to external finance:  
a. The behaviour(s) of the owner manager is believed to guide the 
success of the business and its ability to secure business finance, 
therefore, the experiences, socio-cultural orientation of the BACE 
will be explored.  
b. The type and level of the owner manager‘s qualifications forms 
part of the focus for this study and will be looked at in some depth 
in order to evaluate its relevance to the attitudes and actions of the 
owner manager.  
  
2. To assess the effects of cultural factors and generational differences on 
the ability of BACEs to access external finance:  
The cultural and generational factors that may influence the behaviours 
and/or decision making of the BACE accessing business finance from formal 
sources is to be investigated. This study looks at the relevance and 
interrelationships of these factors with a view to understanding and 
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explaining some of the underlying reasons why some BACE perceptions are 
largely negative concerning accessing finance from formal sources. Chapter 2 
provides some extensive discussions about the ‗enclaves‘ and the impact of 
these in shaping the ‗attitudes‘ of BACEs.  
  
3. To investigate the influence of attitudes and experiences of BACEs on 
their ability to access external finance:  
a. This study sets out to investigate and evaluate how ‗attitudes‘ 
weigh in on the behaviours of the BACE. The suggestions in the 
literature on this subject indicate that the negative experiences of 
BACEs concerning access to business finance are largely 
‗perceived‘ rather than ‗actual‘. This triangulation of opinion and 
experiences of the three key players – i.e. the ‗demand side‘, the 
‗provider side‘ and the intermediaries  - is to extend and improve 
upon past work by using ‗insider accounts‘ to establish a position 
of consensus.   
b. The study also explores the experiences of the business owner 
manager with the UK finance systems, conditions and 
relationships with the provider sides – lending banks.   
    
4. To identify business support gaps and usage among BACEs  
a. There is a view that mainstream policy may be incapable of 
addressing the specific barriers facing those micro-businesses 
which are BACEs. The justification or evidence of this is to be 
traced from ‗insider accounts‘ of both the demand and provider 
sides. This research sets out to identify the options for corrective 
strategies, focusing on business support gaps, as it relates to 
BACEs in London.  
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1.7 Research Questions  
The research aims to find answers to the specific questions:  
1. How does human capital (e.g. relevant qualifications and experience) 
influence BACEs in accessing external finance?  
2. (a)To what extent do cultural factors and generational differences affect 
BACEs in accessing external finance?  
(b)To what extent does the BACE owner manager‘s attitudes influence 
the ability to access external finance?  
3. What are the policy implications of any finance gaps identified in the 
study with focus on business support systems?  
1.8 The Research Structure  
The structure for this thesis will consist of seven main chapters as outlined in the 
next page:   
 
Chapter 2: Literature review   
This chapter presents a detailed account of the key issues concerning BACEs. 
The purpose is to convey to the reader what knowledge and ideas have been 
established on the wider Ethnic Minority Businesses (EMBs) and more 
specifically BACEs. The section positions the study in relation to the existing 
literature available and attempts to identify gaps in our understanding of the 
research topic. The literature searches concern access to business finance in the 
United Kingdom generally with a focus on London from formal sources i.e. 
High Street banks. This is not simply a descriptive exercise, but also presents the 
reader with some appraisal of the reported literature and its limitations. There 
are three sub sections of this chapter:   
‘The demand side’ refers to BACEs (owner managers and/or new business 
starters), this focuses on the experiences, perceptions and the unique 
characteristics of BACEs concerning access to finance.  
‘The supply side’ refers to the lending banks, particularly commercial banks. The 
scope covered the usual sources of finance that BACEs utilise; practices of the 
lending banks such as processing of loan applications; collateral requirements 
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and other issues and/or gaps concerning the ‗provider‘ and ‗supply‘ 
relationships.  
‘Intermediaries’: This sub-section looks at business support services and policy 
implication for BACEs. The literature also discusses the gaps in business 
support provision and the take up of these services. This chapter also looks at 
the policy gaps, the impact that business support can have and the relevance of 
the services offered concerning BACEs.  
Chapter 3: Methodology  
The chapter looks at the rationale and the philosophical assumptions that 
underlie this study. It presents an opportunity for assessing the appropriateness 
of the research methods most suitable for answering the research questions. This 
chapter is divided into three main parts: the first part looks at the theoretical 
underpinnings driving the research methods whilst the second part looks at the 
design considerations; which cover the preferred technique, its limitations and the 
alternative methods available, the third aspect looks at the data management 
and analytical perspectives.  
Chapter 4: Secondary data analysis  
 This chapter looks at evidence from the most recent London Annual Business 
Surveys (LABS – 2006, 2007). This large scale survey (covering more than four 
thousand privately-owned businesses) is a valuable source of secondary data 
and enables BACEs to be compared with other groups of businesses, notably 
white owned businesses. It serves as a reference point for measuring the extent 
of the demand for external finance and the problems in obtaining it from BACEs 
compared to other EMBs and white-owned businesses. The underlining data for 
the 2007 LABS was analysed and inferences drawn from the findings of the 
experiences of BACEs in relation to five other ethnic groups.   
Chapter 5: BACE perspectives: Primary Research Findings (1)   
This chapter presents the findings and analysis of a programme of face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews with purposely selected BACEs (i.e. the demand 
side). It presents empirical findings based on the research questions set. Each 
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research question forms a subsection and themes that emerge under each 
question are presented, analysed and discussed.  Reference is made to the set 
objectives and identified research questions in a way that the reader is provided 
with narratives of the respondents. In the process, a rationale for the choice of 
methods adopted is closely matched with its efficiency in addressing the 
research questions.  
Chapter 6: Bankers & Intermediary Perspectives:   
Primary Research Findings (2)  
This is similar in context, plan and presentation to the previous chapter. The 
focus here is on the ‗Finance Providers‘ and ‗Intermediaries‘. The providers 
comprise the purposely selected commercial banks and the intermediaries 
include the public, private and voluntary sector (referred to as the ‗third sector) 
business support providers.   
Chapter 7: Conclusions & Recommendation  
The concluding chapter summarises and highlights the key findings of the 
research whilst the aims of the dissertation are revisited. It sets a basis on which 
contribution to knowledge and new insights/methodology is arrived at and also 
offers the opportunity to appraise the research methods and techniques utilised 
in this research. The policy implications for the key players i.e. BACEs, finance 
providers and intermediaries - are discussed. There is a ‗check‘ on the 
appropriateness of the research methodology and an appraisal on whether the 
methodological considerations and approaches best answered the research 
questions. In the same vein, the limitations of the study are highlighted and 
issues identified for future research.  Finally, the contribution made by the study 
to the body of knowledge in terms of new insights is summarised and 
recommendations for policy implications and future research are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction   
This literature review is a critical discussion of what is the present state of 
awareness relating to the Black African and Caribbean Entrepreneurs (BACEs) 
in London.  The review of literature is to assess what is known about BACEs, 
and what their attitudes are concerning access to finance. This chapter is 
concerned with a critical discussion of previous published work – past and more 
recent. Some American perspectives have also been looked at in brief, with a 
view to examine whether international perspectives promote good practices and 
to explore what lessons can be learnt.  
The literature on BACEs is sparse and setting out to review literature in this 
particular area of research is an interesting challenge. The sources of the review 
includes research findings and the whole range of governmental statutory and 
voluntary sector establishment reports, briefing papers, text books, newsroom 
briefs, conventional papers, empirical and non-empirical studies pertinent to the 
research area.   
There is a continuous stock of evidence documenting the multi-faceted and 
increasingly fluid nature of small businesses (LDA, 2005; CEEDR, 2007), but 
limited information on BACEs in particular  Previous research suggests that 
access to finance is one major barrier for EMBs with regards to business success. 
BBA (2002); BIS (2005); Ram (2006); Law (2007) looked in detail at the business 
banking needs of EMBs in general. In particular, these researchers identified the 
extent of the barriers these groups face compared to their white counterparts. 
However, there is scope for further research in identifying the reasons for this. 
In general, the research findings consistently indicated that there was no real 
evidence of discrimination to accessing business finance by Black and minority 
ethnic groups compared to their white counterparts.   Fraser (2004, 2008) 
reported in his UK survey of SME finances study that no tangible evidence 
exists in suggesting that some groups indeed faced discrimination accessing 
business finance but that pockets of these groups, particularly BACEs faced 
relatively greater difficulties by virtue of the business enclaves/niche formed in 
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the communities they served. These were synonymous to similar enclaves 
formed by other niche groups such as Polish immigrants (Engelen, 2001) that 
‗fit‘ the same Ethnic Minority Entrepreneur (EME) profile.  
2.2 Structure of the literature review  
The literature review covers three main areas:    
Demand-Side:   
This section looks at the unique features of BACEs; detailing the characteristic 
profiles in terms of definitions, size, and comparison with the other ethnic 
minority businesses (EMBs) in London. The section also reviews the economic 
activities unique to BACEs, including experiences and perceived barriers of 
accessing debt finance. Finally, a detailed review of human capital 
characteristics of BACE owner-managers and the impact of this on eligibility to 
debt finance is presented.  
Supply-Side:   
This section presents the literature relating to the finance providers with 
reference to high street banks, which are the more formal sources of business 
finance in general. The section looks at various sources of business finance used 
by BACEs in particular and the more general EMBs. The section also looks at the 
available literature about the relationships, experience and knowledge that the 
supply side have of EMBs. For example, one of the propositions in some 
research is that banks generally have very poor knowledge of ethnic minority 
businesses. The literature presents some of the relevant issues and factors that 
widen the information gaps in relation to BACEs.  
 Intermediaries:  
Intermediaries refer to business support provision; the section explores the 
effectiveness of partnerships and the relevance of the role business support play 
in enhancing accessibility to information and advice. There are also specific 
references made to the impact of policy initiatives.  
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2.3 BACEs (Demand-Side)  
2.3.1 Introduction  
One of the pioneering studies of ethnic minority entrepreneurs was conducted 
by FOCUS Central London in 1999 and many more emerged over the 
subsequent two decades. Prior to this, UK research on ethnic minority business 
tended to be heavily preoccupied with explaining the extraordinarily prominent 
business presence of ethnic communities originating in the Indian sub-continent 
(Ram & Jones, 1998).  Even at a time of generally rapid self-employment growth, 
South Asian rates stood out far above the national average (Curran and 
Burrows, 1988), presenting a paradox of a national entrepreneurial renaissance, 
on the face of it, led by racialised and displaced ethnic minorities (Ward 1987; 
Barrett et al.1996; Ram & Jones, 1998).  However, apparent weakness can turn 
out to be strength and according to American pioneers in EMB research, 
migration is historically correlated with inordinately high levels of 
entrepreneurial self-employment, both in the USA (Light, 1972; 1984) and 
elsewhere (Bonacich and Modell, 1980).    
Subsequent  studies, (Small Business Services, (2001) Bank of England (2000); 
Ram (2000) BBA (2002); Fraser (2005, 2008) amongst others appear to agree that 
BACEs account for around one in every ten of all small and medium enterprise 
(SME) business units in the UK and this share has remained constant over the 
last two decades (BIS, 2011).  
2.3.2 The Concepts of Human & Social Capital   
Traub (2000) traced the development of Human Capital, to an economist, 
Theodore Schultz in 1990. He equates the concept to all those human capacities, 
developed by education that can be used productively. The capacity to deal in 
abstraction, to recognise and adhere to rules; to use language at a high level are 
all synonymous to this concept. Human Capital, like other forms of capital, 
accumulates over generations; it‘s a thing that parents ‗give‘ to their children 
through their upbringing, and that children then successfully deploy in school, 
allowing them to bequeath more human capital to their own children. The UK 
surveys of SME finances (Fraser, 2005; 2008 & 2009) provides a detailed insight 
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into the correlations between education attained by BACEs compared to a 
control group of white entrepreneurs of like characteristics in terms of size and 
market niche.   
Fraser indicated that there is a positive correlation between qualification and 
entrepreneurship. This concept is also supported by Hayton (2004) who 
suggested that, educational achievement is positively associated with self-
employment and small business ownership. Hayton, an American expert in 
strategic human capital management in SMEs, confirms that human capital is 
believed to be an important source of sustained competitive advantage. This 
was particularly relevant to firms operating in complex and dynamic 
competitive environments where the capability to rapidly acquire and assimilate 
new market and technological capabilities is the key to enduring advantage that 
is clearly weak amongst certain ethnic enclaves. There is a very high occurrence 
of postgraduate and management qualification reported amongst BACEs 
compared to other EMB groups (Fraser, 2005, 2008). Fraser‘s findings suggested 
that the BACE owner managers who had a significant level of management 
qualification tend to set up businesses in non-traditional sectors and therefore 
had a better chance of accessing external finance.   
The findings reported in a number of studies including Hasluck et al.‘s (1997) 
work in Southwark and Lambeth in partnership with the Warwick University 
indicated that the findings that Black business owners were better qualified than 
their ethnic group-counterparts brings up interesting issues, which is part of the 
focus for this research. However, contemporary human capital theories (Hayton, 
2004) support the notion that acquisition of higher qualification enhances the 
decision making of the business owner irrespective of race. There is the belief 
that the process of identifying and exploring entrepreneurial opportunities is 
uncertain and poorly defined when race is brought into the thinking. In other 
words, the emphasis on race alone, hardly offers adequate explanation for the 
reported perceptions of BACEs.   
The ‗ethnic enclaves‘ characteristic of this group promotes tolerance of failure 
which is often blamed on external stimulus such as market forces. If this 
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suggestion is acceptable, then BACE reported failures amongst some owner 
managers is not hinged on ethnicity but rather, other factors come into play. 
Clearly, there is shortage of literature about Human Capital and its impact on 
the accessibility of BACEs to business finance in the UK. The findings so far in 
literature support the notion that the concept of Human Capital is an important 
factor which can be used to explain the reported perceptions of BACEs in 
relation to the BACE attitudes and experiences with finance institutions. The 
American experience applies sociological and economic indices or approaches in 
explaining the concept and how it may affect the cognitive behaviours of the 
target group. The key elements looked at are presented in the next sub-sections:  
2.3.3 Social & Human Capital: A Measure of Entrepreneurial Success  
It was the work of Robert D. Putnam (Putman 1993; 2000) that launched social 
capital as a popular focus for research and policy discussion. 'Social capital' has 
also been noted by the World Bank as a useful organizing idea. They argue that 
'increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper 
economically and for development to be sustainable' (The World Bank, 1999). 
Putnam (2000) refers to the ideas of physical capital as physical objects whilst 
human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to 
connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely 
related to what some have called ―civic virtue.‖ The difference is that ―social 
capital‖ calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when 
embedded in a network of social relations.   
In other words, interaction enables people to build communities, to commit 
themselves to each other, and to knit the social fabric. A sense of belonging and 
the concrete experience of social networks (and the relationships of trust and 
tolerance that can be involved) can, it is argued, bring great benefits to people. 
Education and length of experience in the labour market are the usual measures 
of human capital (Mincer 1974; Hayton 2004; Putman 2000). In more general 
terms, the assumption is that investments in education tend to increase an 
individual‘s generic skills and that additional experience in the labour market 
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will improve the individual‘s job-specific skills. Contemporary human resource 
management systems advocate that, the business performance of the 
entrepreneur is a direct function of the level of human capital acquired. In a US 
study of 99 SMEs, modern HRM practices that promotes discretionary 
behaviour, knowledge sharing, and organisational learning and diversification 
out of ‗ethnic enclaves (in the case of BACEs) were found to be positively 
associated with entrepreneurial performance (Hayton, 2004). Cognitive skills 
are also sometimes included as human capital, although good measures of 
cognitive skills are rarely available in studies of labour market outcomes. In the 
UK context, there is limited application of the cognitive skills in explaining 
perceptions and attitudes, particularly relating to BACEs and access to external 
finance. Alternative clinical cognitive approaches exist in the Health and Care 
sectors but these are outside the scope of this research and perhaps relevant for 
further study.  
Putnam (1993) in the ―Prosperous Community‖ gave a good account of the 
concepts of social capital. He compared physical capital and human capital as 
tools and training that enhance individual productivity.  He presented ―social 
capital‖ as features of social structures, such as networks, norms, and trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. It is also possible that 
the financial institutions (particularly the banks) may fail to recognise the poor 
social capital available to BACEs as a barrier and often not considered as a 
mitigating circumstance for this group when seeking business finance.   
Other authors such as Farkas (1996) looked more specifically at Human Capital 
as a measure against Cultural Capital to explain the relative business failure of 
ethnicity groups and poverty groups in urban cities of America. The study seeks 
to re-orient understanding of the early education determinants of social 
stratification outcomes. It focuses on the processes and consequences of unequal 
skill attainment for ethnic and poverty groups in American urban cities. The 
skills referred to here, include graduate and post graduate education. There is a 
notion that the inner-city groups were unable to acquire high grades in college 
due to the inherent social inequalities attributed to the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the living conditions of inner-city homes. This can be likened 
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to the UK perspectives, and in-fact previous research (Fraser, 2005) suggests that 
the inequality in access to employment is a driving factor for Afro-Caribbean 
people to go into private enterprise and self-employment.               
2.3.4 Overseas Qualification  
Immigrant qualifications may have less value in the labour market than their 
counterparts who acquired theirs in the UK. Friedberg‘s work (1996) suggests 
that the returns to education acquired overseas may be less than the returns to 
education acquired in the host society, and that this may account for the 
earnings disadvantages of immigrant entrepreneurs. ―An important 
determinant of immigrants‘ economic success is the value in their destination 
country of the human capital‖ (Friedberg, 1996).   
However, there are strong feelings amongst many BACEs that other ethnic 
groups and their white peers with lesser or equal educational qualifications and 
experiences have an advantage in accessing business finance (Friedberg, 1996). 
This can be attributed to perceptions and cannot be portrayed as a 
generalization without empirical evidence. English Language can also be seen as 
a major aspect of the migrant‘s human capital that affects earnings and that can 
explain a substantial part of BACEs disadvantages in the labour market 
(Carliner 1980; Chiswick 1991). It could also be argued that overseas 
qualifications may be deficient in preparing the holders to be able to write and 
develop suitable business plans, adequately complete application forms, or 
properly understand the requirements of the application.  
2.3.5 Returns on Educational Investment  
American literature has presented some key questions whether the second 
generation entrepreneurs receive the same returns on their educational 
investments as do native white American entrepreneurs. The evidence suggests 
that second or later-generation American Black Entrepreneurs received lower 
returns to their education than other second-generation ethnic minorities 
(Perlmann 1998, Borjas 1994b). The notion of predisposition to disadvantage of 
first generation BACEs compared to the British born second generation BACEs 
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was evident during the pilot study interviews. It was clear that some of the 
owner managers who had immigrated into the country did not have the same 
level of awareness of financial institutions and social structures.    
Heath (2001) used the ―assimilation‖ concept to explain this. He supported 
Friedbergs‘ (1996: 4) theory of assimilation. He argues ―when immigrants first 
arrive in a new country, they are at a disadvantage in the labour market, relative 
to natives with comparable demographic characteristics and skill levels‖. One 
reason is that natives have many country-specific skills and information that 
immigrants lack. As immigrants spend time in the host country and begin to 
acquire this country–specific knowledge, their labour market performance and 
competitiveness may be expected to improve.  
2.3.6 Discrimination or Skills Gap  
Economists in the American literature have hotly debated the issue of whether 
discrimination against Blacks persists despite acknowledging their possession of 
adequate human capital. This has been studied in a number of ways. The 
dominant approach in American literature is to apply economic theories to see if 
Black-white wage differentials are evident even after statistical controls for 
levels of human capital, language skills, opportunities, and so on. One of the 
approaches used in the US context, which has not been applied in the UK 
perspective, was to employ more direct tests involving audit studies. This 
approach involves matching pairs of individuals with similar education and 
experience but different social factors (race, source of qualification etc.).   
The PIU report (Heath, 2001), to the Cabinet Office, reviewed the American 
experiences using sociological and economic theories to explain the 
disadvantages that Black people experienced in the labour market. This context 
was a good reference point for policy development in the subject area.  It was 
clear from his discussions that Human Capital was one of the key factors 
responsible for the disparity in earning potentials between the Blacks and 
whites in the labour market (Heckman, 1998).   
The relevance of the American literature is to stimulate the debate for 
attempting to separate perceptions from reality as it relates to access to finance 
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by BACEs. Literature in the UK is limited in the area of Human and Social 
Capital, but these concepts provides a platform for explaining some of the 
alleged discrimination reported in recent research.   
2.3.7 Unique Characteristics of BACEs  
There are suggestions in recent literature that some of the key features of BACEs 
which make them seem less favoured by financial institutions (commercial 
banks) relates to their size, business location, innovation and use of ICT, 
business and social network and lack of collateral (LDA, 2005; Ram et al, 2001). 
Other research (Ram et al, 2001) provided alternative explanations in purely 
business sense, that the predominantly micro-enterprise nature of BACEs 
appears to be one of the disadvantageous factors affecting their ability to access 
external finance, as is the case for all micro-businesses rather than the personal 
attributes of the owner managers. This can be explained, in part, by the ‗ethnic 
enclaves‘ concept that was mentioned earlier and that the communities within 
which the BACEs operate are prone to business failures by virtue of closed 
business markets. It was also suggested that it could be that the business sectors 
occupied by the group are risky ventures and are less favoured by the ‗supply 
side‘ – the High Street banks. Subsequently, their lower propensity to access 
start-up and growth finance contribute to poor performance due to 'under 
capitalisation' (Jones et. al., 1994).   
2.3.7.1 Ethnic Enclaves 
For the purpose of this research, ‗ethnic enclaves‘ refer to concentrations of 
ethnic minority immigrants in specific communities. This can lead to the 
marginalisation of these ethnic businesses if they are unable to reach the larger 
markets needed for business growth. The ‗enclaves‘ that arise from these 
communities make some businesses ‗risky‘ because of their marginalisation and 
other associated factors such as language proficiency (Beckhusen et al. 2012); 
poverty and ethnicity (Garner & Bhattacharyya, 2011) and dynamics of 
‗personal networks‘ (IEF Paper, 2011).  The creation of ethnic enclaves in itself is 
inherently characterised by factors that make them prone to business failures, 
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largely because of marginalisation (Basu & Altinay, 2002). The ethnic enclave 
phenomenon exists virtually everywhere ‗immigrants‘ flock together. The 
American perspective has a laissez-faire attitude towards assimilation and 
language acquisition. The U.S government does little to provide immigrants 
with assistance in learning the new culture or to speak and write English 
proficiently. 
A common language facilitates social interaction or ‗trade‘ in Lazear‘s (1999) 
terms. For immigrants, the ability to speak the language of their host country 
enables them to communicate with the majority of the population, thereby 
lowering ‗information barriers‘, consequently assisting integration into the new 
country. Thus, not surprisingly, many immigrants move close to their own 
countrymen (Bauer et al., (2005); Gross & Schmitt, 2003) in order to take 
advantage of the informal networks of friends, relatives and acquaintances and 
thereby become part of the ‗ethnic enclave‘. 
Entrepreneurs are embedded in the network of social relationships which 
enables them to acquire the resources and information from the external 
environment (outside the enclaves/ethnic flocks). The embeddedness of 
entrepreneurs in the network of social relationships is of importance not only 
for entrepreneurs in general but for ethnic minority entrepreneurs in particular. 
The social embeddedness framework asserts that the ‗‘study of economic 
activity must include the analysis of social context within which economic 
actions occur‘‘ (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997, 1999). 
2.3.8 Customer & Market Profiling of BACEs  
It has been established that it is quite important to recognise the demographic 
characteristics of BACEs – geographic location, of customers, their ethnicity and 
type. The Focus Central London, Training and Enterprise Council study of 
BACEs in Lambeth and Southwark in 1999 provided detailed demographic 
profiles of BACEs in two select inner-city boroughs of London. The research 
suggested that over two thirds of the customer base were local (from within the 
Borough) and that this is much higher than other research on London 
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businesses. The research indicated that BACEs were more reliant on customers 
from their own ethnic background compared with ethnic minority businesses in 
other surveys (Bank of England, 1999, Basu & Altinay, 2002).  
 Firms in customer services, retail and manufacturing were particularly reliant 
on ethnic customers, in economic growth terms, these features show that it was 
inevitable that these groups could suffer negative scoping (in terms of scoring 
from loan application points system) which does not favour growth and 
diversification into creative and professional businesses. In other words, the 
high dependence on local markets does not bode well for growth (BBA, 2000). 
A Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) supported project (2011) looked at the link 
between place, poverty and ethnicity in England. The resulting paper analyses 
ways in which location impacts on the relationships between patterns of poverty 
and ethnic groups in terms of employment, clustering and residential 
segregation. A reflection on this literature points out key points in the debate 
about the spatial concentration of minority ethnic groups and the impact of this 
concentration on experiences of poverty. The JRF paper also extends the debate 
and considers possible implications for spaces of poverty characterised by 
‗concentrations‘ of majority ethnic groups. The discussion of poverty, ethnicity 
and ethnic enclaves are necessary to move away from analysis that posits 
vulnerability to poverty as arising from ethnic identity or culture. The inclusion 
of a consideration of ‗ethnic enclave‘ allows an analysis that considers the lived 
context of ethnicity which offers an assessment of the resources and barriers 
available to an ethnic group in particular locations. 
The highest concentration of poverty is in inner-city urban areas (although as 
Milbourne, 2010) points out, around one in five poor people live in rural areas). 
Hills et al., (2010) conclude that lower level incomes across the board are quite 
stable; it is the growing discrepancy between lower and higher incomes – with 
strong regional variations – that is noticeable. Unsurprisingly, that report finds 
that the socio-economic group is the primary index of deprivation. Therefore, 
the potential market place for BACEs would be limited in terms of the ‗earning 
potential‘ and the disposable income. This position also means that 
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microbusinesses that service these groups invariably suffer cash-flows and make 
access to finance a problem. Dependence on ethnic markets that are inherently 
characteristic of higher than average poverty levels (Kintrea et al., 2008) can 
signify business failure for entrepreneurs depending solely on these 
communities. 
There has been a longstanding concern that minority enterprises are overly 
concentrated in a small number of business sectors – often in highly competitive 
and crowded markets such as restaurants and small-scale retail or personal 
services targeting minority clients, such as hairdressers and beauty shops. As 
well as operating in highly competitive and precarious markets, these 
enterprises have tended to cluster in labour-intensive and low-profit areas of 
activity (Ram & Jones, 1998; Smallbone, et al., 2007)  
2.3.9 BACE Skills Acquisition  
The experiences that business owners have before starting their businesses is 
believed to have an important influence on the types of activities they 
undertake, their survival rates and growth potential. Research (Castells, 2000) 
suggests that individuals who have been employed in high skill or technical 
areas, and who have developed a set of skills, which could be subsequently 
utilised in self-employment context, have a good chance of success. Aldrich et 
al., (1984) and Jones, (1992), support this claim by relating the probable success 
rates of BACEs accessing finance to human capital and personal resources. For 
example, one theory supports the fact that, some experiences and aspiration of 
particular BACEs who were born and raised in Britain had a relatively greater 
success than those who were first generation immigrants (Ram, 1998) – meaning 
those BACEs who were not  born nor raised here in England and would not 
have a verifiable educational track record. It is believed that acquiring complete 
fluency in English Language obviates communication barriers, whilst the 
second-generation BACEs also enjoy the opportunity to acquire recognized 
educational qualifications.   
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The general opinion is that BACEs generally have adequate management and or 
higher qualifications, but these skills are often seen not to influence decisions on 
loans applications because they are irrelevant from the points of view of loans 
assessments which are often centralised and do not capture or record 
qualifications (and other personal attributes) of the applicant.  Interestingly, 
other research (Smallbone and Fadahunsi, 1998) suggests that there is still room 
for those business owners not from the second and third generations to acquire 
contemporary business skills which might enhance their business case 
presentations. They concluded that ‗education in terms of business skills has a 
relationship with entrepreneurial behaviour particularly for those owner 
managers with a foreign education.   
They acknowledged the importance of education and financial/business skills 
which can contribute towards understanding the UK market in terms of 
borrowing, market segmentation and advice seeking practices. Fraser (2005), on 
the other hand, suggest that there is evidence based on quantitative data that 
other control groups, such as similar white entrepreneurs which had relatively 
lower qualifications still experienced successes in accessing finance. The Bank of 
England study (BoE, 2002) looked closely at these issues and used other indices 
to explain the impact of business loan refusal of BACEs such as collaterals and 
credit ratings as more significant factors.    
2.3.10 Economic Activities of BACEs  
Research suggests that ethnic minorities tend to concentrate their activities in 
particular economic sectors (Curran & Blackburn, 1993). For example, Afro 
Caribbean business owners are thought to concentrate their activities in retail 
and consumer services with fewer in business and professional services. One of 
the logical explanations of why BACEs congregate their businesses in 
‘traditional sectors‘ is as a result of local demand and supply needs for local 
communities with high ethnic population. Individual ethnic groups have 
particular tastes, for example, in relation to foods and clothing. However, some 
of the reported problems for businesses, which mainly serve BACE 
communities, are that they are constrained by the size and affluence of the 
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market. (BBA, 2002) For example, Lambeth and Southwark are both 
characterised as relatively deprived boroughs with high levels of 
unemployment.  
Ram and Deakins (1995) in their study suggested that there is a projected ‗break-
out‘ into regional/national mainstream markets which will depend, for 
example, on the marketing approaches adopted by the BACEs.   
Creative industry activities, are more likely to be undertaken by women and 
some research (Hasluck et, al. 1997) reports that some women BACEs 
experienced relatively higher successes accessing start-up and growth debt 
finance than their male cohorts (FOCUS, 1999). This interesting finding appears 
to support some of the alternative explanations offered by the lending banks 
that decisions on business loans applications were purely business decisions 
and not discrimination.  
In subsequent sections, the reasoning and practices of lenders are explored in 
some detail and these are compared to some of the attitudinal factors associated 
with some BACEs – for example, some claim or allege that they suffered 
discriminations if they were unable to secure finance. On the contrary, the banks 
claim that decisions on loan applications are purely economic decisions and do 
not consider the business owners‘ characteristics. The debate is on-going and is 
a subject of further research to look at other conditions guiding business loans 
applications apart from economic factors.   
 
2.3.11 Perceived Barriers of Accessing External Finance  
The debate about ‗perception‘ versus ‗reality‘ is an on-going one and various 
schools of thought are emerging. There are different and contrasting definitions 
of perception from the supply and demand sides. Wyer et al. (2007) adopted 
advanced ‗cognitive observations‘ to define ‗perception‘. They looked at a 
variety of perspectives and behaviour examinations to evaluate how people 
think or perceive events. They developed a number of theoretical models to 
reflect the characteristics of social cognition. The scope of the pilot study already 
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completed looked at cognitive behaviours of BACEs to a small extent, but this 
research seeks to further explore social cognitive behaviour to improve upon 
existing knowledge. Wyer et al., (2007) suggest that adaptations of social 
cognitive characteristics are extremely beneficial to the debate of perception 
(Wyer, 2007:6).   
Generally it is noted that perception is a subjective determinant of the individual 
and cannot be regarded as prima facie evidence of discrimination (Jones, 1998). A 
few studies (Wyer 2007 et al., Fraser, 2005) gave some insights about perceptions 
and/or attitudes of some SMEs concerning accessing external finance (Fraser, 
2008; 2009). In some of these studies, notably, Fraser (2009); Kon & Storey, 
(2003); referred to those entrepreneurs who decide not to apply for loans in the 
first place, despite having viable business plans, because they believe they will 
be turned down by the bank. The concept is referred to as a ‗discouraged 
borrower effect‘ (DBE).  Fraser suggested that DBE existed because there are 
costs associated with making loans applications and banks may make errors 
when processing applications, due to information asymmetries, such that viable 
businesses may be turned down (Kon & Storey, 2003).   
The knowledge about this concept is explained in many other researches and 
described as an effect of perception or misperception. In fact, some empirical 
studies indicate that incidences of discouragement are more prevalent than the 
actual loan refusals (Levenson & Willard, 2000). This suggests that the DBE may 
be a greater concern for financial constraints amongst small firms in general and 
most certainly, a bigger issue for BACEs due to other ‗attitudinal tendencies‘ 
such as feelings of ‗defeatism‘ usually associated with ‗business failures‘. 
Available literature mostly generalise the SME groups, but very little is 
evidenced within BACEs particularly. Apart from the perception issues, several 
other factors may exist and the investigation of these forms part of the main 
research goals for this study.  There is a possibility that some individual BACEs 
who allege discrimination may be using these claims of discrimination as a 
‗justification‘ for their own entrepreneurial shortcomings.  
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Raising finance for business start-up and or growth has been reported by many 
researches as a common problem for small firms regardless of the ethnic 
orientation of the business owners. However, there is a consensus across the 
board that Black Africans and Black Caribbean‘s experience the greatest 
problems raising start-up finance, whereas Asians experienced the least, 
Stanworth & Gray (1991); BoE, (1999). An alternative explanation for this is that 
other EMB groups – Asian entrepreneurs record more success in accessing 
finance because they have a stronger social network and use informal sources of 
finance (friends, family, co-operative funds etc.).   
Stanworth & Gray (1991) explored the correlation between the sizes of different 
BACEs in comparison to other EMBs and establish the positive relationships in 
the sense that larger businesses with 10 or more employees were less likely to 
have experienced problems accessing growth finance than businesses with 1-9 
employees (which is predominant among BACEs) accessing start-up finance. 
This suggests that the banks are more willing to lend to the former, perhaps, 
because their financial requirements are less risky and have a much better 
verifiable financial track record. The difficulties experienced by BACEs have 
been linked to the knowledge and interrelationship workings between the 
commercial banks and the demand side. It is useful to note, that, larger 
businesses would have a better chance accessing external finance anyway, 
irrespective of ethnic orientation of its owner manager. The study into finance 
issues in the ethnic minority owned businesses in the UK by Smallbone et al., 
(2001) for the British Bankers Association is one of the pioneering studies into 
the issues concerning BACEs, because the study looked at BACEs particularly, 
in contrast to similar studies which looked at the wider SMEs Some alternative 
explanations are looked at in the next subsection.  
2.3.12 Alternative Explanations for 'Disadvantage Variation'  
One of the UK pioneering studies (Flap et al., 1999) focused on the social capital 
tendencies unique to BACEs), the BBA report (provider perspectives), the Bank 
of England special report, (2000) have all come up with  explanations about 
some of the ‗real‘ issues which put EMBs at a disadvantage, some of these have 
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been discussed so far.  Other aspects suggests that BACE networks were less 
developed (Curran et al., 1993) and subsequently more difficult for EMB bank 
managers to connect with these groups.   
A proposition was suggested in Basu (1991), that one of the key issues may be 
the lack of links for the supply side (the lenders) to access BACEs and 
subsequently, there is an ‗insufficient knowledge‘ about the issues faced by 
these groups – BACEs. The study also highlights the importance of social 
networks to links with providers. It has been reported (Fraser, 2004) that other 
EMB categories – Asians particularly are known to have stronger community 
links than BACEs.  The UK survey (2004) reported by Fraser provides clearer 
evidence of the extent of abundance of small business network links such as the 
ethnic minority business forum and small business services, these are a few of 
the nationally recognised support providers to BACEs. These support providers 
were specifically established to oversee strategies and stimulate interaction 
between the supply and demand sides.  
However, the gap here is the lack of a ‗holistic database‘ of the EMBs and 
therefore there are no real systemic framework to provide the desired links for 
EMBs to access the providers of business finance and for the providers to 
integrate and develop appropriate framework to positively redress the 
perceived imbalance in accessing business finance. Again, this is a case for 
further research being considered at this juncture.   
 2.3.13 Summary - Demand Side  
The reasons why BACEs face disproportionate problems accessing debt finance 
are not clear-cut, based on literature. The term ‗disproportionate‘ is used within 
the context of this study as the relative degree of barriers experienced by BACEs 
compared to similar EMBs, with similar features in the UK.   The use of 
qualitative methodology (as opposed to the predominant quantitative methods 
used in many research in this subject area) and the way three ‗principal agents‘ – 
the demand side, the supply and intermediaries were studied concurrently is a 
unique approach and a key feature of this research. Therefore this study is 
uniquely positioned to explore the behaviours and human capacity attainment 
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(in terms of relevant qualification and experiences) of BACEs and how these 
factors influence their ability to accessing business finance from formal sources.   
A number of studies (some already referenced in this chapter) suggest that one 
of the reasons why BACEs experience disproportionate barriers is because they 
have little knowledge of the finance options, processes and financial decisions 
made by the lenders (High Street banks) involved. More specifically, BACEs are 
unaware of the routes and prerequisites that have to be satisfied to obtain bank 
finance. Case studies (Fraser 2005, 2008) of BACEs with higher qualifications 
and entrepreneurial high achievement were seemingly experiencing greater 
successes accessing finance than many of their immigrant predecessors who 
entered self-employment under-resourced and pressured.   
2.4 Banks (Supply-Side)  
2.4.1 Introduction  
 The supply side for the purpose of this research refers to the providers of 
business finance, particularly the High Street banks referred to generally as 
‗formal sources‘ of finance though this will include a range of other sources.  
One of the objectives of this research is to explore and critically evaluate the 
existing ‗knowledge‘ and ‗practices‘ of the banks concerning BACEs in relation 
to start-up and growth finance. To do this, literature based on interviews with 
bank managers forms a key source of gathering information. The most 
contemporary piece of work in investigating and exploring the attitudes, and 
practices of commercial banks was undertaken by the British Bankers 
Association (2002).   
There is limited literature explaining how much knowledge the banking sector 
has about BACEs in particular, although, there is plentiful literature available 
about SMEs and EMBs as a whole. The problem about this is that, 
generalizations made about SMEs and EMBs could mask the actual issues 
relating to BACEs specifically.  This section looks at providers of finance, the 
relationships with BACEs, perception and opinion of commercial banks relating 
to BACEs, explanations for business failure from a provider perspective and 
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other issues explaining why and what criteria the banks use in administering 
business loan applications.  
2.4.2 Sources of Business Finance   
The literature has indicated that BACEs predominantly use their own savings; 
one in five business owners‘ accessed funds through family and only one in five 
used a bank loan whilst just only one in ten had a bank overdraft (Curran et al. 
1993). The report findings were based on surveyed ethnic enterprises (including 
Black African and Caribbean owner managers) from two localities to offer a 
responsive and fair degree of representativeness.   
The survey sample focused on the wider ethnic minority enterprises, comparing 
some of the Asian groups with African-Caribbean enterprises. In their (Curran 
et al., 1993) research, there were findings which raised concerns of institutional 
discriminations and negative stereotyping. Institutional discrimination (ID), for 
the purpose of this study is concerned with alleged discrimination that is 
seemingly incorporated into the structures, processes and procedures of 
financial lending by High Street banks, either because of prejudice or because of 
failure to take into account the particular needs of the different social identities.   
In general definition, and more specific to this discussion, the key feature which 
distinguishes ‗institutional discrimination‘ from other random individual forms 
of discrimination is triggered by social identity (like the BACEs, a specific 
category of the EMB group): the ID impacts on groups or the individual 
entrepreneurs because they are members of that group. The mention of ‗ethnic 
enclaves‘ earlier supports this, the issue in this case is that ‗attitudes‘ tend to 
influence the perceptions of ID rather than an actual occurrence of ID.  
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Table 1: Sources of start-up finance (%) – over a 12 month period  
  
Table 1: Sources of start-up finance (%) – over a 12 month period   
  Own  
savings  
Family  
Loan  
Friend  
Loan  
Bank Loan Bank  
Overdraft  
Other  N=  
Black British  82.1  17.9  14.3  25.0  3.6  25.0  28  
Black  
Caribbean  
94.0  16.0  4.0  16.0  10.0  9.8  50  
Black African 76.4  26.4  18.1  18.1  9.7  14.1  72  
Asian  66.1  21.0  11.3  29.0  11.3  20.4  62  
Other  93.8  12.5  -  25.0  12.5  13.3  16  
Total  81.0  18.6  12.6  21.6  12.0  16.8  168  
     Adapted from Ram, M & Deakins, D (1995)   
(African-Caribbean Entrepreneurs in Britain, University of Central England, Birmingham)  
  
Table 1 gives a summary of sources of start-up finance used by BACEs over a 12 
month period in a 1995 study by Ram and Deakins. It shows that 81% of start-up 
finance sources for firms studied were predominantly internal sources (savings) 
whilst only 21% (of the firms studied) used a bank loan. It is worth pointing out 
that lower proportions of BACEs accessed bank loans (Table 1). Other research has 
replicated these findings (BBA 2002; BOE 2004; Fraser 2007); in a BBA 2000 survey 
of owner managers of EMBs, 1053 firms were surveyed, and only 21% obtained 
bank finance over a 12 month period.   
One of the explanations for this was attributed to the fact that BACEs do not 
access debt finance due to their perceptions of discrimination. This view is 
supported by Ram et al., (2003), he suggested that in the case of African 
Caribbean, the benefit of doubt is even less in evidence, where negative 
experiences with mainstream financial institutions consistently reported ever 
since Ward and Reeves‘ (1980) initial report on the question. Curran and 
Blackburn, (1993), in their work took an optimistic view, that the suspicion of 
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discriminations might be explained in purely technical terms with reference to 
‗business problems‘.   
However, Fraser (2008) refutes this notion, backed with empirical evidence.  He 
referred to a large scale survey of UK small business finances (UKSMEF, 2004) 
which inferred that, there was no discrimination in credit markets. However, 
ethnicity appeared to influence whether business owners felt discouraged from 
applying for loans even after controlling for differences in loan application costs 
and risks. This suggests that some ethnic groups may be affected by 
misperceptions of ethnic discrimination. The arguments of the lenders themselves 
were two folds: firstly, if BACEs do not approach the banks, it would be 
impossible to claim discrimination practices, secondly, it was believed that the 
decisions made about business loan applications were purely business reasons 
and risk indices were used. BACEs were congregated in riskier business sectors, 
such as retail and localized services.   
A number of other explanations were also provided in some reports, which are 
looked at separately in subsequent sections of this review. Interestingly, some 
comparisons with other EMB categories in a number of studies already reported 
in the previous sections confirmed that a bank loan was the most sought after 
source of start-up finance. Jones et al (1994) reported that EMBs demonstrated a 
similar propensity to have successfully accessed bank finance at start-up 
compared to similar white-owned firms. At the same time, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi-owned businesses have similar propensities to access bank finance. 
The Indian owned businesses show a slightly higher tendency to do so. However 
these findings mask the experiences of BACEs. In other words, the 
disproportionate barriers reportedly experienced by BACEs appear to be lost in 
the wider scheme of reporting findings about EMBs in general. Since the 1995 
study of the African Caribbean Business finance source profile, there has not been 
a similar study which has shown a significant difference in the sources sought by 
BACEs.   
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2.4.3 Alternative Funding  
From the BACE point of view, there are limited alternative funding sources 
explored apart from internal sources as discussed in 4.1 above. The usual 
sources of finance peculiar to BACEs are savings, loans from friends and family 
and consortia contributions. Studies in the United States and Britain have 
explored a number of untapped sources of business finance. One of the key 
sources of alternative finance in the United States is the range of Community 
Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs). In Britain, CDFIs are still in their 
infancy in many cases; this initiative has considerable potential for improving 
alternative source for BACEs. Community development finance institutions 
(CDFIs) lend money to businesses and people who struggle to get finance from 
High Street banks. They are social enterprises that invest in customers and 
communities.   
The initiative creates jobs and help businesses to start and grow. There are 
currently around 60 CDFIs supporting customers in all regions of the UK, but 
there are no reliable records of the utilization of these initiatives by BACEs.  In 
2012, the UK business secretary launched a £60 Million CDFI to boost lending 
amongst small businesses. The fund is enabling CDFIs to increase their lending 
to SMEs, micro and social enterprises across England. It was expected to create 
more than 7,800 jobs in the subsequent six years. The CDFI programs was 
designed to get finance to the small and micro enterprises that couldn‘t access 
bank finance, but can play a key role providing jobs, services, growth and 
prosperity for the local economy. The fund is unique in its achievement of 
financial and social benefits: generating local wealth, reducing welfare 
expenditure, breathing life into deprived and often fragmented communities 
and improving well-being.   
 However, there is an even greater emphasis on the effectiveness of business 
support framework for BACEs, which is looked at separately in subsequent 
sections of this review. Other sources of finance untapped by these BACEs 
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include invoice finance, such as factoring and invoice discounting which has 
become more common for short-term finance for small businesses (Ekanem,  
2002).   
Some studies (Business Link, 2000; Barrett, 1999) found no significant evidence 
to suggest that EMBs do not access debt finance from commercial banks. 
Participation and access is likely to depend on the relationship with bank 
managers. The challenge for lending banks is that they have few links with 
BACEs, therefore a knowledge gap also exist from the Banks perspective.   
2.4.4 Lending Practices of Commercial Banks  
The concentration of the majority of BACEs in certain sectors has been 
highlighted as a possible issue in relation to the banks‘ decision-making 
processes.  The Bank of England (2001) survey drew attention to the importance 
of sector concentration for some EMB groups; the survey suggested that EMBs 
in particular sectors (non-traditional – such as professional services) had a 
higher propensity to access bank finance at start up. A number of technical 
appraisals (loan application evaluation) are adopted by banks in assessing loan 
applications. This is a centralized decision-making process. In some cases, the 
banks have a centralized credit risk and centralized decision-making. In other 
cases, the banks operate with local autonomy that allows decision making to be 
carried out locally by the branch manager.   
The danger for this however, is the lack of a centralized, auditable monitoring, 
which can give room for personnel judgment and stigmatization. However, the 
Bank of England in a number of reports (2000, 2001) indicate that the retention 
of localized decision-making allows greater flexibility and offers the potential 
for individual managers to use their local knowledge of a sector. In practice, it 
can be argued that the localized framework of decision-making autonomy can 
be biased if the individual manager has limited local knowledge of BACEs and 
ethnic minority communities. An understanding of varying cultures and the 
ways by which policy guidelines are applied can influence the decision-making 
process of a BACE loan application.  
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2.4.5 Impact of Loan Processing Framework  
The importance of sector concentration of BACEs cannot be underestimated as 
this forms a key criterion for business loan application. At policy level, specific 
strategies are applied by the lending banks referred to as technical appraisals i.e. 
technology aided processing of loan applications (LDA, 2005). This concept 
refers to finance providers which employed several econometric variables for 
processing of loans applications; such as for allocating and pricing loans, with 
the purpose of reducing information asymmetries and improving the efficiency 
of small business credit markets.   
These technologies are broadly in two forms: transactions and relationship 
lending (Berger & Udell, 2002).   Transaction lending relies on the gathering and 
processing of ‗hard‘ data about the entrepreneur or the ability or the availability 
of collateral (asset based lending). Relationship lending, on the other hand, 
relies on ‗soft‘ information, such as the character and trustworthiness of the 
entrepreneur, which is gathered over time through a relationship between the 
entrepreneur and a loan officer at the bank (Berger & Udell, 2002). In general, 
many High Street banks apply standardised assessments of loans application in 
compliance with the financial regulatory terms of reference, although slight 
discretions may apply to certain business proposals which do not fall into a 
clear framework of assessment – such as businesses with technical details.  
 In some cases, the retail sector could be difficult to assess for lending banks due 
to the risky nature of the business and therefore BACEs that have high 
concentrations in these sectors are particularly disadvantaged. Research 
(Blanchflower et al., 2003), has suggested that lending banks have to make 
economic decisions, but BACEs operating in traditional business sectors may be 
on the receiving end; as such economic assessments identify some of these 
businesses as ‗risky‘. The business owner managers do perceive unsuccessful 
chances of accessing debt finance as discrimination. The debate about the 
practices and judging criteria adopted by lending banks is an important one, the 
balance between risk management and bankable business proposals needs 
further debate.  However, the London Development Agency (LDA, 2005) 
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suggests that commercial banks should have a more flexible framework and 
quota setting in relation to the disadvantaged groups.   
2.4.6 Collateral Requirements & Credit Scoring  
According to the Bank of England (BoE, 1999; Blanchflower et al., 2003), most 
commercial banks claimed to have been moving away from requiring security 
for lower levels of lending. Up to £35,000 is a usual value for which security was 
not required, but this has somewhat reduced since the credit crunch, loans as 
low as £25,000 now require collateral.  However, discretionary levels vary across 
banks and the decentralization of decision-making discussed earlier poses a 
problem for subjectivity of the assessing bank manager. With start-up loan 
applications, a number of banks admitted that security requirements were ‗more 
likely‘ for new business customers (Berger et al., 2005).  
 The subject of credit scoring has far reaching implications for BACEs. Credit 
scoring is a form of transaction lending which has grown in importance for 
micro business lending since the mid-1990s (Allen et al, 2004). Credit scoring 
involves the development of statistical models, using large samples of data on 
past borrowers, to predict the probability of default. Applicants‘ data can be fed 
later into the model to arrive at a credit score which then forms the basis for 
lending decisions. The application of a blanket scoring system indirectly and 
unwittingly creates an uneven field for BACEs as they fall within the small 
business bracket. Credit scoring has a long history in consumer lending but its 
application to small business loans is relatively recent. Fraser (2008) noted that 
the limited data availability of small businesses (not just BACEs) points to poor 
predictive power of the credit scoring system.   
 Fraser also reported, in support of Rutherford‘s  (1995) assertions, that the key 
innovation was by Fair Isaac and Company (FICO) in the 1990s, who noted that 
personal information about the small business owner (e.g., income, personal 
assets, home ownership, outstanding debts and previous loan defaults) is highly 
predictive of the entrepreneur‘s repayment likelihood. The fact that anti-
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discrimination legislation prohibits the use of data on the applicant‘s gender, 
race or religion to determine credit scores is a critical point.  
The ‗soft data‘ absence referred to in the earlier discussion is important and 
relates to parts of the focus of this study where the behaviour of the 
entrepreneur is being explored. Equally, behavioural scoring models are 
strongly associated with ethnicity (Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007).  
The salient factors that emerge in the available literature suggest that there are a 
number of factors that influence the practice of individual managers. These 
include: knowledge he/she has of local BACEs and ethnic minority 
communities in general; understanding of different ethnic minority cultures and 
the way policy guidelines are applied.   
2.4.6.1 Relationship Lending      
Under relationship lending, loan decisions are based on proprietary information 
about the firm owner that is gathered over time through the entrepreneur‘s 
various dealing with the finance provider. In contrast to transactions lending, 
relationships can produce soft information e.g., about the character and 
reliability of the business owner, which may be a useful complement or 
substitute where hard data is sparse or missing.   
Han et al., (2008) identified two key types of relationship lending dimensions; 
duration and concentration. Over time finance providers are able to accumulate 
information about the capacity and reliability of the entrepreneur in meeting its 
financial obligations (e.g., through the repayment history on previous loans or 
bank account performance). Equally, relationships which are concentrated in a 
single finance provider, which supplies the firm with several products at the 
same time, increases the precision and rate of flow of information to the finance 
provider. Han (2008) indicates that concentration also generates stronger 
incentives for finance providers to invest in relationships. Relationship lending 
improves the availability of finance by reducing information gaps/lending costs 
(Fraser (2007, 2008) depending on the degree of competition in the credit 
market. This concept was explained by Rajan (1992) when he compared this to 
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information monopoly which allows the finance provider to extract rents from 
the relationship so that borrowing costs may not fall as much as lending costs.   
Empirical research (Petersen & Rajan, 1994) suggests that longer and more 
concentrated banking relationships increase the availability of finance, lowers 
interest rates and reduce collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995). Since 
relationship lending relies on the development of close ties between a loan 
officer, acting as the finance provider‘s agent, and the small business owner, it 
can be argued that the ‗human element‘, increases the likelihood of BACE 
successfully accessing finance compared with instances where arm‘s length 
scoring methods are employed (Cavalluzzo et al, 2002; Blanchflower et al, 2003). 
The advent of ‗centralised assessment‘ of loan application further creates a 
challenge and loss of ‗soft‘ data (personal attributes of the owner manager) 
discussed earlier which might have enhanced the chances of the BACE to obtain 
external finance.  
 
2.4.6.2 Discouraged Borrowers  
Following on from the introduction of this concept earlier, it is necessary to 
expand further on its significance to BACEs. There has been increasing 
attention, amongst academics and policy makers, on small business owners who 
decide not to apply for finance in the first place, despite having viable business 
plans, because they believe they will be turned down by the finance provider. 
This was evidenced in the scoping aspect of this research earlier on. Many of the 
BACEs who had significant difficulties in securing bank finance in previous 
attempts did not try again. These individuals are known as discouraged 
borrowers (Kon and Storey, 2003). BACEs have been reported in many studies 
(Smallbone et al., 2003; Levenson & Willard, 2000; Han et al., 2008b) for not 
seeking external finance on the premise that they would be turned down.   
Two main reasons have been generally suggested for why discouraged 
borrowers exist; firstly there are costs (financial and non-financial) associated 
with making loans applications and secondly finance providers may make 
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errors when screening applications, due to misinformation or absence of it, such 
that viable and bankable business propositions may be denied finance, 
inadvertently creating a finance gap or what Willard & Levenson (2002) referred 
to as a financial constraint. On both sides of the Atlantic – research in the US 
(Cavalluzzo et al., 2002) and in the UK (Fraser, 2007) concurred that ethnic 
entrepreneurs are more susceptible to discouraged borrowings. Some of the 
reasons cited include; higher application costs due to non-ethnic factors such as 
inexperience, lack of financial skills, types of business. Other reasons include 
informed perceptions of actual ethnic discrimination or misperceptions of ethnic 
discrimination due to poor communication and /or information asymmetries 
between finance providers and BACEs.   
2.4.7 Information Asymmetry  
The subjects of finance gap and information asymmetry are important subjects 
for both the demand and provider sides. Lean & Tucker (2001) gave a detailed 
account of ‗finance gaps‘ as a result of information gaps or misinformation 
concerning to SMEs in general, some of the inferences can be attributed to issues 
relevant to BACEs. The study did not focus on BACEs specifically; rather it 
looked at the small business finance markets referred to as ‗micro finance‘. As 
early as 1931 (Cruickshank, 2000), with the publication of the Macmillan Report, 
suggested that a ‗finance gap‘ exist for small firms owing to their disadvantaged 
position in the market for bank finance.   
It is argued by many, Stiglitz & Weiss (1981); Berger & Udell, (2002), Allen et al., 
(2004); that the fundamental cause of this finance gap is the information 
asymmetry that exists between the provider and the demand side. External debt 
providers require information relating to the borrower‘s default risk in order to 
allocate debt finance. However, information in the market for small firms‘ credit 
may be imperfect and asymmetric with entrepreneurs being typically better 
informed about their chances of success or failure. This information gap exists 
because small firms are recognised as being less transparent with information 
than larger firms, and the explanation for this may be attributed to insufficient 
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track records and the collection of private information relating to the 
entrepreneur is costly (Boris & Wilko, 2007). In this context, credit rationing may 
arise where the finance provider is unable to verify the default risk rating of the 
firm; Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) theorise that this led to an adverse selection 
problem.  
 Fraser (2008) argued that under information asymmetries finance providers 
may require collateral on loans so that the entrepreneur bears the uncertainty of 
the venture.  Insofar as BACEs (findings of the pilot study, 2007) are less 
transparent with information than their counterparts in the other ethnic 
minority groups (many banks lack quality data on these groups because they 
operate in ethnic enclaves as earlier indicated), the problem of financial 
constraint may affect them disproportionately. It was suggested that the 
information gap has widened in recent years by further centralisation in bank 
lending decisions and the introduction of computerised business credit– scoring. 
This system tends to replace people with numbers, and therefore loses out on 
the soft data – personal attributes of the BACE, which might otherwise minimise 
the effect of information asymmetry.   
The theory which becomes evident through review of literature is that, ethnicity 
seems to play an insignificant role in the processing of business loan 
applications by the lending banks. However, specific factors – such as lack of 
credibility and good financial performance track record; mean some BACEs 
encounter greater problems meeting the eligibility criteria than others.  
Human capital characteristics and their relevance to information asymmetry 
have been featured as a focal point for discussion. There appears to be similar 
trends in reported literature (Putman, 1993) that acknowledge the human capital 
concept as a major factor in the survival and business success of specific groups; 
particularly within the immigrant population. Lean and Tucker (2001) argued 
that the fundamental cause of this ‗knowledge gap‘ may be attributed to the 
information asymmetry that exists between the supply and the demand of 
business finance. The review looked at the main consequences of information 
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asymmetry and how it affects the demand and supply side. UK literature tends 
to highlight the reported perceptions of BACEs with lesser emphasis of the 
deficiencies of the business loan processing by the finance industries, one of 
which is the recent centralization of business lending decisions in the UK.   
A survey (Lean and Tucker, 2001) of private enterprises showed that when 
commencing a business, most of the needed funds came from all kinds of 
savings and private lending, not bank loans. The UK experience of BACEs is 
that the ‗knowledge gap‘ and ‗underutilization of alternative sources of finance‘ 
(such as CFDI‘s) is a bigger problem.  In essence, the author suggests that whilst 
there is a disproportionate finance constraint affecting BACEs, the ‗knowledge 
gap‘ may suggest that BACEs do not identify and utilise alternative sources of 
finance adequately.  
Lean and Tucker (2001) describe the small firm as the agent of the finance 
provider, and as such, undertake to generate returns from its investment 
projects on behalf of the provider (the BACE in this case). What this implies 
therefore, is that, any failings or information gap that exists in that context not 
only affects the small business enterprise, but also affects the finance 
investment. In order to assess how wide the finance gap is, it is useful to look at, 
in some detail, the range and scope of finance providers. Finance providers for 
micro businesses range from Venture capitalists and High Street banks right 
through to soft loan and grant providers. However, as noted by Binks and 
Ennew (1996), the main source of external finance provided for small firms is 
bank finance. For the American situation, informal sources were the 
predominant source of finance in terms of success and accessibility (Putnam, 
2000).   
Finance gaps and its cause have been introduced earlier. The assumption is that 
information is distributed asymmetrically between the bank and the firm, but 
from the bank‘s perspective, it is argued that if incomplete information about 
the quality of the project and the management skills of the BACEs exist, the 
bank manager may unwittingly give rise to adverse selection. Meaning that, 
valid business proposals may be refused as a result of 
misinformation/incomplete information about the BACE owner manager 
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and/or the business case, and the possibility for invalid business case to be 
favoured.  
The pilot study (Babayemi, 2007) conducted suggested that some of the BACE 
owner managers interviewed failed to actualise their full potentials, i.e. not fully 
understanding the context in which the banks process loan applications. Some 
of the respondents interviewed did not understand why they needed to utilize 
professional services to develop a business plan. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) theory 
was further developed, emerging from a much earlier concept proposed by 
Altman (1968) by developing a matrix of risk which explains the ‗adverse 
selection‘ earlier mentioned.   
The Stiglitz & Weiss theory is characterised by ‗credit rationing‘ – in economic 
terms, the theory is based on ‗market imperfections‘ referred to ‗market 
equilibrium‘. This occurs when demand exceeds supply, forcing the cost of the 
loan to rise, decreasing demand and/or increasing supply until demand and 
supply are equated at an equilibrium price. In essence, the application of the 
theory to BACE borrowings means that where ‗demand‘ far outstrips ‗supply‘, 
‗rationing‘ becomes inevitable. Therefore banks granting loans are concerned 
with profitability and risk management. Because BACE businesses are largely 
‗risky‘ propositions mainly for those rooted in ‗ethnic enclaves‘ such as ‗retail ‗ 
businesses; adverse selection may arise as a result of the ‗residual imperfect 
information‘ existing.  
 The adverse selection aspects of interest rates are a possible consequence of 
different borrowers having different probabilities of repaying the loan. 
However, it is difficult to identify a ‗good borrower‘ from a ‗bad borrower‘, and 
to do this, the banks adopts a variety of ‗screening devices‘, resulting to riskier 
borrowers being the most affected.  
The information asymmetry problem may not only result in good lending 
prospects being rejected by providers, but also poor prospects being accepted by 
providers, as discussed earlier. Altman defined the latter as a Type 1 Error and 
the former as a Type II Error, illustrated in (fig. 1) below:  
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Figure 1: Risk Category Model   
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     Source: Altman, 1968  
         
Within the parameters of this research, qualitative data is the modest evidence 
used to examine and explain the relationship on the information gaps between 
the principal (Banks) and recipient (BACE). What the model suggests is that, in 
theory, the provider can reduce the risk of Type 1/2 Errors by carefully 
screening firms at the outset and monitoring projects during the life of the loan.  
The problem of information asymmetry and the resulting selection and moral 
hazard are further compounded by certain trends which are evident in the 
banking sector. Firstly, competition in the banking sector is leading to greater 
market concentration, takeovers and mergers. This has an important impact on 
the market for small firm finance as there is evidence that larger banks are less 
well placed to build close relationships with small business customers.   
  
The provider–recipient interaction (Fig.2) in the presence of information 
asymmetry is a useful tool that can explain the multidimensional perspectives 
and links between the demand-provider spheres of business finance. Figure two 
adopted from Lean and Tucker (2001) presents a model of principal (provider) 
and agent (demand) interaction, noting that the former focuses upon high street 
bank financing. It was argued that the centralization of the lending decision and 
greater reliance on computer credit scoring compound these problems for 
BACEs. The model cited in figure two has taken on a broader meaning; indeed, 
it often appears that the term is applicable to any type of non-bank finance 
 58  
  
(informal) provided to small firms. The significance and relevance of this model 
to the information asymmetry is that it highlights the complexity and frailty 
existing between the agents (provider – demand relationship). Therefore if there 
is a tilt in equilibrium on one side, in terms of information gap, there is 
definitely a resultant effect on the other side.   
  
Figure 2:  Information asymmetry in small firm lending (Lean & Tucker, 2001)  
2.4.8 Banking & Credit Facilities for BACEs  
The banking and financial services systems are highly regulated and the British 
Banking Association is an important source of data, ranging from legislation 
and regulation to annual reports, codes of practice and press cuttings. Providers 
of financial services of the kind with headquarters in the City of London were 
not traditionally interested in low income yielding businesses, migrant 
entrepreneurs or otherwise (OFT, 1998). Lack of access to a range of financial 
services has become part of the UK social exclusion agenda and the focus for 
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Government attention.  Moore (2000) criticized some of the business loans 
assessment framework, which did not collect data types that would avoid 
discriminatory practices, but offered some explanations of the situations 
described. Noticeably BACEs are (or have been) on the whole, disadvantaged 
because they appear to come from poorer backgrounds than their white 
counterparts.   
Moore (2000) refers to the social exclusion initiatives of the Government as 
commendable effort to redress inequality and create positive initiatives to 
provide level playing fields for disadvantaged groups. Moore‘s position was 
that bank‘s processing of loans applications should be flexible and responsive to 
the needs of ‗disadvantaged‘ groups. The other side of the argument – from the 
banks perspectives was that the financial services standards were not selective 
and therefore, banks were handicapped in the use of discretions. The use of 
routine, automated methods of sending out business and banking services mail-
shot, assessing insurance risks and credit worthiness all mean that inner city 
ethnic businesses with relatively low income (compared to white and non-ethnic 
businesses) are likely to be treated the same way. In other words, it is the 
‗actual‘ or ‗perceived‘ economic status of BACEs that explains their experiences 
of the financial services sector, not their ethnic orientation. (OFT, 1999)  
The OFT further suggests that the processes of assessing risk make it unlikely 
that ethnicity could be a factor. In other words, market rationality is built into 
the computer programmes and the exclusion of candidates for financial and 
banking services on the grounds of ‗race‘ or ethnic origin would be contrary to 
the profit-maximising strategies of High Street banks.  
2.4.9 Alleged Discriminatory Practices  
The last few sections discussed information asymmetry in some detail and the 
theories applicable to both the demand and provider sides were discussed, and 
there are other non-ethnic variables suggested in the literature. Cultural and 
language barriers are further obstacles identified in the Bank of England report 
(1999) affecting free flow of information. Information deficiencies/poor 
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communications are likely to make Ethnic Minority Businesses riskier to lenders 
(Smallbone et al., 2003) and worsen misconceptions amongst EMBs that they are 
being discriminated against.  
In a report commissioned by the Bank of England and published in 1998 it 
observed that:  
 Non-White businesses tended to be younger and smaller but more profitable and 
likely to export….pay significantly higher interest rates and have to yield higher 
levels of collaterals…and are… significantly more constrained by interest rates and 
in terms of credit available (Binks & Ennew, 1998; 30 – 31)  
The 1998 report contained only a small sub-sample of ethnic minority businesses 
and so in 1999 the Bank of England, as a result of more systematic enquiries 
published a report The Financing of Ethnic Minority Firms in the United Kingdom 
(Bank of England, 1999). The available data suggests a number of reasons why 
minority businesses experience greater difficulty in acquiring funds and pay 
higher interest. Because many BACEs - particularly those in ‗ethnic enclaves‘ are 
concentrated in activities with higher risks and possible failure rates, lenders 
view such businesses as riskier proposition to invest in. However, BACEs 
businesses perceived this as a discriminatory bias and that the banks could be 
directly or indirectly discriminative.   
The Bank of England, 1999 report indicated that the direct discriminatory 
perceptions could derive from prejudice against a particular group and indirect 
discrimination would be the outcome of making assumptions about owner 
managers of certain groups (for example, about their activity and collateral). The 
report suggested that both direct and indirect discrimination might exist; 
however, this was not on a wide scale.  
2.4.10 Policy Implication for lenders  
The BBA (2002) report gave an account of the experiences, attitudes and 
practices of commercial banks concerning BACEs. Qualitative interviews with 
selected lending banks revealed that there were no overall advantages or 
disadvantage for BACEs associated with centralized or localized decision 
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making on the parts of the banks considering them for financial assistance. The 
study did not conclude that there were particular benefits for BACEs with 
decision-making system. Rather, there were both advantages and disadvantages 
with both systems of decision –making.  
 The study did conclude, however, that the crucial difference, in determining 
such effects on BACEs, still depend on individual bank manager practice and 
knowledge of BACEs and their trading practices. The key problems reported by 
the banks are twofold: Firstly, those decisions on business loan applications 
were solely economic decisions, which employ a number of automated indices 
to measure risks and profitability.    
In practice, firms that do not have adequate collaterals, credit standing and 
strategic orientations, regardless of the ethnic background would be at a 
disadvantage accessing finance. On the other hand, the second main issue for 
the banks is the lack of knowledge and absence of data on the activities, success 
and economic sustainability for BACEs. For bank managers and loans 
application personnel, training and improved links with BACEs are areas that 
have not been effectively explored.  
2.4.11 Summary: Provider Side  
In summary, two key points can be made about reviewed literature on  
‗perceived‘ versus ‗actual‘ discrimination relating to ‗banks‘ dealings with 
BACEs. Firstly, from an economic point of view discrimination is irrational 
when it leads to loss of profit. Such discrimination is explained in ‗rational‘ 
economic terms – a calculation of risk, correct or mistaken. This is not a well-
founded assertion to make without very substantial supporting evidence.   
Secondly, the policies of the financial institutions are likely to be written in 
terms of the law, official regulations and codes of practice regulating their 
activity. Until regulatory bodies of the banking and financial sectors adopt 
codes of practice on discrimination that generate monitoring data, research in 
this field will have to use interactive and more qualitative field work techniques 
of sociology, anthropology and social policy to investigate practices amongst the 
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supply side and to explain the impact on the demand side. These data will not 
be found in company files or in any convenient library in mainland Europe (or 
anywhere else). The challenge in engaging the lending banks in the face of 
confidentiality of information is immense.  
2.5 Intermediary: Business Support  
2.5.1 Introduction  
This section considers the support needs of BACEs and how effective the 
existing statutory and voluntary sector support providers are in offering 
appropriate support and advice. One of the main research objectives for this 
study is to ascertain the effective relationships between BACEs and support 
providers and to discern their attitudes, practices and experiences towards 
current business support provisions. Research (Dhaliwal, 2006; Scott & Irwin, 
2009) found different attitudes and levels of utilisation of business support 
across the different ethnic minority entrepreneurs with the African Caribbean 
communities being the most positive towards many business initiatives. Other 
categories of the EMB groups, such as the Asian Entrepreneurs have forged a 
better relationship with banks and these group record higher success rates 
accessing debt finance and other external financial services than the BACE 
groups.   
It is unclear from the literature whether the reason for the success rates recorded 
by Asian entrepreneurs is attributed to a better business support system. 
However, Dhaliwal (2006) suggests that South Asian businesses tended to rely 
more on informal support networks and maximise the benefits of social capital. 
Some of the argument is that the business support for BACEs are less 
established, underutilised or largely does not meet specific needs based on the 
unique characteristics of the group in terms of cultural orientation.   
Earlier research shows that, the response of ethnic minority businesses to 
support providers is generally perceived to be low for BACEs. (Marlow, 1992; 
Smallbone & Fadahunsi, 1998). But fairly recent research (Dhaliwal, 2006; Ram  
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& Smallbone, 2003; Deakins et al., 2002) have noticed an increased positive 
response to utilisation of formal business support. The reasons for this shift in 
trend can be attributed to the efficacies of policy development.  
2.5.2 Context for Business Support Usage  
Smallbone and Fadahunsi in a preliminary analysis of small Nigerian Firms in 
North London (1998), suggest that business owners‘ ‗support needs‘ are the 
needs for external resources such as information, advice, training and other 
assistance which will enable them to deal more effectively with business 
problems. The researchers also suggest that business owners have a ‗hierarchy‘ 
of support needs (based on Maslow‘s hierarchy of needs) which will determine; 
what they require, whom they require the services from, willingness to pay, and 
ability to use the support effectively.   
The hierarchy will also vary from firm to firm depending upon economic 
factors, business sector, location, business size and educational background and 
human capital of the owner-manager. Bryson et, al. also propose a theoretical 
logic that the notion of hierarchy of support needs relates to another theoretical 
contribution which considers small firms‘ networking activities and use of 
support providers (Bryson et, al. 1993). This approach suggests that businesses‘ 
network relations and use of support providers can be placed on a continuum 
ranging from ‗compulsory‘ to ‗voluntary‘.   
All firms, it is, argued, have compulsory relations with, for example, buyers and 
sellers, since without them they would not be in business. However, other 
external links with, for example, solicitors, and external support providers are 
more voluntary. This theoretical contribution is enhanced if it is recognized that 
what constitutes ‗compulsory‘ and ‘voluntary‘ relationships can vary according 
to firms‘ economic activity and current business condition. Concerning the 
latter, for example, it is suggested that in a time of crisis the advice of 
management consultants may be equally important as from a bank.   
Tables 2 and 3 below provide some representative data adapted from the first  
Ethnic Minority business survey ever conducted in Lambeth and Southwark  
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Table 2:  Use of selected external agencies for advice & support by BACEs in a 12 months 
Period (%s)  
  
Use of selected external agencies for advice & support by BACEs in a 12 months Period (%s)  
  Lambeth  Southwark  Total  
Accountant  85.3  75.2  80.3  
Bank Manager  55.2  41.3  47.6  
Business Colleague  42.2  24.8  33.6  
Solicitor  58.6  30.4  44.7  
Family  37.9  28.3  33.2  
Friends  20.0  15.9  18.0  
Trade Association  20.2  5.0  12.6  
Private Consultant  9.5  9.7  9.6  
N=  116  113  229  
 
         Source: Ethnic Minority Businesses in Lambeth & Southwark survey (CAG,  
        Consultants), 1999  
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     Table 3: Awareness & use of support providers in a 12 months period (%s)  
Awareness & use of support providers in a 12 months period (%s)   
  Lambeth  Southwark   Total  
  Aware  Used  Aware  Used  Aware  Used  
Business Link  37.9  11.2  26.5  0.9  32.2  6.1  
Council  39.7  6.0  38.9  0.9  40.0  3.5  
PYBT  31.0  1.7  30.1  5.3  30.0  3.5  
Chamber  16.4  3.4  23.0  3.5  20.4  3.5  
LSBS  18.1  3.4  14.2  2.7  17.0  3.1  
FOCUS TEC  9.5  1.7  17.7  1.8  13.9  1.7  
E. Enterprises  -  -  8.8  0.9  8.8  0.9  
Threshold  7.8  0.0  -  0.9  7.8  0.0  
Instant Muscle  5.2  0.0  -  -  5.2  0.0  
Total Support  -  19.0  -  12.4  -  15.7  
N=  116  116  113  113  229  229  
  
Source: Ethnic Minority Businesses in Lambeth & Southwark survey (CAG, Consultants), 1999  
2.5.3 Business Support Usage  
There is well documented low level of use of business support services applied 
in all sectors (including retail, health and professional services) and BACEs 
particularly used external training sources to a lesser extent than small 
businesses in general (CEEDR, 2001). Significantly, the low level of reported use 
of business support services by BACEs was not because of lack of awareness of 
the existence of mainstream business support; it‘s rather, the lack of 
understanding of the types of support available. There are some doubts about 
the relevance of what was offered, confusion about which providers can best 
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meet the firms specific needs, a lack of confidence and trust in those delivering 
support and a low level of willingness and ability to pay (CAG report, 1998). In 
another study, (Dhaliwal, 2006) evidence showed that there is increased usage 
of mainstream support provision relating to African Caribbean entrepreneurs 
but generally lower than their white counterparts. Some of the reasons stated 
were the obvious characteristics of microbusinesses irrespective of ethnic 
connotations – such as size; for example, problems resulting to this includes 
hiring workers, getting the right skills and retaining labour, lack of 
diversification (adverse effect of ethnic-enclaves) were all pertinent issues. Lack 
of time for anything other than the day to day running of the business was a 
major problem. So whilst open to outside business support, finding the time to 
accommodate it was a major challenge.    
Other misgivings about the support that is offered and confusion caused by the 
continued fragmentation of the support infrastructure and a failure of agencies 
to deliver ‗one-stop‘ support in practice (GLE/CEEDR, 2000) have been 
suggested as other reasons for the problems for BACE take up of business 
support from formal sources. There is also a general lack of understanding 
about the variety of available forms of support, as well as a lack of experience in 
dealing with support regimes. This is evidenced in the absence of a ‗robust 
intelligence‟ on Minority Ethnic Businesses and therefore, the lack of specialist 
support services and support advisers has been suggested to be a real gap in 
policy development (Smallbone, 2003)  
2.5.4 Business Support Needs of BACEs   
Many of the support needs of EMBs are similar to their white counterparts 
(CEEDR, 2007); there are also culturally specific issues that include language, 
religious and gender considerations. An issue that has been addressed in a small 
number of papers concerns the need for supplier diversity and increasing access 
of Black and ethnic minority business owners to procurement contracts (LABS, 
2007). Access to finance is the main barrier for BACEs and therefore, business 
support infrastructure should see this as its main support area.  However, 
research suggests that the problem is the poor take-up of the mainstream 
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support provision rather than the lack of it (Scott & Irwin, 2009). The more 
recent reporting and debate on the poor take up of external advice and finance 
by UK SMEs was conceptualised as a model of ‗discouraged advisees‘ (Fraser, 
2009). This means that micro business entrepreneurs, notably BACEs, by virtue 
of their shortcomings such as: ethnic disadvantages, human capital shortfalls 
and gender influences contribute to abstinence from using ‗trusted/formal‘ 
sources for business advice and support. In London, the existence of well-
established and relatively well-resourced specialist providers was a noticeable 
feature compared to other localities. This meant that the range and type of 
services offered was relatively diverse, with some agencies able to draw upon 
specific funding such as EU, SRB and other regional sources. Some of the more 
specific support needs (cultural, generational, gender, human capital 
shortcomings) documented concerning BACEs arise from lack of confidence 
amongst business owners (Dhaliwal, 2006; Scott & Irwin, 2009; Bennett, 2008). 
Other factors include cultural issues, effects of bureaucracy and prejudices.   
These factors warrant a more focused type of support rather than the generic 
support services available via mainstream support agencies, which are reported 
to be distanced from the realities of difficulties faced by BACEs. The impact of 
these gaps is a function of regulatory instruments, which is looked at in detail in 
the next section of this review.  Delivering business support to BACEs has not 
recorded encouraging successes in recent times; meaning take up is low.  
Evidence of this is supported by Business Link – the largest provider of business 
support to small firms. Business Link (web portal, 2010) report declared that a 
mere 3.4% of BACEs utilized support services based on their clients from areas 
of large ethnic populations in the UK; they stated that they were involved in 
specific initiatives targeted at BACEs. Even though, there has been a concerted 
effort to engage local community leaders, funding local enterprise Agencies, 
working with local authorities for Grants, Phoenix  
Fund, Business Clubs, women in business initiatives, working to increase access 
to sources of finance, and IT support. The outcome of these initiatives has not 
yet been evidenced and there is scope for further research in this area.  
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2.5.5 Gaps in Business Support for BACEs  
The needs of BACEs have not been met adequately by contemporary sources of 
business support. This is largely due to the varying and complex characteristics 
of these groups. As a result a more qualitative approach is desired in exploring 
the explanations for the gaps in support services take up, and the inadequate 
availability of specialist support providers for specific groups. This concept has 
a number of explanations and it is a function of the standpoint that is taken. 
From the demand side, the BACE owners themselves, it is claimed (SBS, 2000) 
that there is little awareness of the scope of support available and the lack of 
confidence to approach the support providers.  
The small Business Service statistical figures (2000 to 2005) recorded small take 
up of business support services by BACEs (SBS, Home Page – 
http://www.sbs.gov.uk). 
One possible explanation for this is likened to the cost of the services, 
particularly those in the private sectors whilst the public sector support services 
were relatively cheaper and in some instances completely free, or at least 
subsidised.   
Another reason for the underutilisation of the support services is attributed to 
the discouraged effects associated with BACEs, because a significant number of 
BACEs do not have faith in the use of business support for various reasons, 
including cost of professional support services; some of the support services do 
not meet the specific needs and it can be argued whether many support 
organizations are not actively involved in marketing their services to these 
BACEs. The lack of trust can be attributed to the fact that mainstream small 
business owners have a distrust of government funded organizations due to 
some of the reasons stated. At the very least, the government financed support 
services are considered bureaucratic and seen as antithesis of the flexible and 
informal style advocated by small business owners (Scase & Goffee, 1989).   
In summary, the problems for support providers in raising awareness and 
building trust amongst BACEs relates, to a large degree, issues about 
information and knowledge gaps existing concerning this group, the extent to 
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which they are prepared to immerse themselves in community issues, and a 
longer term commitment to developing a credible presence amongst BACEs.  
2.5.6 Policy & Strategy Intervention   
Ram and Smallbone (SBS, 2001) have provided a detailed overview of policy 
considerations impacting on EMBs with regards to access to finance. Although it 
is not a primary objective for this review to critically analyse impact of policy, a 
number of key themes have been identified as being crucial if there is to be a 
positive contribution to the body of knowledge. Identifying policy measures 
alone will not address the perceived problems faced by BACEs. Reference has 
been made to the problems associated with information asymmetry concerning 
BACEs. Fraser (2009) suggests that policy intervention should focus on tackling 
underlying financial delinquency, which seems to explain much of the ethnic 
variations in loans refusal rates.  Other areas desiring policy intervention 
focused at some of the underlying factors proven to predispose BACEs to 
experiencing higher barriers in accessing finance includes: lack of financial skills 
and advice; poor financial performance/credit history; and, ethnicity/cultural 
differences. Developing strategies and policy instruments to address cultural 
differences, the main reason for financial delinquency among BACEs, is a much 
difficult proposition.  
 Lean & Tucker (2001) also suggest that there is little justification for policy 
action with respect to the majority of small businesses, as there appear to be no 
significant debt finance gap. Those firms who might be characterised as micro 
start-ups owned by individuals who are socially excluded and, at the other 
extreme, small businesses with high growth-potential who may well be 
operating in the high-technology sector. For the former, a debt finance gap 
arguably exists. With respect to the latter, empirical evidence indicates that the 
under-provision of equity finance (risk capital) is the major issue (Lean & 
Tucker, 2001).   
Empirical evidence also suggests that BACEs are significantly more likely to 
miss loan repayments and/or exceed their agreed overdraft limits and this 
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behaviour significantly accounts for their much higher loan refusals, therefore, 
financial management supports by banks is important. One of the key effects of 
‗credit and financial performance‘ is that the increased use of credit and 
behavioural (notable repayment history/behaviours) scoring offers a possible 
explanation for the apparent absence of ethnic discrimination in the UK. This is 
similar to the USA perspective (Blanchflower et al., (2003), the similarity is 
compared based on the US study which relates to periods in the 1990 before 
small business credit scoring was prevalent. The explanation implies that the 
UK credit market would manifest ethnic discrimination were it not for the 
remoteness between the demand and supply sides engendered by scoring 
systems. The misperception of discrimination is more founded in the UK than it 
is in the USA, perhaps due to the information asymmetry already discussed.  
2.5.7 Impact of Personal Attributes on Business Support Usage  
Access to and utilisation of business support is paramount to bridging much of 
the knowledge gaps discussed concerning BACEs. The contribution to the 
policy dimensions is a key objective for this study. But before key findings on 
the policy dimensions are discussed, this subsection pulls together some of the 
key variables reported to influence the uptake of different types of business 
advice, which in turn may have an impact upon whether external finance is 
either accessed by BACEs or constrained.   
Experts on the subject (Carter & Shaw, 2001; Smith-Hunter, 2006; Deakins et al., 
1994; Irwin & Scott, 2006; Ram & Smallbone, 2001) highlight the perceived 
impact and significance of the owner manager characteristics such as gender, 
ethnicity, and human capital as an enabling or constraining factor in accessing 
finance. These studies looked at the interrelationships of these key variables, 
which forms the key explanatory factors being factors for attempting to explain 
the disproportionate barriers facing the groups reported in many studies. Figure 
3 below summarises the assumptions presented by these studies as a conceptual 
model. The characteristics have been discussed in this literature review in some 
depth where applicable. 
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     Less Educated                        Human Capital                  More Educated (Education)   
 
 
     External Finance        Female          Gender             Male        External Finance 
      (Constrained) 
 
Black & Minority Ethnic                         Ethnicity                      White 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Figure 3: The traditional notion of how owner-manager characteristics influence the finance 
constraints (finance gaps) of business loans applicants who possesses viable business 
propositions   
(Source: Adopted from Scott & Irwin, 2009).  
  
2.5.8 Policy Intervention for Support Agencies  
Amongst a number of suggestions proposed in some research (BBA, 2002; 
Smallbone et al., 2003; Dhaliwal, 2006 Scott & Irwin, 2009), three main areas 
stand out as far as business support agencies were concerned. There is need for 
identifying specialist support that is targeted at BACEs. Developing frameworks 
for clearer understanding of how the commercial banks and other external 
financial systems work is desirable.  There is also a need to adopt a more user-
friendly method in presenting cases to the finance providers bearing in mind 
that smaller firms may not understand some terminologies.  
 The high presence of ethnic minority businesses in the UK has meant 
recognition by government initiatives to support this group, initially in the form 
of Enterprise Agencies, the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and in the 
mid/late 90s – Business Links (Ram & Jones, 1998). However, research would 
suggest that Enterprise Agencies have not proved popular with EMBs (Curran 
& Blackburn, 1993) but that BACEs are significantly more likely to use the 
support of an agency than either white or South Asian Owned business (Jones & 
McEvoy, 1994; Ram & Deakins, 1995). Equal opportunity agendas and quotas 
mean that there is recognition of the poor utilisation by EMBs of support 
services. However, there are still gaps in policy development to redress these 
largely because of the lack of a robust data on this group and the constraints of 
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sensitive data protection – such as ethnicity, which offers greater challenges for 
policy makers to redress the imbalance and the banks to set targets and quotas.  
2.6 Literature Review Summary & Key Points  
This review looked at the experiences, attitudes and practices of BACEs with 
regards to the widely documented barriers to accessing finance. The accounts 
and understanding of the commercial banks is reviewed but not conclusive 
enough to make generalisations. The experiences of BACE owner managers in 
the UK in general in raising finance are varied and the nature of the problems 
they face are quite complex.  The range of possible explanations offered to the 
perceived difficulties that some ethnic minority businesses experience in raising 
finance is in many respects similar across a number of studies documented. But 
most research focus on the wider SME groups and the particular BACE category 
appear to be assumed in generalisations which completely masks the real issues 
they face. Some of the gaps in literature, rest on the impenetrable systems of 
loans assessment framework and decision making of lending banks, which 
needs further investigations. More qualitative research is desirable in 
understanding some deep-rooted perceptions of BACEs and the need to develop 
strategies that foster relationships.   
It is also clear that the evidence presented in the literature reviewed suggests 
that banks and other finance providers have to recognize that the needs of 
BACEs are beyond economic basis alone, as cultural and other characteristic 
factors need to be integrated in the decision-making processes. BACEs 
themselves have a role to play in improving their access to external sources of 
finance. This is partly a matter of ensuring that they consider the full range of 
sources of finance available to them. There is increasing evidence to suggest that 
some BACEs tend to associate business failures with perceptions of 
discriminatory practices of lending banks. The literature review suggests that 
there is little evidence (Fraser, 2005, 2008; BBA, 2002; Dhaliwal, 2006) to support 
the reported perceptions of discriminatory practices.   
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 2.6.1 Key Points from Literature Review  
This literature review highlights a number of key points:  
1. Lack of data on EMBs generally and BACEs in particular is a major problem 
and evident in the efforts in presenting accurate information in terms of 
representations in London. Estimates are often derived from data on the 
wider SME population in London. Very limited reliable data on BACEs in 
London are available  
2. The reasons why BACEs face disproportionate barriers accessing debt 
finance is not clear-cut, based on the literature. Research reports consistently 
report that BACEs are not particularly disadvantaged in accessing business 
finance when compared to other similar groups; however, there are 
suggestions that some specific ethnic groups experience disproportionate 
barriers, when compared to the white counterparts and other similar EMBs 
with similar features apart from ethnicity. There is very limited literature on 
the causative factors for explaining these ‗disproportionate barriers‘.  
3. The influence of appropriate qualification is seen as useful in enabling 
business owner managers make sound judgements and develop good 
business cases. The correlation between the type of education (such as 
financial education) and management experience is considered to be a key 
issue. However, there is currently little empirical evidence to reaffirm its 
significance in ensuring that the business owner manager, irrespective of 
personal characteristics such as ethnicity, is advantaged in securing finance 
from external sources.  
4. Banks who base their judgements purely on business profiling claim that 
risky ventures like the ones in which BACEs congregate are ‗too risky‘ for 
investment and profitability. However, literature also suggests that the 
knowledge they (the banks) have of these groups is poor and may be missing 
out of the investment opportunities BACEs can offer.  
5. The literature on the provider side tends to be well balanced, ruling out 
discrimination when assessing loans applications. The OFT (1999) suggest 
that the processes of assessing risk make it unlikely that ethnicity could be a 
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factor during evaluation of loans applications. In other words, market 
rationality is built into computer programmes and the exclusion of the 
applicants for financial and banking services on the grounds of ‗race‘ or 
ethnic origin would have been contrary to the profit-maximisation strategies 
of High Street banks.  
6. Literature suggests that well qualified EMBs enter self-employment because 
they experience discrimination in the labour market and supposedly face 
promotional barriers and the ‗glass ceiling‘ effect. Therefore, the subject of 
attitude is entrenched within these groups due to a range of wider 
institutional barriers facing ethnic minorities in general. The measure of 
attitudes is relative, but there is little research focusing on this concept.  
7. The lack of data on EMBs in general appears to be a key problem as most 
research tends to focus on the wider SME population. Very little research is 
focused on BACEs specifically and hence the gaps in offering explanations of 
the underlying issues affecting these groups and their low propensity to 
access formal sources of finance successfully. The true picture in terms of 
numbers is a key challenge and therefore, targeted policy measures may be 
ineffective.   
8. Attitudinal behaviours and actions of BACEs appear to influence how they 
seek finance and business support, for example, many do not seek debt 
finance and presume they would be denied. In the same token, many do not 
seek formal sources of business support and advice, and they pre-judge that 
the services on offer does preclude their needs without even trying or in 
many cases, they do not appreciate the benefits of it. There are a number of 
gaps needing more focus, some of the key areas to be investigated include 
the absence of targeted business advice support that are of a ‗specialist‘ 
nature. Mainstream support services appear to be ineffective and therefore 
many BACEs in the ethnic enclaves may be reluctant to seek professional 
business support, mainly because the advice available did not address their 
needs.  
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The gaps found in this review of literature can be associated to a lack of 
sufficient qualitative research and lack of insider accounts from BACEs studies.  
The triangulation approach adopted in this study drawing upon the 
perspectives of three principal agents therefore endeavours to advance our 
understanding of the reasons why BACEs experience particular difficulties in 
accessing external finance and seeking related business support.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76  
  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction   
This chapter considers both the conceptual framework and the practical 
elements of the research design. The conceptual framework (below) identifies 
and groups the constructs that emerged from literature. This chapter explores 
the research questions in more depth, and discusses the most appropriate 
methodological approaches, given the aims and nature of the research. It is 
important to place the research within a theoretical framework and to discuss 
the epistemology (the researchers‘ beliefs about how to discover new findings 
that seek to extend and improve upon past work in the subject area) as both 
affect how the research questions were refined and shaped the methodological 
choices. This research made use of a mix of data sources (i.e. both primary and 
secondary).   
This is followed by a discussion of the practicalities of how the data collection 
was conducted, and the approaches taken to data analysis. Historically, 
quantitative approaches tend to dominate the research in this subject area, 
emerging in findings that categorise BACEs in a generic SME group. The 
problem with this is the lack of, or insufficient empirical findings that explain 
the underlying reasons for the behaviour of many BACEs relating to ‗access to 
finance from formal sources‘. Therefore, a qualitative method is adopted as the 
main methodology for this study to provide ‗insider accounts‘ of three key 
research subjects– the BACEs, banks (loan processing managers) and 
intermediaries (business support and advice providers). Essentially, the method 
or technique used involved ‗semi-structured interviews to obtain qualitative 
data. Five broad research questions were used as an interview guide emerging 
from the research objectives (see appendix 2). Three questionnaire instruments 
were prepared, one for each of the three research subjects (BACE entrepreneurs; 
bank lending officers; and business support agencies).  
  
However, the use of mixed data sources adds a new and original dimension to 
this study, as it gives credence to the application of both quantitative and 
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qualitative approaches as they relate to social research. The two approaches are 
seen to complement each other‘s strengths and weaknesses, but a significant 
justification for the interpretive approach is because of the explorative nature of 
this research. The justification for the use of mixed data sources also enables the 
researcher to ‗triangulate‘ findings by teasing out areas of convergence and 
disagreements.  Most social research is based on either positivist (quantitative) 
or interpretive (qualitative) approaches, with much of the previous research in 
this field using an essentially positivist approach based on the quantitative 
analysis of large survey data sets. Adopting a qualitative approach based on 
semi-structured interviews with three different groups of actors helps to 
advance our understanding of the reasons why BACEs experience difficulties in 
accessing finance and related business support by looking at different 
perspectives. For example, the analysis of a secondary data (LABS 2007) 
provided a control (i.e. comparing BACEs with white owned and other ethnic 
minority businesses). The approach also provides unique evidence on the 
demand for different types of finance.  
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3.1.1 Conceptual Framework  
 
Fig4: Conceptual framework 
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The framework maps out the key constructs that emerged from the literature 
review and has been grouped under the three principle agents where the themes 
emerged from. It was noted that the BACE themes had to do with the unique 
characteristics that best describe the accounts they gave whilst the same applied 
to the providers/banks and the intermediaries, each presenting their own 
accounts and views concerning the research objectives. These thematic are used 
to focus and design the research strategy that helps establish the lines of 
enquiries for the primary research.   
These are social phenomena of which their meanings are continually being 
invented and modified by social actors, as grouped in the framework guiding the 
field work. key constructs that emerged from the literature review such as 
‗human capital‘; ‗culture‘ and ‗attitudes/behaviours‘ from the ‗demand side‘ and 
indeed other constructs from both the ‗provider‘ and ‗intermediary‘ perspectives 
are viewed as being ‗constructed‘ and therefore, the researcher sees these as a 
function of time and place, as they are not definitive and are constantly 
changing. Therefore, it can be inferred that the onset of the ‗credit crunch‘ would 
have influenced the BACE and provider perspectives on the difficulties of 
accessing finance, in other words, had there not been the advent of the economic 
crisis, it may be argued that the principal agents, notably the demand side may 
have viewed the barriers they face in accessing external finance differently. Each 
of the principal agents views creates some areas of convergence (i.e. human 
capital relevance to the chances of the entrepreneur to make informed decisions 
of the type and source of finance needed based on the ‗risks‘ and ‗viability‘ of the 
business case) and a divergence of opinion about relevance of the ethnicity and 
or culture of the entrepreneurs. The demand side disagrees that the ethnicity and 
the associated issues are not financial indices to consider during loans 
application assessments. They claim that this in itself indicates a degree of 
discrimination for non–ethnic groups. Therefore clearly this is one of the areas of 
disagreement that was noticeable. 
 
The reader might expect the researcher to be ‗value free‘ and objective in this 
research. However, this will depend on the readers methodological stand-point – 
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for example, if they favoured a positivist or scientific research approach, they 
might expect the researcher to be ‗value free‘, but not if they favoured a more 
interpretivist approach. Problematising the issues around ‗bias/values‘ is to 
recognise and acknowledge that research cannot be entirely value free, but that 
practical choices and considerations should ensure that there are no wilful 
incursions of values into the research process. The factors concerned with 
perceptions, attitudes, culture and human capacity relate to the views of a select 
group – BACE‘s, therefore a qualitative research strategy that is sensitive to how 
the participants interpret their social world appear the best methodological ‗fit‘ 
to achieve the objectives set. The choice of methodology ensures that purposive 
selection of cases is guided by the emerging constructs.  
The literature review identifies a number of ‗key constructs‘ which forms the 
basis for the empirical work for this study. The constructs/concepts are arranged 
under three separate parameters – demand, supply and intermediaries. The 
research questions emerged from these and the following chart identifies the 
‗constructs‘ and the framework shows how they interrelate. The key constructs 
that emerged characterise the various themes to explore, their state (often 
subjective) and how they relate with each other. There are no ‗definitive‘ 
guidelines for measuring ‗attitudes‘ but the accounts of the participant 
respondent provides a basis to develop theory from the analysis of information 
and not the other way round. To be able to have a framework to guide the 
research, it was important to have a theoretical understanding, that the 
constructs fit into specific boundaries of a social construct. Structuring the data 
under certain  categories and headings – in the case of this study, under the three 
main agents – and as the model above shows, try to bring the ideas together with 
a view to explain the ‗pull‘ and ‗push‘ effects of the factors. In some cases, there 
are agreements and for some, divergent views arose. 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy   
Research theory or philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the 
nature of that knowledge (Saunders et al., 2007). It also explains the thought 
processes, the drivers for choice and the evidence for the effectiveness of the 
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preferred approach adopted in this study. Assumptions which underpin the 
research strategy and processes including the specific techniques or methods 
considered. Nonetheless, the fact that a question for which there are multiple 
answers does not mean that anything goes; it means that social and business 
researchers choose from alternative approaches to acquiring knowledge. Each 
approach has its own stance on how to do research and the approaches are 
rarely declared explicitly in research reports. Yet, philosophical approaches play 
an important role in the outcomes of research, which are found across the social 
and business discipline and their related fields.   
In this study, two schools of thought were considered. These are the positivist 
and interpretive epistemologies.  The positivist research philosophy adopts a 
quantitative data analytical strategy which prefer ‗working with an observable 
social reality and that the product of such research can be law-like 
generalisations (Remenyi et al., 1998). There are several versions of positivism, 
the logical empiricism which is the accepted or conventional view was 
considered for the purpose of this research. The classical theorists, Auguste 
Comte, Karl Marx and Max Weber made a major contribution to modern 
civilisation when they argued that the social science world could be studied as 
science (Bryman & Bell, 2003). The thoughts of Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857), 
who coined the term sociology, while dated and riddled with criticisms and 
interpretations continue in many ways to be important to contemporary 
sociology. Classical theorists contended that rigorous, systematic observation of 
the social world, combined with careful, logical thinking, could provide a new 
and valuable type of knowledge about human relations. Researchers of this 
school of thought seek rigorous, exact measures and ―objective‖ research, and 
they test hypotheses by carefully analysing numbers from the measures. Critics‘ 
charge that positivism reduces people to numbers and that its concerns with laws or 
formulas are not relevant to the actual lives of real people (Ekanem, 2005).   
The second approach considered is an interpretive philosophy adopting in-depth 
interviews. This approach provides a more meaningful dimension in the 
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exploration of perceptions and attitudes of specific groups; BACEs. The subject of 
perception is a complex area and a substantial knowledge of the cognitive 
behaviours of BACEs is desirable. This study argues that the applicable 
approach is that of exploring ‗feelings and attitudes‘ – as a social concept which 
has no external reality, although they may lead to particular courses of action 
which influences behaviours. They cannot be seen, measured and modified like 
objects, therefore this approach is the predominant one adopted for this study. 
The accounts of the participants offers the most effective information resource, 
mainly because an ‗interactive dialogue‘ enables the researcher to ‗probe‘ into 
general themes in a manner that ‗quantitative‘ methods are unable to achieve.  
Philosophical approaches play an important role in the outcomes of research, 
which are found across the social and business science and their related applied 
field. (Saunders, et. al., 2007) Interpretive approach can be traced to German 
Socialist Max Weber (1864 – 1920) and German philosopher Wilhem Dilthey.   
Dilthey (1883) argued that there were two fundamentally different types of 
science: Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenshaften. The former is based on 
abstract explanation and the latter is rooted in an empathetic understanding of 
the everyday experiences of people in specific settings, as it is the case for 
BACEs being studied. The underlining concept of this approach is that 
researchers must learn the personal reasons or motives that shape a person‘s 
internal feelings and guide decisions to act in particular ways.   
3.3 Adopted Techniques for this study  
The research methodology and design employed in this study as a whole 
comprises three distinct stages;  
1. Exploratory study;  
2. Quantitative analysis of a large secondary data set;  
3. Qualitative analysis of primary research (interview data)   
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Stage I: Exploratory study  
A pilot study was conducted in 2007 as part of the MSc Research Methods 
programme. The focus of the pilot research was to evaluate the characteristic 
attributes, human capital and attitudes of BACE owner managers, concerning 
accessing business finance from formal sources. A qualitative approach was 
adopted, employing semi-structured in-depth interviews. The exploratory study 
involved six purposefully selected Black African and Caribbean business owners 
that were running their own business or planning to set up one. Two high street 
bank managers who were responsible for processing business loan applications 
and a London Development Agency (LDA) executive (whose role had a direct 
bearing on policy development) were interviewed.   
Stage II: Quantitative Data: Analysing Secondary Data  
Data from the 2006 and 2007 London Annual Business Surveys (LABS) was 
obtained from the LDA and responses analysed to those questions relating to 
access to finance, investment and various business characteristics. The 
importance for using the LABS was that it differentiated between businesses on 
the basis of their ethnicity, including Black businesses. The LABS survey of 
private sector businesses was undertaken annually by the LDA from 2003 until 
2007. The survey covers all types of businesses in terms of size, sectors and 
organisation type (including, sole-traders, family-owned businesses, franchises, 
and social enterprises). About 4,000 businesses in London were interviewed 
each year.   
The LABS questionnaire for the years studied comprised 78 questions, but the 
analysis for this research focused on those questions concerning the following 
issues: business profiles; investment and access to finance; priorities, problems, 
and constraints on businesses; business practice and advice and management 
competencies. This afforded the researcher an opportunity to explore, describe, 
compare and examine relationships and trends within the LABS 2007 data 
analysis.   
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Stage III: Qualitative Data - Analysing Interview Data/Primary Research   
Primary data was obtained using, semi-structured interviews from the 
purposely selected respondents/participants that were relevant to the research 
questions and objectives. Three principal participant categories were purposely 
established (the BACE owner managers, loan processing bank managers and 
business support and advise providers: some secondary data were obtained 
from CEEDR; interviews with some ‗third sector business support advisers‘).   
Respondents were engaged on a one to one basis over a two and half year 
period on the field. In the semi-structured questions was a list of themes which 
were shaped around the 5 core research questions detailed in chapter one, 
which were subdivided into sub-themes and used as prompts. The prompts 
varied from interview to interview, based on the respondents position on the 
issues being investigated. The nature of the qualitative data collected had 
implications for its analysis (Chapter 5 & 6). During the analysis, the non-
standardised and complex nature of the data that were collected during the field 
work was grouped into categories before they could be meaningfully analysed.   
These data were used not only to reveal and understand the ‗what‘ and ‗how‘ 
BACEs behave when it comes to accessing business finance from formal sources 
but also places a degree of emphasis on exploring the ‗why‘ which is the added 
value to the body of knowledge. The non-standardised interview data, were 
audio-recorded (where the respondent allowed for this, while many felt 
uncomfortable about being recorded, but agreed for notes to be taken) and 
subsequently transcribed, that is, reproduced as a written (word-processed) 
account using the actual words used by the respondents and the researcher 
endeavoured to capture the tone in which it was said. One of the major 
challenges of transcribing the interviews was the time invested for transcribing 
the audio-recordings. Qualitative interviews with the following were conducted 
between the 2009 spring through the autumn of 2011:  
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(a) BACE owner managers (i.e. ‘demand side‘); This involved 30 face-to-face, 
semi structured interviews with a sample of BACE owner managers with a view 
to evaluating and analysing the significance and impact of the different aspects 
of human capital on the difficulties they face accessing business finance from 
external sources. The basis for selection of respondents was based on a number 
of sources: contacts from the field work and sign-posting from such contacts 
following the pilot study of 2007. There were no formal sources that could have 
been used to select a list.   
A purposely selected list of BACEs was carefully matched with the special 
interests for the research objectives. The impact and relevance of the  human 
capital of the BACE owner managers  in accessing external finance was pivotal to 
this study, therefore it was felt that the participants required needed to be 
purposely selected. The selection of respondents is based on a ‗nonprobability 
sampling‘, which means that the purposely selected respondents were carefully 
selected to focus on a small number of cases that are especially informative and 
relevant to the research investigations. The researcher uses different 
interconnected networks of contacts and organisations in the field to locate the 
respondents. Some judgement was made to select a fair representation to satisfy 
some of the issues under investigation; for example the selection parameters 
(BACEs) were characterised and grouped by:  
  
1) Educational attainment  
2) Business experience/sector 
3) Generational feature 
4) Gender mix  
  
(b) Bank managers (i.e. supply side); Face-to-face in-depth interviews with five 
purposely selected high street bank managers in London. A desk-top research of 
listed UK High Street banks in London offered a list of twenty-two (22) banks to 
choose from. About a dozen were approached, and five (5) agreed to participate 
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in the case studies. The five were the top British owned banks (apart from 
Santander, who at the time was a British owned bank).   
Selection of the loan managers were purposely selected (same basis for selecting 
the BACEs), to ensure that the representation was not random. The profiles of 
the loans managers are shown in table 6.1 in the appendix section.   
The ages were in the range of 25-35 (2 respondents); 36045 (1 respondent) and 
46-55 (2 respondents). The gender balance was on a 2:3 (Male: Female) whilst 
the ethnicity of the respondents included two Asians and 3 White managers. 
Incidentally, the effort to select a BACE loan manager in the London Local 
Authorities (LA) was futile. The LA‘s from which the loan managers were 
selected included Haringey, Southwark, Enfield, Brent and Lambeth. A 
conscious decision to focus in some of the ‗ethnic enclaves‘ highlighted in 
chapter 2 was the reason for selecting some of the London inner-city areas 
where BACEs had higher business concentrations.  
The objectives were to investigate the knowledge, attitudes and experiences of 
the selected bank managers in dealing with BACE clients and also to probe into 
the practices of making business loan decisions and the criteria adopted in 
dealing with applications. The interviews also aimed to ask bank managers 
about whether they thought BACEs faced particular difficulties and barriers in 
accessing bank finance.  
(c) Business support providers (i.e. ‘intermediaries); Face-to-face in-depth 
interviews with six officers purposely selected within business support agencies 
(both public and voluntary sectors) to BACE groups specifically and EMBs in 
general. The list was obtained from the Centre for Enterprise and Economic 
Development Research (CEEDR) of the Middlesex University Business School. 
The purpose was to identify possible gaps in support provisions and to assess 
the relevance of the type of support offered to the particular needs of BACEs. 
Also, this would help identify the policy implications of any finance gaps 
identified in the study.   
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Field Work Considerations (intermediaries):  
1. In-depth interviews with a senior LDA official- The officer interviewed 
was the most senior officer responsible for the aspects being researched at 
the time  
2. Focused In-Depth interviews with selected ‗Enterprise Support Agencies‘. 
3. Secondary data was obtained from the Centre for Enterprise and Economic 
Development Research (CEEDR) – these were questionnaires for 
enterprise agencies conducted in 2008 involving in-depth interviews with 
selected voluntary sector business support organisations in London.   
The following enterprise agencies reviewed includes:  
a. Enterprise Agencies (Desk Top Review):  
i. Brent Business Venture (BBV)  
ii. African Caribbean Business Support (ACBS)  
iii. East London Small Business Centre (ELSBC)  
iv. African Caribbean Business Network (ACBN)  
b. Enterprise Agencies (Telephone Interviews)  
i. Haringey Business Development Agency (HBDA)  
 ii. Portebello Business Centre (PBC)  
 iii. Croydon Business Venture (CBV)  
3.4 Design Considerations & Process Map  
The logical question for designing the field work for this study was to identify 
and substantiate the most suitable (or combination) techniques to enable the 
author obtain primary data that best address the research questions set.   
Respondent selection (sampling), negotiating access, collection and management 
of empirical data, ethical issues, limitations and contingency plans were some 
practical considerations addressed as part of the research design. These 
processes are discussed separately in the next sub-sections. Figure 3 below is a 
process map detailing the specific aspects for the empirical work and the 
respective components discussed separately.  
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(Source: Authors‘ - 2007)  
Figure 5 above, is a map route of the identified processes or aspects for the empirical study. The 
framework was guided by the various stages adopted, showing how the various aspects related.   
3.4.1 Participant Selection and Recruitment Process   
The selection considerations made for this study were based on a number of 
factors including cost, time and relevance to the research objectives and 
anticipated outcomes for the research questions set. The principal methodology 
preferred for this study applied a qualitative dimension (even though, some 
quantitative approaches were employed, simply to have a basis to help focus the 
research questions – secondary data analysis of the LABS 2006/2007).   
The sampling approach mode was based on a ‗quota‘ system, a non-probability 
sampling technique that was based on the judgement of the researcher. The 
decision was to create a strata of 4 key categories (qualification, generational, 
gender and type of business) as these were the aspects of interest to this study. 
Once the ‗quotas‘ have been set, the researcher then  actively sought to establish 
contacts via professional contacts, snowballing, referrals and other informal 
method of finding participants that ‗fit‘ the set quotas. A total of about 36 
contacts were made of which 30 participants were selected based on the quotas 
Figure 5:  Research process: path model   
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set. In some cases, preliminary (informal) discussions were held to filter 
appropriateness for the quota framework.  
The BACE owner managers selected needed to fit the parameters set by the 
research aims and objectives with a view to answering the research questions. It 
was therefore necessary to apply a purposive sampling technique to select the 
respondents for the in-depth interviews, which focused on a small number of 
BACEs - 30 cases; whilst this is not a representative population of BACEs in 
London, 30 cases purposely selected across the various lines of enquiry for this 
research provides some useful indication based on quota selections –type and 
levels of qualification attained, age, generation and ethnicity. Majority of the 
cases were London based entrepreneurs (with the exemption of 1 case who 
moved to the midlands during the course of the field work). There was a larger 
representation from the ‗ethnic enclaves‘ spread across some of the inner 
London Boroughs characterised by marginalised ethnic communities: Lambeth, 
Southwark, Lewisham, Newham and Brent. The logic behind these targeted 
geographical locations was to have participants that had a connection with the 
research questions under investigation.   
Part of the research questions was to explore the impact and or relevance of 
BACE‘s human capital in terms of relevant qualifications; experience and usage 
of support services which influence the chances of successfully accessing 
external finance. In order to find answers to this specific question, the selection 
for the BACE owner managers were based on a set quota. However, it is worth 
noting that unlike a stratified sample, the sampling of the purposely selected 
individuals is not carried out randomly, since the final selection of the BACE 
owner managers was targeted by the interviewer.  The quota considered three 
key grouping; one group comprised of respondents with relevant postgraduate 
(up to masters and above) level in a recognised management and/or finance 
degree and has run a business for over three years or more.   
The second group comprised of BACE owner managers with lesser degrees 
(degrees from a non-finance/business management field, at first degree level or 
less).  The logic for this quota grouping of respondents is a systematic choice of 
sampling technique which is dependent on the feasibility and sensibility of 
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collecting data to answer the specific question(s) and to address the objectives of 
the research. In essence, this technique provides the opportunity to carefully 
reach difficult-to-identify groups in a wider population. The resource of the 
purposive sampling list was gathered from existing contacts; snowballing 
network; and via other web-based directories.  
One of the main challenges for filling the quota has to do with the values of the 
researcher, having being embedded in the research, therefore, a degree of bias in 
selection of participants may be prone to questioning. Also, because the choice 
of respondent is left to the interviewer, the proponents of probability sampling 
argue that a quota sample cannot be representative. Secondly, in quota 
sampling, the samples have not been chosen randomly, which makes it 
impossible to determine the possible sampling error. In the case that BACEs are 
somewhat difficult to access means that selected participants may be biased to 
an extent. But the purposive nature of the identified 30 participants selected 
does provide a ‗fit‘ into the criteria/characteristics being investigated was 
deemed appropriate within a qualitative methodology. It is undoubtedly 
cheaper and quicker than interview surveys on a comparably small probability 
sample, as it is in the case of this study.  
3.4.2 Data Gathering & Reliability  
This sub-section looks at the justification of the three staged technique (as 
itemised in section 3.2 earlier) for gathering qualitative data which is an original 
approach to help drill down from the tripartite investigative perspectives (the 
demand, supply and intermediary participants).This stage allowed the 
researcher generate ‗qualitative data‘ and then triangulate findings in a way that 
help explain and discuss research conclusions. The approach adopted a non-
standardised one–to-one interview with the BACE owner manager, where a list 
of semi-structured and detailed questions was asked. The interview with each 
respondent varied; based on the themes and responses they gave, leading to 
prompts that helped obtain detailed and useful information from their 
experiences and beliefs.  
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 The nature of the questions, prompts and the ensuing discussions required that 
the interview data needed to be recorded (with the respondents permission) by 
audio-recording (in some cases where the respondent agreed to this) the 
conversations and/or notes were also recorded. There were a number of 
benefits to the use of this non-standardised, semi-structured interview style: 
firstly, it suited the purpose of this research which was seen as exploratory and 
secondly; the information collected were useful for explanatory purposes – 
finding explanations for generalisations and assumptions.  
Essentially, where it was necessary to understand the reasons for the decisions 
that the participants have to take, or to understand the reasons for their 
attitudes and opinions, the best method for achieving this was by conducting 
qualitative interviews. This technique also affords the researcher (interviewer) 
an opportunity to hear oneself ‗thinking aloud‘ about issues that may not have 
been previously considered. The rich and detailed set of data collected were 
then analysed using content analysis technique. 
Another key benefit of this interview technique is the significance of establishing 
personal contact rather than the use of a questionnaire. The interview provided 
the respondents the opportunity to reflect and express themselves on events, 
experiences and beliefs rather than needing to write this down. Healey (1991: 
206) also makes the point that ‗the interviewer has more control over who 
answers the questions‘ in comparison with a questionnaire, which may be 
passed from one person to another.  
3.4.3 Data Quality Issues  
Some considerations were given to the reliability of data obtained and certain 
‗interviewer behaviours‘ were effectively managed to reduce and or control 
forms of bias: listening and being very attentive to what the BACE owner 
manager was saying or even not saying (by observing body language). The lack 
of standardisation in this type of interviews may have led to concerns about 
reliability (Easterbysmith et al., 2002; Healey and Rawlinson, 1994). It is possible 
that the researcher/interviewer may have inadvertently presented own beliefs 
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through the questions asked; the manner or sequence in which they were asked. 
On the other hand, there is also a small likelihood of the interviewee or response 
bias to have occurred as a result. This type may have been caused by 
perceptions about the interviewer, as referred to previously, or in relation to 
perceived interviewer bias. These problems of bias are inherent of this method 
and are largely that of subjectivity and communication dynamics, nonetheless, 
efforts were made to control occurrence of these limitations on the data quality.   
These possible limitations were best managed by the approach and style of the 
interviewer, given the interviewee ample freedom to express themselves freely 
(Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Healey and Rawlinson, 1994; Robson, 2002) 
without intrusion and undue pressure by the researcher.  
The control and/or management of the limitations and reliability of the adopted 
methods ensured that, the findings derived from using the non-standardised 
research technique, were not necessarily intended for replication. Since the 
findings reflect reality at the time the research was conducted, in a situation 
which may be subject to change (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).  The possibility 
for other researchers to come up with similar findings has a significant 
likelihood, if the research is conducted under the same conditions. But of course, 
social behaviour and perceptions constantly change with the changing socio-
political environment.   For the purpose of this study, the researcher made and 
retains notes relating to the design, the reasons underpinning the choice of 
strategies adopted, methods chosen and data collected on the field (empirical 
work/interview transcripts/notes etc.).  
3.5 Analytical Approach   
Content Analysis: The approach adopted involved a systematic coding and 
grouping of themes that were traceable through the transcripts. Qualitative data 
refers to all non-numeric data or data that is not quantified and can be a product 
of all research strategies. It can range from a short list of responses to more 
complex data such as transcripts of in-depth interviews or entire policy 
framework/documents. For this approach to be useful the empirical data 
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collected needed to be analysed and the meanings understood. Responses 
relating to beliefs, perceptions and experiences were abstract events and could 
not be counted, therefore, a process of grouping and coding unique themes was 
the most appropriate method of analysing the responses collected during the 
interviews.   
This approach is generally referred to as content analysis or narrative analysis.  
Miles et al., (1994) describes qualitative coding as ‗tags‘ or ‗labels‘ for assigning 
units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a 
field study. Narrative analysis is broadly defined as an account of an experience 
that is told in a sequenced way, indicating a flow of related events (from one or 
several respondents), that had been taken together and are significant for the 
narrator (the participant/respondent in this case the BACE owner manager) and 
 convey meanings to the researcher/interviewer (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). 
Alternative approaches employed for processing the secondary data (LABS 
2007) obtained was the use of computer aided data analysis software - SPSS. 
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Figure (6) below, is a process map for handling qualitative data and the various 
components that guided the field work of this study.  
Figure 6: Interactive model for data management  
              Collect Data                                                      Analyze  Data                     
 
 
                                                                                      
     Listen                                                                                         
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                           
                                                                                                           
                          Data              Visual              Data                                               
  Observe               1                                   2                                                 
 
                                    Jotted                                                         
                                    Notes                                                           
 
                                                                                                    
 Interpret & 
   Interview                                                                                              
                         Memory &                Field 
                                      Emotion                      Notes 
 
 
 Artefacts              (Documents, Maps, Observations of Others)   
 
 
Source: Adapted from Ellen (1984a: 214)  
  Data in Field Research (Data 1 = Raw sense data, experiences of researchers; Data 
2 = Recorded data, physical record of experiences; Data 3 = Selected, processed data 
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3.6 Ethical Issues  
Ethical considerations were made throughout the various stages of the planning 
of this research (planning and strategy development, seeking access to 
respondents, collection, and analysis). In the context of this research, ethics refer 
to the appropriateness of the researchers‘ behaviour in relation to the rights of 
those who become the subjects of this study – the BACEs, banks and 
intermediaries.   
Blumberg et al., (2005:92) defines ethics as the ‗moral principles, norms or 
standards of behaviour and our relationships with others‘. In research terms, 
this relates to how the researcher formulates and clarifies the research topic, 
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design the research and gain access, collect data, process and store data, analyse 
data and write up the research findings in a moral and responsible way. Issues 
such as access and consent are also essential considerations embraced. For 
example, where a respondent agrees to participate in a particular data collection 
method, this does not necessarily imply consent about the way in which the 
data provided are subsequently used. Clearly, the assurances that the researcher 
provided the respondent about anonymity and confidentiality helped to 
develop an understanding of the nature of the consent agreed. For example, 
many of the owner managers interviewed preferred not to be recorded, but 
agreed for the researcher to take notes of the discussions.  
 For the purpose of this research, the author ensures that the way this research is 
designed is methodologically sound and morally defensible to all those who 
were involved.  
3.7 Negotiating Access   
Considerable thought was also given to the strategies considered for 
negotiating access and the ethical concerns that could arise in relation to this 
aspect. One of the specific barriers encountered was that of accessing and 
evaluating documentary data relating to business loans application (bank loan 
processing) as the interviewed bank or business development manager declined 
discussing these aspects and did not agree for the researcher to inspect any 
paper work for obvious reasons of confidentiality and data protection. 
Hypothetical case scenarios were used to attempt to get a fairly detailed 
experience of processes involved in the loans application assessments and 
challenges the banks face.   
The economic context of the ‗Credit crunch‟ at the time of this research and the 
subsequent tight controls posed a significant challenge for accessing data from 
the ‗supply side‘ (High Street banks). Therefore, paying careful attention to the 
researcher‘s approach to gaining access to prospective organisations identified; 
the data, or even the gatekeeper (the key contact) that had the authority to 
authorise access (Stockport & Kakabadse, 1994; Ekanem, 2002) was a challenge.  
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Two access levels were considered, the first and key access level was the initial 
physical access, which had to do with identifying the selective participants for 
the interviews. Gummesson (2000) suggests that gaining access might be 
difficult for a number of reasons: firstly, the lack of perceived value in relation to 
the research being undertaken or the researcher; secondly, the nature of the 
topic because of its  potential sensitivity, or because of concerns about the 
confidentiality of the information that would be required and thirdly, 
perceptions about the researchers‘ credibility and doubts about the researcher‘s 
competence and approach (this aspect has been discussed in some depth 
earlier).  
The second access level is the cognitive access (Gummesson, 2000) which refers 
to the ability to utilise good researchers‘ personal and interpersonal skills to 
conduct the interviews effectively, in a way that appropriate answers to the 
research questions can be obtained without pressure. Therefore, simply gaining 
physical access to the participant is not sufficient, the researcher had to utilise 
effective communication, relationship and interviewing skills   
3.8 Summary   
This research methodology choice (the ‗mixed approach‘ by virtue of the use of 
both qualitative and quantitative data sources) best fit the research objectives in 
a way that helped to approach the research topic from different perspectives, i.e. 
interviewing both BACE owner managers and the finance providers. This 
methodology approach builds on other methodological choices and approaches 
used in other research of similar context. Some of the limitations have been 
noted and the conscious efforts by the researcher to mitigate these limitations 
have been identified.   
Having argued that the mixed approach presents builds on other approaches, 
the position is not to claim that a multi-strategy research is superior to research 
that employs a single research strategy. One of the logic for this mixed approach 
is the possibility to triangulate the results of the findings from the different 
agents (respondent groups) employing a method associated with one research 
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strategy, cross-checked against the results of another strategy. Whilst this 
approach gives this research an original status, it is also an adaptation of the 
argument by writers like Webb et al., (1966) that confidence in the findings 
derived from a study using a quantitative research strategy can be enhanced by 
using more than one way of measuring a concept. For example, in their 
longitudinal study of culture in a governmental organisation in the USA, 
Zamanou and Glaser (1994) collected similar types of data, using different 
(quantitative and qualitative) methods to examine and analyse different aspects 
and perspectives of organisational behaviours.  
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CHAPTER 4: SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the findings and analysis of the 2007 data set of the last 
London Annual Business Survey (LABS). This review compares some of the 
findings and interpretations of the preceding years (2003 – 2006); as it relates to 
the relevant aspects of study. LABS provided a unique source of data, based on 
a series of large-scale business surveys over a 5 year period, which included 
data relating to obtaining finance and, most importantly, enabled comparison 
between businesses run by entrepreneurs from different ethnic groups.  It does 
help the researcher to answer some basic questions about the extent to which 
Black businesses sought external finance and how successful they were in doing 
so (compared to other ethnic groups including white owned businesses. The 
LABS is the annual survey of private sector businesses in  
London that was undertaken by the London Development Agency and Business 
Link 4 London (BL4L) since 2003 and the last was in 2007. The survey covers all 
types of private sector businesses/companies that are incorporated in London 
and subject to Company law. It is a telephone survey which reaches about 5,600 
private enterprises (employing at least one person). The survey findings are 
based on six ethnic categories including Black-owned businesses and provide a 
rich database for analysis as part of this research. The approach adopted in this 
secondary data analysis was to compare black ethnic categories with white 
businesses with regards to:  
  
• significance of ‗human capital‘ in terms of qualification 
and management practices/decision making of the owner 
managers of the firms surveyed,  
• types of business finance approached and barriers faced,  
Use and effectiveness of business support  
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4.2 Objectives of the LABS Programme   
The objectives of the annual surveys were to:  
1. collect indicators of the performance of private sector businesses in 
London , to allow the factors that influence business performance to be 
analysed, and assist in the development of LDA (defunct) policies and 
procedures  
2. analyse the impact of London‘s physical and social infrastructure on 
businesses  
3. identify issues faced by businesses where help and support may be 
beneficial  
4. monitor the change in these factors over time  
4.3 Presentation Approach & Methodology  
This analysis and interpretation of the LABS data is predominantly based on the 
published findings of the 2006 LABS result and the 2007 raw data that was 
analysed using basic SPSS statistical presentations (descriptive & comparative 
graphs/charts). This was done to explore how the published results (LABS 
2006) compared to the 2007 results. Some inferences were made based on 
outputs of frequencies and percentages generated. Four main themes which 
form part of the key research objectives of this study were the focus. The 
published LABS 2006 survey contained 78 questions in total covering 9 key 
areas including the following:  
• Business profile/ Workforce  
• Turnover, profit and productivity   
• Investment and access to finance  
• Sales and purchasing  
• Priorities, problems, and constraints on businesses, and the geographical 
spread of customers and suppliers   
• Information technology and innovation  
• Research and collaboration  
• Business practices and advice  
• Management competencies  
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The three essential (of the four) key areas relevant to this study and a total of 
19 (of the 78) questions in the LABS (2007) formed the subject of focus. These 
were summarized into three themes for clarity:  
1. Characteristic profile of the owner managers of the relevant ethnic 
categories being investigated – this looked at the different aspects of 
existing levels of ‗human capital‘ of the owner managers in terms of  
qualifications (not the specific type or level), experiences and sector of 
business which influence access to external finance.  
2. Experiences and attitudes relating to access to finance – The experiences 
and attitudes of the BACE owner managers was considered as impacting 
on various characteristics, choices or behaviours; investment decisions 
they make; the reasons cited as problems they face approaching (or not 
approaching) external sources of finance. Series of questions in the 
survey questionnaires focus on these themes.   
3. The use of business advice – The literature (Dhaliwal, 2006) suggests 
that some BACEs underutilise the full range of business support services; 
for those who do, advice received does not meet the specific 
requirements of BACEs. The LABS 2007 questionnaire looks at the 
practices and usage of advice agencies in some detail. Some of the 
specific questions asked in the surveys look at the use of external 
organisations for advice; whether professional advice services were paid 
for; how satisfied the businesses were with the advice received and the 
relevance of the advice to their specific needs.   
The LABS annual survey reports were structured into three core parts. The first 
part looks at the unique characteristics of London businesses in terms of size, 
sector, ownership and workforce; the second part looks at the economic 
performance of businesses in London and the third part focuses on factors 
affecting business performance in London and how businesses operate. Part 3 of 
the published LABS reports looks at the barriers and enablers affecting 
businesses, investment and access to finance; management and planning 
approaches of the owner managers and business information and advice 
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seeking activities. For the first time, the 2007 LABS result identified government 
regulations as the number one problem/constraint affecting businesses in 
London, shifting focus slightly away from access to finance which scored as the 
highest ranked in the 2006 and previous surveys (2004, 2005).  
The methodology adopted in this secondary analysis of published reports is a 
detailed desk top review of the 2006 LABS report and the 2007 LABS dataset 
from which relevant comparisons with the previous year‘s surveys were made. 
The result of six broad ethnicity categories were analysed based on the results 
obtained from the surveys. The categories (Selected London Regions: west, 
south, central, north and east) included: White; Black, Asian, Mixed; Chinese 
and Refused. It was possible to compare the results of weighted Black owner 
managers responses to the other EMB groups (particularly the Asian categories) 
and the white categories which served as a control group for discussion. Tables 
were used to present the data and discussions of the key findings follow.  
 The data source was a combination of the LDA summary findings of the LABS 
2006 and the raw data of the LABS 2007 annual surveys. The ‗Black ethnic 
group‘ referred to Black African and Caribbean owner managers and therefore 
corresponded with the focus of this study. The review of the 2007 LABS focused 
on those questions relevant to this research; BACEs and problems faced in 
accessing finance from formal sources.   
4.4 LABS Result Analysis   
This LABS 2006 analysis is presented as summary of the results published by the 
LDA as it was impossible to analyse the actual responses of the surveys. The 
alternative approach employed was to analyse the 2007 LABS data, using basic 
SPSS and the adjusted outputs- predominantly frequencies and percentages. To 
do this, a preliminary ‗data clean-up‘ was conducted using the SPSS package to 
label and code the data from the six broad ethnicity categories. The data 
processing tasks carried out were two-fold:  
Firstly, the resultant population sampled ‗N‘ (all businesses that participated in 
the surveys minus the missing data (those referred to as ‗refused/don‘t 
know/blank responses) was calculated.  Therefore the actual value for ‘N’ is 
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referred to as ‗adjusted value’ based on the six broad ethnicity categories 
surveyed (LABS, 2007). Table (4) is the rounded-off frequencies referred to as 
adjusted values (rogue results had been discounted).  
It was quite difficult to rely on/or use the population total ‗N’ in the raw data 
obtained from the 2007 LABS dataset. This was because the ‗missing data‘ were 
not readily identifiable. Table (4) was generated from SPSS; labelling the 
variables (‗zero‘ to ‗five‘) this was allocated to the five main ethnicity categories 
and the sixth label  assigned to the ‗refused/don‘t know‘ category). The reason 
for this was to remove the ‗outliers‘ which may skew the results. In other 
words, table (4) is the treated result generated from the LABS 2007 dataset to 
make some sense of the totals, using ‗frequencies‘.  
Table 4: Broad Ethnicity Frequency Statistics – Rounded Variables (SPSS Output)  
 
  
Notes:  
Valid/adjusted ‘N’ = 2595: A total of 4527 responses are valid and this was used 
as ‗N‘ for the purpose of the discussions and inferences in this review report. For 
example:   
‘N’ = 2918 for the white businesses analysed and ‘N’ = 138 for the valid Black 
owned businesses analysed. A total of 932 responses were either refused or don’t 
Broad Ethnicity Frequency Statistics  –   Rounded Variables  ( SPSS Output )   
  
Valid/adjusted ‗N‘ =    3595 (4527 –   937)   
N’ = 2918   for the white businesses analysed   
‘N’ = 138   for the valid  Black - owned businesses a nalysed   
Source: LABS 2007  – data file   
  Broad Ethnicity Categories 
2918 64.4   64.5 64.5 
138 3.0   3.0 67.5 
405 8.9   8.9 76.5 
44 1.0   1.0 77.4 
90 2.0   2.0 79.4 
932   20.6   20.6   100.0 
4527 99 .9   100.0 
5   .1 
4532 100.0 
White   
Black   
Asian 
Mixed   
Other / Chinese 
Refused / don’t know   
Total   
Valid   
S ystem   Missing   
Total   
Frequency Percent   Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
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know whilst 5 counts recorded as ‘error/missing system’, again these were 
discounted from the total population.   
‘Adjusted‘ values = the outliers, missing/blank responses which has been 
removed from the total, leaving a resultant actual value – questionnaires that 
have been fully completed. Missing Systems relates to numeric missing data in 
this context- values automatically recognized as missing by SPSS. The 
understanding here is that the system (SPSS) simply handles the missing values 
by omitting the counts in its analysis. For example, the ‗N‘ value discounts all 
missing value from the total. The problem however is that it is difficult to 
identify those responses in the categories being analysed that were blank/did 
not respond to the questions asked.  
Missing data: the discounted responses pose a significant limitation as it is 
likely that a significant number of this may have included ‗Black owned‘ 
businesses (that declined answering some of the questions), hence skewing the 
resultant totals. This is a clear indication of some of the ‗limitation‘ of statistical 
approaches in the context of this research and hence the need to adopt 
complimentary approaches via qualitative methods.   
4.4.1 Characteristics of BACEs  
There were 349,513 businesses in London in 2006 (LABS, 2006) – all businesses, 
which accounted for about 3,266,117 people employed in the SME sector. 
Almost one in five of London‘s businesses were owned by ethnic minority 
communities (19.5%). This compared with almost one in three of London‘s 
population (29%) classified as being from ethnic minority communities in the  
2001 census. From the rounded samples (95% significance level) surveyed, 4% 
were Black-owned compared to 3% in 2006. The survey also showed that Black-
owned businesses made up a significantly higher proportion than average of 
small businesses in the consultancy and professional sectors.  For example, the 
LABS 2006 analysis of breakdown of sector types showed that about 43% of 
Black-owned businesses surveyed were concentrated in these business sectors.   
It is possible that the data presented related to a ‗cumulative data‘ for a sizeable 
proportion of small firms altogether, rather than just for Black businesses. 
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Because of the high number of cases which did not identify their ‗ethnicity‘ 
(missing/incomplete responses, the findings about the concentration of Black 
businesses in the ‗consultancy and professional‘ services may have been 
skewed). This appears to have been one of the limitations of the LABS data 
reviews adopting purely quantitative methods. The LABS 2007 results show that 
38% of Black owned businesses was concentrated in the consultancy business 
and professional services sectors compared to 37% of all other EMBs surveyed 
in 2007. The survey result suggests that a significant proportion of the Black 
owned businesses operate within these sectors in proportions similar to the 
white groups surveyed.  The LABS 2006 result indicated that Asian owner 
managers concentrated in retail and whole-sale goods trading which was one of 
the community based services within which they operated.  
 This may explain, in part, one of the reasons why Asian owned businesses have 
a stronger propensity to access sources of alternative finance (i.e. family or co-
operative small loans) is probably due to their strong networks in terms of social 
capital. The (2003 – 2005) LABS records a slight decrease in ethnic minority 
business ownership in this period as the proportion of EMBs in the surveyed 
businesses was somewhat lower in these earlier surveys.   
 A closer look at the underlying (2007) LABS data showed that Black-owned 
businesses continued to rise since 2003 at a steady rate. It is not immediately 
clear from the data being analysed why this was the case, but the researchers‘ 
view was that people from ethnic minorities tend to enter into self-employment, 
because of the ceiling-effect in paid employment. However, some of the 
responses cited for setting up a business showed that a desire for independence 
or to be one‘s own boss was the most commonly cited reason (20.5%) for Black 
owned businesses. For some of the other categories in the EMB groups, such as 
the Chinese and Asian business owner managers, family business were passed 
on from generation to generation, ‗being one own boss‘ may have not being the 
main reason for running a business.  
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4.4.2 Influence of Qualification and Management Practices  
One of the main objectives of the empirical study was to explore how human 
capital (e.g. relevant qualifications and experience) influence BACEs‘ decisions 
to access external finance. Some specific responses to some of the questions 
asked in the LABS annual survey of 2007 (Q75a – 75d) around qualifications, 
training and experiences of Black owner managers showed the following:  
  
Table 5: Owner managers with some form of qualification  
TOTAL  white  Black  Asian  Mixed  Other  
Refused  
  
Un-weighted ‗N‘ 4527  2918  138  405  44  90  
886  
  
% of those with 
Qualification  18%  50%  24%  32%  34%  20%  
  
Source: LABS 2007 –Result Summary (Tab 273)  
  
Table 5 above is a comparison of the respondents surveyed based on un-
weighted samples of all establishments in London (LABS 2007). The table 
illustration simply shows the comparisons based on counted responses and 
percentages related to the proportions of the various ethnic categories. The key 
point was the high percentage (50% - about half of 138) of Black owner 
managers with a qualification compared with 18% of a significantly larger 
population (2918) of the white group. This is consistent with other research and 
supports the notion that BACEs record the highest proportion of academic 
qualification than their peers in the UK when compared like for like.  
 The fact that the data (Table 5) does not provide sufficient information on the 
types and level of qualifications attained, is not so much a limitations of 
overreliance on quantitative data, but the questions around qualification types 
and or levels were not asked. Perhaps, complementing the quantitative 
approach with some qualitative approach affords the researcher with the 
opportunity to ask specific questions to provide meaningful data, which in 
effect helps in drawing useful inferences.   
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4.4.3 Investment & Access to finance  
The 2003 - 2007 LABS annual survey showed that problems in accessing finance 
has consistently been  amongst the top five highly ranked barriers to investment 
and growth for London businesses generally (though, the ranking changed 
yearly). A close look at some of the underlying data reveals a number of 
interesting but inconclusive issues worth noting, some of these are looked at in 
this review, Access to finance and management decisions on investments were 
some of the key issues looked at.   
The LABS 2006 survey analysis gave a detailed insight into some of the findings 
relating to the experiences of the six main ethnicity categories. The analysis 
showed that two thirds of all businesses seeking external finance were 
successful in their applications to banks. There were, however, some noticeable 
differences across ethnic groups. Nearly three quarters of white-owned 
businesses were successful in obtaining bank finance. This compares with fewer 
than three out of 10 Black-owned businesses and fewer than three out of five 
Asian-owned businesses.   
In the preceding 4 years of the LABS annual surveys, the three main reasons 
cited by ALL categories, irrespective of ethnic category were: lack of collateral 
(45%); not being able to obtain a large enough loan (42%) and the lender not 
understanding the applicants‘ business needs (40%) – with more of the Black 
respondents citing the latter as the most frequently mentioned reason: LABS 
2004, 2007). The LABS 2004 went further to separate ‗barriers and enablers 
affecting business competition‘ from ‗investment and access to finance‘. For the 
former, availability of skilled employees, crime, transport and the cost of current 
premises were seen by businesses as their most significant problems.  Access to 
finance was a much lesser issue when it comes to competition, this ranked as the 
fifth most significant problem in some of the surveys. It was also noted that, 
despite the qualification attainments of some Black-owned business owners, 
they were not adopting and utilising appropriate marketing strategies for 
launching new products/services.   
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The 2006 LABS report inferred that the Black owned businesses tend to operate 
in marginalised sectors and therefore may be operating in isolation compared to 
Asian-owned businesses which often have good social networks. Smaller 
businesses were less likely to source finance externally and typically invested 
less than average amounts of capital.   
Size of the organisation rather than ethnic orientations was the key factors 
influencing capital investment. However, Black-owned businesses were much 
less likely to be successful in accessing bank finance compared to other ethnic 
groups. The reasons for this are not entirely clear by merely looking at statistical 
representations from the 2006 LABS results. In order to shed more light on the 
reasons for their lower success rate, the underlying data on ‗access to finance‘ 
from the 2007 were looked at in some detail.   
Table 6 compares the percentages of the 6 ethnic business categories surveyed in 
the investment range of less than £50,000 up to £500,000. It is not surprising to 
note that the Black owned category shows smaller averaged investments. The 
reason for this is varied and form part of the investigations of the empirical 
work.       
Table 6: Capital investment at site in a 12 month period  
  White  Black  Asian  Mixed  Other/  
Chinese  
Refused 
/don’t 
know  
Un-weighted  4527  2918  138  405  44  90  886  
Total   
(All  
establishments)  
355969  260376  12483  36581  5135  4459  35300  
<£50K  252974  190102  10339  28833  3005  2147  17306  
% proportion  71%  71%  83%  79%  59%  48%  49%  
£50k–£100K  24808  17784  864  2237  254  1347  2083  
% proportion    7%  7%  7%  6%  5%  30%  6%  
£100K -£500K  11250  7415  320  1099  134  34  2196  
% proportion  3%  3%  3%  3%  2%  *0%  20%  
*Insignificant measures        
Source: 2007 LABS Dataset – Tab 93; (Grossed-up counts)     
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Table 6 compares the proportions of capital investments that fell into particular 
investment size bands in a 12 month period (LABS 2007 dataset). The objective 
was to compute the percentages of businesses in each ethnic category that made 
investments in each of the investment size categories. The significant figures 
used to compute the percentages was to divide the total (grossed up) in the 
three investment size categories by the total counts in all establishments. This 
trend is not an unusual pattern irrespective of the business ethnicity in a 
competitive financial market and conditions, larger businesses tend to have a 
much greater investment capacity than small and medium enterprises.   
When the businesses investing up to £100,000 and above were analysed, only 3 
% of the Black category invested that much. This is expected due to the size of 
micro businesses and appears to be consistent with other businesses of the same 
size of any ethnicity.   From table 3, there were very little differences in the 
investment size categories between the EMBs and their white counterparts. 
Interestingly, the white and Black businesses recorded almost the same 
proportions of investment in the £50K – 100K and the £100K – 500K investment 
categories.   
The researchers view is that the Black owned businesses invested as much as any 
other ethnic groups and little less than the white control group, which was quite 
expected based on ‗size‘ of the firms rather than ethnicity. The alternative 
arguments could have arisen if data were available to compare the individual 
category success rates of investments as the LABS survey did not capture these 
via quantitative surveys. It is hoped that the empirical work for this study 
would find some alternative and meaningful explanations to these possibilities.  
The inferences drawn from the LABS result does not, on its own, support the 
proposition that ethnicity of the owner manager is an influencing factor when 
Black business owners seek finance. But the inferences and interpretations tend 
to support the view that small businesses are more likely to experience 
difficulties when seeking finance.  This agrees with the LABS 2004 findings that 
showed that size of the business rather than ethnicity may be a key factor 
predisposing businesses to accessing capital funds. The reason for this is purely 
economics rather than by personal attributes of the entrepreneurs.   
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4.4.4 Experiences and Attitudes (Relating to Access to Finance)  
The difficulties for measuring perception have been discussed and referenced in 
the literature searches and subsequent field work in this research. The LABS 
2007 data offered an opportunity to explore and analyse a number of variables 
for attempting to measure the experiences and ‗feel factor‘ of BACEs 
approaching funding sources. This analysis considers the range of 
reasons/problems for:  
(a) the factors attributed to discouraged actions and possible failures of the 
businesses  
(b) assessing the feel factor of the owner managers and possible reasons for 
this and  
(c) evaluating the effectiveness and utilisation of business support   The 
approach adopted for analysing the raw data was to select a number of 
questions asked in the survey that were relevant to this theme. 
Frequencies were run by the SPSS software to identify valid samples (i.e. 
valid responses of the total population): these did not include the 
missing/blank responses, and the Total white (Tw) and Total Black (Tb) 
responses were used for the comparatives. The results were then 
presented in tables that compared the results of the Black owned 
businesses and the white owned businesses. Discussions of the findings 
followed each table and summary headlines of the key themes 
highlighted. Eight (8) questions were selected and analysed;   
Table 7: Whether respondents approached any external sources for investment or other 
finance in a period of 12 months  
All Establishments 
N=355969  
Total  White  Black  
  355969  260376  12483  
‗yes‘  71705  49212  19%  5492  44%  
‗No‘  262163  200342  77%  6683  54%  
Source: LABS 2007    (grossed up totals), (Unknown/refused counts discarded)  
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Table 7 shows that Black owned businesses (54%) did not approach external 
sources of investments or other finance, but a corresponding higher proportion 
of the white owned businesses (77%) didn‘t either. Perhaps, the dependence on 
quantitative data alone makes it difficult to explain how these findings come 
about, by merely reviewing statistics.    
It is necessary to note that, if the 54% Black owned businesses did not approach 
any external sources of investment or other finance, as they may not have 
needed any, it is then impossible to know whether or not they would have been 
successful. There are two obvious lines of arguments; the first is that the Black 
owned businesses do not adequately seek formal sources of funding because 
they do not need it and the other dimension is the widely reported discouraged 
borrower‘s effects.   
The research findings of the BBA, DTI, and Bank of England have concluded 
that there are disproportionate barriers faced by the Black owned businesses. 
The area needing further explanation is the possibility or need to explore if there 
is a relationship between the discouraged factors (business owners who did not 
feel they would succeed) and the business owners who actually approached the 
banks but failed in obtaining a business loan. An assumption for one of the 
possible reasons for the failures in obtaining business finance relates to types, 
sectors and sizes of the businesses rather than the entrepreneur‘s personal 
characteristics such as ethnicity. This is consistent with research which agree 
that sector is not a determining influence in this respect (SBS, 2001) and that size 
is a more dominant factor (Fraser, 2008) than ethnicity.   
Table 8: Whether respondents experienced any problems in accessing external funding 
in the 12 month period  
All Establishments  
N = 355969  
Total  White  Black  
Total*  355969  260376  12483  
‗yes‘  44080  28910  11%  4033  32%  
‗No‘  311105  230728  89%  8450  68%  
Source: LABS 2007    *(grossed up totals/Unknown/refused counts discarded)  
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The 32% of the Black owned businesses which indicated that they experienced 
problems (Table 8) is significantly higher than the 11% of the white owned 
businesses, despite a relatively low respondent weighted count (4033 cases) 
compared to the 28,910 (weighted) white owned businesses. When the result in 
table 4 previously was considered, it was unclear why the variation is this 
significant; merely looking at the data does not offer much explanation as to the 
reasons behind this finding. A suggestion is that a higher proportion of the 44% 
that did approach a finance source may have failed to secure finance or that they 
may have secured insufficient amounts.   
 
Table 9: Where respondents experienced problems  
 Seven (7) response options available, 3 were chosen for analysis:  
(a) Cannot obtain large enough amount  (b) Lack of asset collateral to 
guarantee loan  (c) Lending organisations do not understand the needs of the 
organisations  
   Total white (Tw)  Total Black (Tb)  
Totals*   28910  % proportion  4033  % proportion  
 (a)  12538  43%  2415  60%  
 (b)  11330  39%  2632  65%  
 (c)  13804  48%  2550  63%  
            Source: LABS 2007    (*grossed up)  
Notes (Table 9):   
The %‘s are worked out by dividing the respondents who cited a reason    (i.e. cannot obtain 
large enough amount) by the total counts of the corresponding category. For example: the % 
proportion of the Black businesses who cited (a) as the main problem is: (2415/4033) % = 59.8%   
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The significant observations in table 9 are that all three reasons analysed 
suggests the Black owned businesses appear to be more disadvantaged with 
significantly higher percentages across the three reasons. This is consistent with 
the themes that have been a presented in the literature (chapter two), but what is 
missing with these statistics is the lack of ‗underlying‘ factors to support these 
results. It is anticipated that, the qualitative methods of in-depth interviews may 
offer alternative explanations.  
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Table 10: Types of external sources of finance approached in a 12 month period  
Including: 
(a)Banks (b) Leasing or hire purchase company (c) Equity 
partner/venture capital (d) Loan from government agency  
  
   Total white (Tw)  Total Black (Tb)  
Totals*   49212*  % proportion  5492*  % proportion  
 (a)  35646  72%  4768  87%  
 (b)  1595  3%  63  1%  
 (c)  2315  5%  95  2%  
 (d)  2275  5%  54  1%  
       (Source: LABS 2007)        
 *grossed up (the grossed up figures, rather than the actual counts offered the best chance to              
make some meaningful inferences)   
  
Table 10 confirms that banks were the most approached source for external 
finance for businesses in London irrespective of the ethnicity of the business. 
However, it appears that a higher proportion of the black owned businesses 
that used external sources of finance relied on the banks (87% of Black owned 
businesses compared to 72% of their white counterparts). The implication for 
this may be that the Black business category tend to be over reliant on banks 
for finance and as suggested in literature (BoE, 2002), they do not explore 
alternative sources enough to increase chances of securing business finance. 
Whilst the same can be said of the white businesses, a small but significant 
proportion of them approached alternative sources.   
The other point to be made is that the Black owned businesses might not have 
been aware of appropriate alternative sources that could have suited their 
needs. This may be attributed to the low human capital (in terms of financial 
education in this instance) for some of the owner managers. Alternatively, lack 
of confidence and/or the discouragement effect are possible reasons.  
 114  
  
  
Table 11: Whether successful in gaining finance from sources approached  
(a) Banks  
(b) A Grant fund (e.g. Government grant)  
(c) Credit Card  
  Total white (Tw)  Total Black (Tb)  
Totals*    436*  % proportion  49*  % proportion  
Yes  No  Unresolved  Yes  No  Unresolved  
(a)    61%  21%  18%    49%  48%  3  
(b)    28%  66%  6%    -  -  -  
(c)    91%  8%  1%    100%  -  -  
Source: LABS 2007       *un-weighted  
(NB: The base figs. were the un-weighted data, the grossed up figures were not available)   
  
Table 11 suggests that a significant proportion of Black owner managers were 
unsuccessful (48%, of which 3% had unresolved issues with the banks, but 
details were not available within the data set analysed) securing finance from 
three common sources approached compared to the 21% of the white owned 
control group that could not secure finance, this is in addition to the 18% who 
had unresolved issues in the period analysed. Interestingly, all the Black 
business owners sampled expressed total satisfaction in using credit cards as a 
finance alternative.   
The risk of non-payment of credit cards, is an issue for this group, particularly 
as interest rates are higher than average for similar products. This implies that, 
there is a possibility for the group to fall into debt, resulting in adverse credit 
ratings. The table also suggest that Black owned businesses hardly access grant 
funding and reasons for this may be similar to those mentioned in the 
discussions for Table seven.    
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Table 12: Decisions and actions considered resulting from previous experiences 
including factors that led/influenced the business not to seek any external 
finance in the 12 month period  
(a) Do not want to take on too much risk or overextend the business  
(b) It‘s too expensive  
(c) The business does not like to take out loan  
(d) Felt if applied for business loan, could be turned down  
 
   Total white (Tw)  Total Black (Tb)  
Totals *   189596*  % proportion  6627*  % proportion  
 (a)  109692  58%  4471  67%  
 (b)  72201  38%  3156  48%  
 (c)  108886  57%  2364  36%  
 (d)  12858  7%  905  14%  
   
Source: LABS 2007         
  *grossed up (the ‗actual counts for this table had an awful lot of ‗missing data‘, hence the 
decision to use the ‗grossed up‘ data, which were based on proportions of all categories 
analysed)  
 
One key inference that can be made from Table 12 is  that Black owned 
businesses are risk averse and indeed do not adequately seek business loans 
compared to the white owned control group. A high proportion of the Black 
business category (67%) said they did not like to take out loans compared to 
the 58% of the control group. The reason for this response is not evident from 
the data, but is supported by research (Ram & Deakins, 1996) which showed 
that African Caribbean Businesses (ACBs) have a particularly low propensity 
to seek bank finance at start-up, relying instead on personal savings and trade 
credit.   
This same view is supported by the (CEEDR, 2000b) study of business issues 
and support needs of African Caribbean Businesses (ACB) in London. An 
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alternative view is the lack of special facilities or waivers – discretionary 
adjustments such as reduced collateral requirements offered by banks (such as 
HSBC) to South Asian customers (Focus Central London, 1999).  
The other significant point is the proportion of Black businesses (14%) who did 
not access finance because of the ‗perception‘ (feel factor) that they might be 
refused (i.e.  the ‗discouraged borrower‘ effect).   
The limitation of these statistics (as in several earlier studies – Bank of 
England, 1999) is the inability to probe further to ascertain why the 
respondents felt the way they did toward seeking external finance. Even 
though, the LABS 2007 data offers the largest data sample possible, but the 
relatively small valid  responses for the critical questions makes it difficult to 
give generalisations about the attitudes of the Black owned businesses without 
employing  alternative methods for verifying these findings.   
The empirical work during this study supports the view that the attitudes of 
the group manifest in their behaviours and actions, but there could be other 
variables which would emerge during the field work (but not available in the 
datasets analysed) as alternative explanations to why the Black business owner 
managers held particular attitudes about accessing external finance. For 
example, a possible reason could be that the BACE owner managers felt there 
was an element of negative stereotyping involved on the parts of bank 
managers, resulting in them not being taken seriously. 
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Table 13: External Organisation used for business advice in 12 months period  
(a) An accountant (b) Bank manager (c) A solicitor (d) Another business owner (e) 
Business link  
   Total white (Tw)  Total Black (Tb)  
Totals *   260376*  % proportion  12483*  % proportion  
 (a)  42070  16%  2482  20%  
 (b)  16311  6%  1232  10%  
 (c)  13135  5%  339  3%  
 (d)  6228  2%  751  1%  
 (e)  10362  4%  1270  10%  
  
Source: LABS 2007     
(*grossed up base figs. used)  
  
Table 13 suggests that businesses in London generally do not maximise 
available sources of business support services. The two groups compared use 
the accountant as their main source for business advice, this is not surprising 
as the finding is consistent with previous research on Ethnic Minority 
Businesses in general, indicating that they have a low propensity to use 
mainstream business support agencies. The data above also suggest that a very 
small proportion (6%) of white businesses approached bank managers for 
support, compared to the relatively higher (10%) for the Black businesses.  This 
is notable because the proportion of respondents in the Black business category 
is significantly quite low (1,232 grossed up fig) compared to the white group 
(16,311 grossed up). This suggests that the Black owned businesses rely on 
their bank manager as a useful resource. There are a number of theories that 
have been suggested as possible reasons for the low take-up; one that has 
become noticeable in the empirical work undertaken is the lack of information 
and awareness of the existence of mainstream business support services.  The 
absence of customised support services to meet the needs of the range of ethnic 
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groups has been widely reported (Dhaliwal, 2008; Ram et al., 2012). Another 
perspective is the lack of willingness to pay for professional services (not 
shown in the tables, but well documented in the literature review chapter). The 
Focus, 1999 study, one of the earlier researches into Black businesses in terms 
of access to finance also showed that Black owned businesses were far more 
likely to have contacted one of the various support agencies/organisations 
than their counterparts in other ethnic minority groups. This is supported by 
the proportion (10%) shown above who approached Business Link for advice 
compared to the very low (6%) uptake by the white businesses.  
4.5 Summary  
The review of the LABS reports (2003 – 2006; plus the analysis of the 2007 data 
set) present a number of interesting findings. The 2007 LABS used 78 questions 
in the survey questionnaire focused on nine (9) themes. The questions relating 
to ‗Investment and Access to Finance‘ formed the basis and focus for analysis 
in this chapter. The key findings relevant to this study are presented in the 
tables in this chapter, whilst the key themes are detailed in the sub-sections. 
The questions selected for analysis were those that related to the objectives of 
this research which provides an alternative methodological perspective to 
complement the qualitative approaches adopted.   
4.5.1 Influence of Qualification and Management Practices  
Half of the (138) Black owner managers had a formal qualification compared 
with a quarter of a significantly larger population (2918) of their white 
counterparts. Owner managers of Black owned businesses generally have 
relatively higher qualifications than their counterparts from other ethnic 
categories, but the LABS survey questions do not drill down enough to 
identify the types and/or levels attained.  Therefore, it is not possible to make 
a generalised claim to the validity and relevance of this factor to the chances of 
the businesses to access external finance. In-depth interviews would certainly 
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offer opportunities to obtain some detailed explanations and evidence to 
support this claim.    
Further research is desired to separate perceptions from reality and perhaps, to 
show how relevant qualifications (types and levels) contribute to making 
judgement and presenting the business case for seeking external finance. The 
nature of the questions asked and the resulting responses do not make it 
possible to make much inference about the influence of the qualifications 
attained and its impact on the ability to access appropriate finance.   
4.5.2 Capital Investments  
Three investment size categories by the six (6) ethnic categories over a twelve 
month period were compared (Table 6). The three tiers were: <£50K, between 
£50 – £100K and £100 – £500K. The variations in the range of investment 
finance relates to the ‗sizes‘ rather than ethnicity, smaller firms generally are 
unable to invest as much as the larger firms as expected.   
From literature (chapter 2), there were some suggestions that one of the main 
determinant factors for successful investment and access to finance by SMEs is 
size rather than ethnicity orientation. For example, in 2006 over 40% of all 
businesses reported that, they had not been able to invest as much in capital 
over a 12 month of trading as they would have liked to, but still accessed some 
finance.   
For these businesses, the key constraints on investment were market conditions 
(44%), a decrease in profitability (35%) and problems accessing external 
finance (33%) – LABS 2006. The Black-owned businesses had an overreliance 
on bank lenders and therefore underutilised the various alternative sources of 
finance, compared to the Asian-owned businesses. The key point here is the 
emphasis on ‗perception‘ referred to as the ‗feel factor‘ which comes through in 
a number of reviews, but the quantitative approach employed in the LABS 
work was unable to explore this concept further.   
For example, there is a clear perception of refusals often nurtured by the Black 
owned businesses even before trying to apply for finance from formal sources 
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referred to as the ‗discouraged borrower effect‘. This further supports the view 
that some of the problems reported by the Black owned businesses can be 
largely attributed to ‗attitudes‘ as one of the explanations. It is also evident that 
the Black owned businesses are less likely to take risks, hence limiting the 
scope to expand or grow their businesses compared to their peer EMB 
categories.   
4.5.3 Experiences and Behaviour of Black Owned Business Owners  
One of the key issues analysed in the 2007 LABS results was that of 
‗discouraged actions‘ and possible failures arising from this. When 
respondents were asked (Table 7) whether they approached any external 
source of finance for investment (notably from banks) in a twelve (12) month 
period, Black owned businesses (just over half of the respondents) indicated 
they did not approach external sources, but a corresponding higher proportion 
(three quarters) of their white counterparts didn‘t either.   
This finding raised an interesting point which is inconsistent with literature 
because, Black owned businesses have been widely reported to be over-reliant 
on debt finance and less inclined to seeking alternative sources. The issue 
about ‗discouraged borrowers‘ is very topical and relevant to this study. The 
review of statistical data does not provide clear reasons for ‗behaviour‘ 
without complementing these findings with qualitative accounts, which is the 
originality for this research. The effect of the ‗discouraged borrower‘ could not 
be generalised based on quantitative data alone (table 8), because, even the 
Black businesses (fairly even proportions with the white businesses) that 
experienced problems when they sought finance from banks did not indicate 
whether they were turned down or didn‘t apply at all.   
Another significant point relates to the underutilisation of alternative sources 
of finance such as grants, social funds and other community focused funding 
initiatives. Table eight (8) supports this notion and one might think that the 
‗knowledge gap‘ for the owner managers about these alternative funding 
sources might be significant.  
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4.5.4 ‘Behaviours’ and ‘Attitudes’ towards External Business Support Usage  
The usage of business support services across the six ethnicity categories 
appears to be generally low and consistent with findings in literature.  
Businesses in general do not use the full range of business support services 
adequately; however, there are some variations in the sources approached by 
the respective ethnic categories analysed. A common observation (Tables 12 & 
13) is that Black owned businesses are less inclined to seek business advice and 
are also less likely to invest in professional support services. Literature 
(Dhiwali, 2006) suggests that the likelihood of using external business advice 
amongst small firms tends to decrease with increased size, except for the very 
large businesses seeking expert support services.   
The most popular sources of advice include: accountants, bank managers and 
solicitors, not in any particular order, but the use of accountants is consistent 
across all establishments because this is a statutory requirement. The 
interesting point noticeable amongst Asian and Chinese owned businesses is 
that they tend to rely on internal sources (family, similar organisation) as the 
preferred source of advice. It is not surprising though, because of the stronger 
community links they have compared to Black-owned businesses which often 
operate in isolation and within ethnic enclaves that have been well 
documented in the literature review. The LABS surveys however, did not 
provide enough data to establish whether there were particular gaps and 
reasons for the type(s) of business support utilised.   
4.6 Limitations of the LABS Analysis  
The LABS survey provides a valuable quantitative and to a lesser extent, some 
qualitative data that helps to further focus the research questions for this 
study. It did not adequately cover many components which could have probed 
into specific issues and evidence required to make generalisations. Some of the 
intrinsic weaknesses of the LABS data are that they are not sufficient for 
discerning underlying reasons or factors which influence cognitive behaviours 
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or attitudes.  Relying solely on the LABS data does not help to ‗explain‘ 
generalisations as insider accounts would.   
Another major problem with the LABS raw data had to do with missing data 
and with the choice of certain data counts: weighted versus un-weighted 
counts. The approach for mitigating some of these difficulties was to purposely 
select a grossed up totals or an un-weighted total depending on the type of 
analysis desired. The choice and consistency of the counts type selected for 
discussions had significant fluctuations in the subsequent comments and 
inferences. Overall, the analysis of the LABS surveys helped in justifying the 
complementary qualitative methodology adopted for this study. This LABS 
analysis also supported many themes that emerged in the earlier scoping study 
and literature review searches and also helped the researcher focus some of the 
research questions and methodological considerations.   
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CHAPTER 5: BACE PERSPECTIVES: PRIMARY RESEARCH  
FINDINGS (1)  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents and analyses the main findings from qualitative 
interviews with 30 BACE owner managers (referred to as the ‗Demand Side‘). 
The field work was carried out over a two and a half year period (between 
2008 and 2011). The interviews (some were several interviews) of these BACE 
firms both complement and develop some of the key findings arising from the 
LABS analysis detailed in Chapter 4, enabling a more detailed examination of 
the attitudes and behaviours of BACEs with respect to access to finance. A 
semi-structured questionnaire was used (see appendix 2) and the notes/data 
obtained were the accounts of the respondents which formed the data 
obtained for analysis. Table 14 below shows the profiles of the 30 participant 
BACE owner managers including relevant variables used for the analysis. 
 
Table 14: Interview Participants Profile  
No.  BACE – 
Owner  
Manager.  
Maximum  
Qualification  
Attained  
Generation  
Gender  
Ethnicity  
  
Notes  
1  DD  MBA (Finance &  
Management)  
2nd  - Male/African  
  
Professional  
Services Sector  
2  FO  Bsc  
  
2nd - Male/African   Cleaning Services  
3  MA  Bsc  2nd - Male/African  Recruitment & Training  
4  EW  Msc/Certified Assessor  1st  - Female/ Caribbean  Training & Consultancy  
5  BD  BA  2nd - Male/African  Printing  
6  HB  GCSE  1st  - Female/ Caribbean  Education  
7  SW  Bsc  3rd  - Female/ Caribbean  Nursery  
8  MG  AL  3rd - Male/ Caribbean  Catering services  
  FE  Msc   1st  - Male/African  Initial contact, declined 
Further Interviews.  
10  AA  Msc  1st - Male/African  Transport Services  
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No.  BACE – 
Owner  
Manager.  
Maximum  
Qualification  
Attained  
Generation  
Gender  
Ethnicity  
  
Notes  
11  OT Bsc         1st -Female/ 
Caribbean  
Fashion retail  
  
12  AA  Msc, IT Systems Certified  2nd - Male/African  Consultancy  
13  TJ  AL  1st - Female/ Caribbean  Nursery  
14  KA  Msc, MBE  1st - Male/African  Professional Services  
15  NJ   Msc  1st - Male/African  Professional Services &  
Consultancy  
16  AA  Msc  2nd - Male/ Caribbean  Initial Contact only  
(Recruitment)  
  
17  
  
AO  
  
Msc  1st - Male/African  
  
Property Services  
18  
   
AO  
  
Msc  1st - Male/African  Professional/ ELearning  
19  JG  MSc  2nd Female/Caribbean  Training & Recruitment  
20  
  
BO  
  
PhD  
  
1st - Male/African  Advocacy & Training  
21  KA  Msc  1st - Male/African  
  
Media   
22   
  
RKM  Bsc  1st - Female/African  Training  
23 AA  
  
Msc  1st - Male/African  Consultancy & Training  
24 BO  Msc  2nd - Male/African  Business /Personnel  
Development  
  
25  
EE  Msc/ Certified        2nd - 
Female/Caribbean  
Services/training  
26  
  
SS  Bsc         2nd - Female/African  Retail  
27  SD  GCSE        3rd - 
Female/Caribbean  
Hair & Beauty  
  
28  
JM  MPhil  1st  - Male/African  
  
Services  
  
29  
IA  MA  1st - Male/African  Consultancy  
  
30  
OA  HND  1st  -Female African  Food Supply  
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The findings constitute a development of new evidence for explaining the 
barriers facing groups of BACEs. This also adds a new dimension to the 
research domain, in that they shed light on the business owners with emphasis 
on the level and scope of qualification attained as influencing factors which 
affect access to external finance. The main issues examined include evaluating 
the importance of the human capital and its contribution to the chances for 
accessing finance. The other aspect being examined includes evaluating the 
extent to which attitudes impact on the entrepreneurial success of owner 
managers. The last part of this section presents the findings about the 
awareness and usage of business support services and its effectiveness.  
For the main study, 30 cases were purposely selected for in-depth interviews 
with a view to present them with a number of questions and attitude 
statements. The justification for in-depth interviews has been detailed in the 
methodology chapter. In the main, the researcher examines, in depth, certain 
features of the 30 purposely selected BACEs. The interviews were conducted 
over a period of about two years, collecting extensive data.  Tables 14a & 14b 
below gives a snap shot of the background and characteristics of the 30 cases.  
  
The basis and justifications for selecting the ‗purposeful list of respondents‘ 
was detailed in Chapter 3. Some judgement was made to select a fair 
representation to satisfy the issues under investigation; for example, the 
selection parameters were characterised and grouped by:  
  
 Educational attainment  
 Business experience/sector  
 Generational feature 
 Gender mix  
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Table 15a: The BACE owner managers ‗fit‘ into set quota parameters:  
(Human  
Capital)  
Qualifications  
Secured Finance     
Notes  Yes  No  
1st Degree  3  2  The influence of human capital in terms 
of qualifications and experience of the 
BACE owner manager was one of the 
key objectives for this study. Though, 
some of the respondents who secured 
finance still felt they did not obtain 
enough or had applied many times 
before a small success achieved. The  
levels of qualification attained by ALL 
respondents are shown in Appendix 3  
Pgd or over  14  1  
GCSE  5  0  
Vocational   
Qualification  
1  2  
TOTAL CASES  23  5  2 cases had never sought finance  
  
  
Table 15b: Generational & Gender Compositions of BACE owner 
managers/respondents interviewed  
     
Generation  Male  Female  Notes  
1st  11  5  Largely immigrant BACEs  
2nd/3rd  9  5  The 2nd & 3rd generations had similar 
characteristics – born and studied in the 
UK  
TOTAL CASES  20  10    
  
Table 14 shows the range of business sectors within which the respondents 
operated. The schedule shows that a ‗fair mix‘ of business sectors was 
sampled purposely for reasons already stated. There were however, more 
male respondents (20) selected as the female owner managers were fewer, 
many possible female respondents were running their businesses on a part 
time basis and most rarely sought finance. The reasons for this were discussed 
in Chapter  
2, mainly because of family commitments and child care. There were more 
Black African owner managers (20) selected as much research (chapter 2 – cites 
numerous studies) suggests that this category of Black firm owners recorded 
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more ‗dissatisfactions‘ when seeking finance from formal sources, hence the 
justification to select more respondents for investigation, compared to the (10) 
Black Caribbean owner managers.  
Tables 15(a) & (b) show brief narratives of the 30 BACE owner manager 
respondents that were interviewed over a two and a half year period (winter 
of 2008 – winter 2011). The cases were identified by numbers (1 – 30) and the 
owner managers initials used for anonymity. The transcripts (selected 
transcripts also attached as appendix 3) contain extracts that were fed into the 
Nvivo project file as an ‗External Source‘, with which some aspects of the 
emerging themes were analysed – analysing qualitative data quantitatively. 
5.2 Research Objective 1: Influence of Human Capital on accessing external  
finance  
    Table 16a: Significance of Human Capital to securing finance     
     Source: Attitude Query (Nvivo outputs)  
 
    The responses that were tracked using the Nvivo software were texts and/or phrases such as: 
I agree education matters…… 
Not too sure….. (Neither Agree nor disagree) 
Strongly disagree/ disagree totally about this….. 
I don‘t really think that professional qualification is a ‗do or die‘ matter, but may be relevant 
as well….(neither agree nor disagree) 
 Research 
Question 
Q1: Does the respondent agree (or otherwise) that their 
level/type of qualification and business experiences 
favour their ability to secure external finance? 
Nvivo8 Significance 
Themes aggregation: 
 
All Interviews (30) 
The Nvivo software has been set to equate the „significance’ responses for 
all the transcripts as a function of the themes that were „dominant‟ in the 
interview transcripts as having a positive effect on the chance or 
probability of the BACE to access business finance from formal sources. 
The determinant variable tested is the relevance of „Human Capital’ of 
the respondent to their chances of securing business finance. The labels are 
on a five point scale: 
Human Capital 
Level/Knowledge Gap 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Owner Managers 
(BACE) 
2 16 2 6 4 
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This method of ‗query‘ helps to identify and apportion the degree of 
significance – meaning how many times the words were said to 
agree/disagree with the question being discussed during the interviews. It is 
possible to infer that 60% (18) of the BACEs interviewed believed (53% agreed; 
7% strongly agreed) that the attainment of professional and relevant 
qualification and experience of the BACE do have a positive impact on the 
business owner manager‘s chances of accessing business finance. A number of 
respondents spoke along these lines:  
  
“I could not agree more with this. In fact, I think it‟s a critical factor an 
underlining factor responsible for how BACEs make decisions and go about 
considering take-up of banking finance as this is a very red-tape process and a 
„know-how‟ is desirable. I also think this is why many BACEs do not „try‟ to 
access bank finance, because of the work entailed, such as business planning 
and writing a strategy/developing a detailed cash-flow for example.” DD - 
29/10/08  
  
“I think that a relevant management qualification can only improve how you 
explore finance sources but ultimately, your experience + environment will 
play a big part in how you obtain finance....... I believe getting a qualification 
helps your profile in accessing finance. I do not think it is required to make a 
business successful. I think to a lender, it gives a professional impression of 
your business and you! ”AA - 17/10/08  
  
“I agree if the manager / owner don‟t have the knowledge it can create an 
information gap as understanding or capacity is less. This creates a 
disadvantage being a small firm requires a high level of knowledge, a diehard 
resilient spirit and good people skills. All these factors in my view encompass 
knowledge.”  EW – 20/11/08  
  
These statements re-affirm the relevance attributed to the need for financial 
skills that has been documented as a gap for SMEs in general and not just for 
Black businesses (Scott, 2008; Hussain & Matlay, 2006).  
 A significant, but lesser proportion of the interviewees, 10 of them (33%) 
strongly disagreed/disagreed that the attainment of relevant qualification 
and/or experience was critical. Some of the cases looked at suggested that 
some banks tend to overlook the ‗credence‘ of the business idea by focusing on 
presentation and lack of financial information such as cash flow:  
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“I really don‟t agree to an extent that having a relevant management degree is 
relevant….. from experience, I believe you have to have some form of formal 
education, i.e. to be literate and be able to understand the basics for looking 
after your business requirements….. The matter of qualification is a bias factor 
in this  
matter and I also think it depends on the nature of your business 
too....”  BD – 4/12/08  
  
Well, for me the blame is more leaning towards the banks rather than the 
BACEs who may be disadvantaged in a number of ways such as 
communication, low knowledge or skills to develop business plan and having 
collaterals. In cases where the business loan applicant has a viable business 
proposal, the prospective lending bank should be providing extra support to 
nurture the idea, you just never know which of the ideas, no matter how 
crudely presented can turn out to be a very profitable venture for both the 
customer and the bank!....” DD – 14/1/09  
  
The contrary opinion was those who felt that the issue of education was 
overemphasised. The result showed that these groups recorded the least 
success accessing finance. There may appear to be a finance gap; from the 
financier perspective who may consider the BACE proposal to be ‗risky‘ or 
may have insufficient information and therefore miss out on a bankable case. 
From the interview findings, only a small proportion of the qualified BACE 
owner managers‘ actually secured finance from external sources, one can then 
infer that the BACE levels and type of educational attainment on its own does 
not necessarily influence the probability for accessing finance. But the 
argument is that lending banks do put an emphasis on the business proposal 
accompanied with appropriate financial assessment and forecasting 
irrespective of educational attainment and/or ethnic orientation (Fraser, 2008)   
Therefore, it seems logical to infer that whilst relevant education is important, 
it is not a sufficient condition, on its own for receiving bank finance. As 
Curran et al., (1997) recognises, the role and significance of financial skills, 
particularly when it impacts on their understanding of financial planning, 
does help. They recognise that BACEs are heterogeneous and that a vast 
majority of owner managers do not possess sufficient financial skills to 
develop and manage strategic investments.   
What is worth of noting is that the highly qualified BACE owner managers 
still experienced difficulties of successfully accessing external finance, only 
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33% of all cases interviewed secured bank finance, despite 53% agreeing and 
about 7% strongly agreeing to the relevance of higher qualifications as helping 
them make the right choices about which financial product to access – 
surprisingly, these included mostly non formal sources of finance such as 
enterprise loans and personal savings.   
What this shows is that some of the better educated BACEs were successful 
with obtaining non-bank finance mainly because they could discern which 
finance source was most appropriate at the initial setup of the business.  A 
female BACE for example argued that she saw no need to apply for a business 
loan, not because she did not need the finance, but she felt that her assessment 
and projection of overhead and expenditure could be managed with a small 
amount of start-up finance which she could raise without accessing a bank 
loan. Often times BACEs lack the ability to identify the appropriate source of 
finance at the point of need and the ability to make such assessment comes 
with a level of financial knowledge and management decision.   
The level of human capital attained is relevant and may serve as an essential 
explanation for the alleged discrimination based on personal characteristics of 
the owner manager. However, there may be other explanation(s) for the 
reported barriers faced by the groups in relation to the use of business 
support, effect of knowledge gaps and other attitudinal characteristics of the 
BACE owner managers.   
Looking more closely at the BACEs who disagreed that attaining a higher level 
of qualification had an impact on the chances of accessing external finance, it 
was necessary to group these responses/cases along the categories of the level 
of qualification attained. Not surprisingly, some of the cases, that had 
challenges accessing finance appeared to have very negative perceptions of 
the ‗supply side‘ (lending banks). The aggregation along the levels/type of 
qualification was to ascertain whether there was any association between the 
levels of education gained and the ability of the BACE to secure finance. Table 
15b compares the correlation of the ‗feel factor‘ with two broad criterion (post 
graduate qualifications and above and those attaining less than a postgraduate 
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qualification). Other variables such as gender and generational/cultural 
views, use of ‗business support‘ resources etc. are looked at separately in the 
subsequent result analysis. 
 
Table 16b: Level of education attained and its influence on seeking/accessing 
external finance  
  Educational  Level 
attained  
Secured Finance  Failed  Total 
Cases  
Agreed  At least had a 1st 
Degree  
3  2    
Post Grad. & Over  14  1    
      20  
Disagreed  GCE/AL  1  -    
Vocational  1  2    
At least 1st Degree  4  -    
      8  
    NB: 2 Cases neither agreed or disagreed, result discounted  
  
The table above show the comparison of the views of the respondents when 
asked whether they agreed/disagreed with the proposition that levels of 
qualification attained helped with securing external finance in a 12 month 
period: the proposition is that a higher/relevant qualification increases the 
chances to secure finance.  
Table 16b presents the result of 28 cases interviewed and split in two parts: the 
first where those that agreed with the proposition that the level of human 
capital – in terms of education - positively influenced the BACE owner 
manager‘s chances for securing finance. Those with higher qualifications 
recorded more success and on the other hand, those who disagreed with the 
suggestion that qualification attained was relevant in accessing finance 
recorded less success.  When the cases were disaggregated and looked at more 
carefully (comparing the success rates), it can be suggested that the higher 
qualifications attained is also relevant to the success probability of the BACE 
to access external finance, a total of 14 firm owners with post degree 
qualifications and above registered a higher success rate, i.e. they were 
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successful in their applications for finance. Those with lesser levels of 
qualification (2 Cases - no formal degree) achieved the lower success rates; the 
4 cases that secured finance attained at least a first degree, and didn‘t agree 
that qualification was relevant – the reason for this was probably because they 
only secured a small amount of finance.  
Whilst this result is inconclusive due to the small number of cases studied, 
there is a suggestion that those with higher qualifications compared to their 
counterparts with lesser levels of qualification tend to agree that levels of 
educational attainment are relevant to their chances for securing finance. The 
argument was that, obtaining relevant qualification (i.e. financial or 
management) tends to enhance their presentation of a business case and the 
proposal document is better designed. The alternative argument could be that 
the happen to have a better business idea in the first place.  
5.2.1 Summary - Relevance of Human Capital  
The results in table 16b indicate that there is a relationship between the human 
capital attainment (in terms of qualification) of BACEs and their ability to access 
business finance from external sources. However, this suggestion may be 
largely attributed to attitudes which require further investigations and perhaps 
a larger sample of cases might have offered more reliable evidence. Over half of 
the interviewed cases expressed their views based on their experiences that 
those with higher educational achievements particularly those with relevant 
management and financial skills tend to agree with the proposition that higher 
qualification enhances the chances for securing finance from external sources. 
One of the explanations cited was that the owner manager would have a better 
understanding of the bank‘s requirements in terms of presenting a good 
business case with the relevant financial information.  A small but significant 
proportion of BACEs that had lesser levels of qualifications (those with no 
formal degree) tend to disagree with the proposition.   
A view can be taken that the qualifying requirements for external finance are 
standardised, irrespective of the applicant‘s personal characteristics. The focus 
for the lending institution (banks) would certainly be to maximise profits and 
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minimise risks. A fair (about a third) proportion of respondents thought that 
having a post–degree qualification did not entirely enhance the owner-
manager‘s chance in accessing debt finance but that the ‗financial skills‘ and 
qualifications in the finance subject areas were the critical needs in meeting the 
stringent bank requirements. It is worth noting that it may not be the owner 
manager who has the financial skills as it could be a financial director/officer 
within the company which might have been overlooked by the loans processing 
officer or system, it can be argued that the business owner may have presented 
the business case and inadvertently underutilised or recognised the skills 
available from other staff members. 
The other important point about the relevance of human capital was that, 
despite a large proportion (18 cases) agreeing that high levels of human capital 
were desirable for interpreting and processing bank financial requirements, 
(such as business planning, risk mapping, equity assessments, option appraisals 
for the appropriate type and amount of finance required) a small number of 
BACE respondents still felt that the banks were not considering the limitations 
for those with lesser qualification and competence required for presenting a 
good business case. There was a feeling that many bankable business ideas and 
proposals could be inadvertently overlooked because of poor presentation of 
the business case by the BACE owner manager.  
 Some research (CEEDR, 2008) presented empirical evidence that some SMEs 
still face difficulties in accessing bank finance and presented a good account of 
the possibilities that there may still be some market failure associated with 
good, bankable business cases from SMEs that do not receive finance. However, 
the study found relatively few instances of market failure which is consistent 
with the work done by other researchers, which propose that one of the reasons 
for the ‗finance gaps‘ is attributed to ‗informational effects‘.   
The term informational effect was discussed in chapter two which looked at the 
missing or misinformation between the supply and demand sides. One of the 
effects highlights the unwitting refusal of bankable cases because of information 
asymmetry.   
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A view can be made that acquisition of appropriate relevant management and 
financial skills, training and experience has the potential to enhance decision 
making –being able to analyse and decide on the type of finance applicable, the 
development and presentation of the business case or proposal. Furthermore, 
better decision making and innovative approaches empower the BACE owner 
manager to break out of the ethnic enclaves that a significant number of some 
BACEs have created based on attitudinal and behavioural tendencies. Breaking 
out of these ‗ethnic enclaves may enable those facing disproportionate (in 
relation to other EMBs) barriers to absorb external shocks and thrive in difficult 
economic conditions as noticeable in the last few years resulting from the ‗credit 
crunch‘. Some further discussion is made at a later stage in this chapter on the 
relative stimulus BACEs show in coping with the impact of the economic down 
turn in recent times.  
5.3 Research Objective 2: Effects of Cultural and Generational Differences on  
Attitudes  
This section consists of two parts: the first part focuses on the  cultural and 
generational features of BACEs, whilst the second part looks more at how these 
factors influence their behaviour and  ‗attitudes‘ towards seeking external 
finance. These factors are intricately interwoven and difficult to separate as 
very little data from previous research (LDA, 2005; SBS, 2001) is available.  
Questions asked related to specific characteristics of BACEs in areas such as 
language, knowledge of the system as a function of their past experiences, and 
generational influences; this considers the cultural views, reasoning and 
behaviours of the owner managers by virtue of past experiences, upbringing, 
opportunities and general ways of life.  Questions related to how the BACE 
owners felt about failure of securing finance from external sources, the reasons 
they gave and how attitudinal and the discouraged borrower effects deter 
them from applying for finance in the first instance or trying again.   
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Table 17a: – Influence of Cultural & Generational Characteristics  
  
 Research 
Question 
Q 2/3:   Cultural and generational characteristics has a 
positive impact/effect on the chances of securing finance 
Nvivo8 Significance Themes 
aggregation: 
 
All Interviews (30) 
 Nvivo set to equate the ‗significance‘ responses for all the 
transcripts as a function of the themes that were ‗dominant‘ 
in the interview transcripts as having a measured response 
to a pre-set 5-point scale measurement. The summaries 
were broken down into a more detailed result analysis in 
table 17b/c  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Generational variables as an 
advantage to securing 
finance (in terms of where 
qualification attained, 
language and knowledge of 
the UK financial systems) 
2 16 2 6 4 
    
Table 17b: Impact of attitudes as a function of Generational and Gender 
characteristics (1)  
n= (total gender/generational BACE counts as a proportion of 30 respondents)  
    Generation 
Counts  
Secured 
Finance  
No Success securing finance  
  Gender  
Split  
(M/F)  
N  %  N  %  N  %  
1st  
Generation  
  
  
Male  
  
11  
  
37%  
  
5  
  
45%  
  
6  
  
54%  
  
Female  
  
5  
  
17%  
  
2  
  
40%  
  
3  
  
60%  
  
2nd/3rd  
Generation  
  
  
Male  
  
9  
  
30%  
  
4  
  
44%  
  
5  
  
55%  
Female  
  
  
5  
  
16%  
  
4  
  
80%  
  
1  
  
20%  
  
  Source: Nvivo Query Outputs  
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Table 17c: Impact of attitudes as a function of Generational and Gender 
characteristics (2)  
Stereotypical/feel factor:  
On the basis that the generational characteristics favours (positively)  the owner  
managers  (2nd/3rd generations probably have an advantage ) 
    Strongly 
Agree  
Agree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree  
  Gender  
Split  
(M/F)  
n  %  N  %  n  %  N  %  N  %  
1st  
Generation  
  
  
Male  
  
2  
  
18  
  
4  
  
36
%  
  
4  
  
36
%  
  
1  
  
9%  
  
0  
 -  
  
Female  
  
2  
  
40
%  
  
2  
  
40
%  
  
0  
 
-
  
  
1  
  
20%  
  
0  
 -  
  
2nd/3rd  
Generation  
  
  
Male  
  
0  
  
-  
  
  
1  
  
11
%  
  
2  
  
22
%  
  
5  
  
55%  
  
1  
  
11 
%  
Female  
  
  
0  
 
-
  
  
1  
  
20
%  
  
0  
 
-
  
  
4  
  
80%  
  
0  
 -  
        Source: Nvivo Query Output
 
5.3.1 Findings and Analysis  
The relationship between generational and gender characteristics of the BACE 
owner managers was assessed. This was to check if there were any other factors 
bearing on this relationship. For example, one of the ‗attitude questions‘ asked 
whether the ‗culture‘ of the immigrant owner manager (1st generation) was 
much different to that of a resident (2nd/3rd) generation owner manager and 
whether or not this had a significant impact on decisions and orientations 
around applying for debt finance.   
For the purpose of this discussion, the ‗cultural orientation‘ of the owner 
manager is in relation to the influences of where the owner manager was born, 
grew up, and attained education and the experiences they encountered. 
Cultural orientation is an abstract concept and not easily measurable. The 
approach adopted was to appraise the accounts of the BACE owner managers 
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(table 17b) and attempt to disaggregate these under ‗labels‘ or categories of 
profiles – 1st generation as one category and 2nd/3rd generations (those born 
and trained in London) as the other. The categorisation adopted in table 17c 
was based on both the gender and generation variables.   
The 1st generation BACEs are those where the founder had immigrated from 
abroad and would be expected to have less knowledge and understanding of 
the business, market and regulatory environments in the UK. The 2nd 
generation BACE owners were either born and raised in the UK or born abroad 
but came into the UK at a very young (under 5) age. They would be similar to 
the 3rd generation BACE owners who were born in the UK and had always 
lived here.  
Once again, the attitudes of the interviewed BACE owner managers were rated 
on a five point scale and considered in relation to the two generation 
categories. The gender sub-grouping was identified to ascertain whether there 
were any gender relationships/relevance of the cultural behaviours and/or 
orientations of the owner managers interviewed in accessing finance as 
detailed in table 16a. The findings suggest that the cultural orientation of the 
BACE owner manager does influence their attitudes to accessing external 
finance. Those with lower human capital feel they would be treated adversely 
by banks. Some 1st generation BACEs appear to hold on to ‗past experiences‘ 
and therefore indicate that perceptions, behaviours and practices are 
interwoven.  This study found that there is an increasing shift away from 
‗negative perceptions‘, meaning to say that those BACEs with higher levels of 
educational attainment tend to accept that human capital attainments and 
generational differences have an influence on their chances to access business 
finance from formal sources. In essence, the ‗blame culture‘ appears to be less 
significant amongst those BACEs with higher levels of education.   
There are also small pockets of ‗gender‘ variability in the explanatory factors 
as female 2nd and 3rd generation BACEs appeared (see table 16c) slightly more 
inclined to agree that they suffered no discriminations by the lending banks. 
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This suggestion that female entrepreneurs are more likely to experience a 
positive outcome accessing business finance is not unusual and is consistent 
with similar studies (Fraser, 2008). It is worth noting that the sample of 30 
cases is relatively small and therefore findings cannot result into making 
generalisations but simply a degree of indication of the relationships between 
these characteristics and its influence on accessing business finance from 
formal sources. The suggestion is that the 1st generation entrepreneurs may 
be at a disadvantage – communication problems and language skills for 
example, despite having higher qualifications, and in many cases, also having 
better business experience(s) than their 2nd and 3rd generation counterparts.   
Furthermore, many of the 1st and a small number of the 2nd generation 
respondents who were born elsewhere but arrived in London at an early age 
indicated that their past experiences growing up in some inner city areas left an 
almost indelible memory of racial bias and disadvantage on their minds. This 
in effect has had a long-lasting negative perception concerning accessing 
statutory services inclusive of financial services from formal sources.    
A respondent said:  
“….. I also feel that an important factor  to note, perhaps as one of the 
reasons why the BACE has a negative perception about difficulties accessing 
bank finance relates to the experiences they may have had from deprived 
orientation which can influence the chances of success in general terms. As 
a qualified assessor, I have done a lot of training targeted at „disadvantaged 
young persons from inner cities” EW – 11/6/09   
  
Some of the better educated respondents share these ‗feelings‘ which inevitably 
hampers attitudes and behaviours. These ‗deep-rooted‘ feelings of ‗unjust‘ past 
experiences obscure the judgement of the entrepreneur and therefore widen the 
barriers they face.   
5.3.2 Generational Influences  
Empirical evidence (Table 17a) suggests that two-thirds of the BACE case 
studies suggested that the generational effect was an influencing factor in 
accessing business finance. In particular, this included:  
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1. Where educational qualifications were acquired – there were 
respondents who stated that foreign qualifications were 
rated less favourably than locally acquired degrees;  
2. language fluency and   
3. Knowledge of the UK financial systems and eligibility 
criterion.   
 The examples cited above are connected and suggest that those who had a UK 
orientation, i.e. the 2nd and 3rd generations had an obvious advantage because 
they were born in UK. This includes those who may have come to stay in UK 
from a very young age and would presumably integrate fully into the system 
(ways of life in the UK).   
Because of the qualifications obtained in England, they would more likely have 
had a better understanding and orientation of living in the UK. Immigrants 
with same levels of qualifications attained abroad are perceived by some 
authorities (notably educational and vocational establishments) as substandard 
when in many cases this is not the case.  
A female 2nd generation who was born abroad but lived her teenage and adult 
life in the UK had this to say:   
....A BACE may have a very good business plan but language skills and 
communication dynamics may be a gap or challenge. For example, the 
business owner may not be able to make detailed inquiries, because of the 
communication/language or accent challenges. The preconception can be 
along generational lines or source of qualification. Qualifications from 
abroad sometimes may be seen as substandard in some cases, this is a poor 
judgement." JG – 16/6/09  
  
Disaggregating the gender and generational variables showed that the female 
entrepreneurs generally had a small but notable advantage over their male 
counterparts in accessing external finance. This study did not seek to explore 
the differences in the basic business characteristics of businesses run by women 
in the ways they sought finance. However, it is therefore possible to draw a 
false conclusion that female BACEs have a significant advantage over male 
BACEs, because some of the differences in the attitudes of women-led and 
men-led businesses may reflect differences in the kinds of businesses that they 
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run. For example women-led entrepreneurs often run smaller businesses and 
some on a part-time basis because of family commitments and therefore seek 
relatively smaller amounts of finance.   
Cosh et al. 2008 (one of the several studies - North et al 2010; Roper and Scott, 
2007, CBR 2008; Allison et al 2005; Marlow and Carter, 2006; Carter et al. 2001 - 
about female entrepreneurs access to finance) looked in detail at female 
business leadership particularly with reference to their success in raising 
finance. In their work, the comparison between female-led and male-led firms 
that were seeking finance found no gender effect on decisions to seek finance.   
However, they found that in relation to finance seekers, female-led firms are 
more likely to benefit from free banking and to seek significantly lower 
amounts of finance. The inference from this finding is that the female-led 
entrepreneurs are seen as less risky than their male counterparts.  In their 
analysis, Cosh et al., adjusted for ‗size differences‘ of the firms (female-led and 
male-led firms) and found no differences in the average percentage of finance 
secured.  
It is worth noting that the apparent advantage that female BACE entrepreneurs 
had in the present study is inconsistent with other research findings. In their 
study, Caleb et al., (2012) found that a greater proportion of women 
entrepreneurs were solely constrained by financial barriers than their male 
counterparts. The reasons for this are consistent with the factors earlier 
indicated by virtue of the type of businesses and other personal constraints 
women entrepreneurs encounter.   
It is worth noting that quantitative type studies limit the chances to obtain 
‗insider accounts‘ which might have altered the results in this case. The general 
consensus is that there were no significant differences in the chances they 
(female-led entrepreneurs) had securing finance compared to their male 
counterparts, if ‗size differences‘ where kept constant, as in the case of Cosh et 
al., (2008)  approach.   
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However, the aggregate results do confirm that the 1st generation BACEs 
(particularly those of African orientation) seem to agree that they were at a 
slight disadvantage of suffering disproportionate barriers (in relation to some 
other SMEs who were born and grew up in London). For those BACE owner 
managers in this category, the main challenge is that of ‗knowledge gaps‘ and 
language fluency in some cases. A small but significant proportion of those 
with the least qualifications assume the position that the banks processing 
managers may have been prejudiced as a result of the language barriers 
(fluency). These claims are looked at in some detail later on when the ‗provider 
side‘ accounts are reviewed and analysed.  
Another key finding was that respondents with higher qualifications indicated 
that language barriers were of a lesser problem than the ‗interrelationship 
bonds‘ between the processing bank loan manager and the BACE owner 
manager. The lack of confidence and overemphasis on past experiences, rightly 
or wrongly, is a concern for some BACEs. The impact of this is the inability to 
foster positive links with banks and to engage with related support provisions. 
The contrary is for the 2nd and 3rd generation BACEs who by virtue of their UK 
orientation have a more ‗concentrated‘ relationship with these institutions, and 
therefore forge a way to enhance their chances of securing external finance.  
A respondent said:  
“I certainly think that the loan manager will assess the applicant in many 
parts, they will assess the loan applications based on education, based on 
experience, quality of business plan and  potential business outlook, but I 
also believe he/she will assess the applicant on a personal level and a British 
accent (if the loan manager is British) will help. I think it is possible to use 
the English Language as a second language but I think it will affect the loan 
manager‟s perception and ultimately his or her decision in lending” AA – 
29/7/09  
  
The above statement suggests that some BACEs feel that the judgement of the 
bank loan manager may influence the outcome of a loan application, when in 
reality is not the case as the banks assessment of a loans application is often 
detached from the assessing officer at the local branch. The applications are 
scored by the use of computerised systems which are done centrally, thus, it 
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can be argued that the removal of the loan manager from the ‗decision loop‘ 
might be a disadvantage.  
5.3.3 The extent of ‘Attitudinal’ influences    
There are some suggestions in this study that the cultural and generational 
characteristics appear to influence the behaviour and attitudes of some BACEs. 
This relates to the education attained where they grew up and knowledge of 
the system as these factors are measured by generational differences (tables 
17b/c).  
Measuring and/or evaluating the attitudes of BACEs relating to accessing 
finance from formal sources can be a difficult proposition. However, the 
analysis of empirical data obtained from ‗insider accounts‘ helps in some way 
to understand and explain some of the underpinning reasons why some BACE 
attitudes are largely negative.  
  The category of BACEs that stood out as one for concern and scope for further 
research/investigations is the male, 1st generation BACEs. This group may be 
seen to portray a degree of susceptibility for facing disproportionate barriers 
compared with the 2nd/3rd generation firm owners (the reference comparators) 
in the finance market. For example, there is indication that the 2nd and 3rd 
generation Black entrepreneurs have a perceived advantage over their 1st 
generation counterparts as detailed in the previous section. For example, there 
are suggestions that the language barriers and or fluency become a debilitating 
factor that disadvantages the 1st generation BACEs. The proportion (about 7 
cases) of all respondents in this category were those with little or no post 
graduate qualifications and operated predominantly within the ‗risky‘ business 
sectors such as traditional goods and services supply (beauty therapy, ethnic 
food supply etc.).   
5.3.4 Influence of Generational & Cultural Characteristics on Attitudes  
Table 17a indicates how generational and cultural variations of the BACE 
owner managers interviewed impact on their chances of accessing external 
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finance. The results highlight the stereotypical views of the respondents based 
on the generational characteristics such as language fluency, value and origin 
of educational attainments. This is in terms of where the qualification was 
attained and the more general skills and knowledge that may empower the 
BACE entrepreneur, as well as acquiring complete fluency in English, thereby 
obviating communication barriers.   
The results shown in table 17b, disaggregate the findings along gender 
variables, and suggest that the second and third generation owner managers 
enjoy the opportunity to acquire recognised educational qualifications.  Four 
out of five of the female (second and third generation combined) respondents 
secured finance from external sources, compared to the two out of five 
(success rates) of their counterpart 1st generation female owner managers. The 
source of their education and orientation of the system have been cited as 
possible reasons for this.    
Interestingly, when the responses from the male (notwithstanding their 
generational differences) BACEs were compared, there were still noticeable 
difficulties in the success rates for male firm owners in general (without 
consideration for the generational differences, it does remain that the 1st 
generation still experienced greater challenges as earlier suggested), for 
accessing finance. There is a proposition that male entrepreneurs appear 
prone to default on loans than their female counterparts (Rheinbaben & 
Ruckes, 2004; Boot, 2000). The notable point from their study was that, there 
seems to be a strong opinion based on the generational variations when the 
stereotypical views were scored with the help of the computerised matrix 
scoring of the Nvivo software. There is little difference between the genders 
but there is clearly a direct link with the cultural orientation of the BACEs and 
how attitudes arise.   
5.3.4 Impact of ‘Human Capital’ on Entrepreneurial Behaviours  
The results that have been presented and analysed so far examine the 
possibility that some of the BACE firms optimised their use of bank debt 
 144  
  
finance by making their human capital count in their favour. The implication 
for this is that they use their knowledge, skills and confidence to research 
accessibility and qualifying criteria to a wide range of funding options. A 
higher proportion of the respondents with higher qualification often seek 
funding from informal sources at start up to minimise the risks. Some were 
able to critically appraise the need for a relatively small loan until there was a 
genuine need for a larger finance.  Some research (Smallbone & Fadahunsi, 
1998) argues that these groups are risk-averse which helps to explain the 
shortfall in bank uptake. Some of the sole trading BACEs are located in fields 
where financial thresholds are relatively low, with little outlay required in 
setting up. A female consultant (sole trader) had this to say:  
  
“Well, one of the saving graces for me is the fact that I have not committed too much to 
credit facilities, I suppose, this helps my survival” SD – 21/4/09  
This comment is typical of African-Caribbean owner managers, irrespective of 
gender, generational or educational orientation. The result does support many 
research findings (Ram & Smallbone, 2003; Deakins et al., 2002) that BACEs 
do not seek external finance enough to warrant a claim of discrimination. To 
evaluate this generalisation, the analysis of the findings from the ‗banks 
perspectives‘ is presented in the next chapter. What these findings appear to 
suggest is that the male, 1st generation BACEs have the highest susceptibility 
for experiencing disproportionate difficulties amongst the generic ethnic 
minority entrepreneurs in London when seeking external finance.   
It is therefore noticeable that this small but significant number of respondents 
interviewed considers themselves to be subjects of ‗unfair treatment‘ that, in 
their opinion, is based on their identity. The alternative explanation or 
possible reasons for this view relate to the fact that, the reasons why this 
assumption is arrived at is that some of the respondents in this category may 
be using the alleged discrimination (based on their accounts) to mask business 
failure or entrepreneurial shortcomings.   
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5.3.5 Summary  
In this section, there is limited but significant evidence to suggest that 
‗attitudes‘ were driven partly by generational variables (gender characteristics 
were insignificant), but what was clear was that past experience and culture 
of the BACE respondent were relevant. The results of using an attitude scale 
(Table 17a)  confirm that the 1st generation BACEs (particularly, those of 
African orientation) agree (over half) that they were at a disadvantage 
because of the value of qualifications attained from abroad and in some cases 
a lack of fluency in English language. It is interesting and worth noting that 
there were some differences in opinion between the ‗African‘ and the 
‗Caribbean‘ experiences in terms of the value of qualifications and language 
competency. The Caribbean experiences and attitudes were more positive 
than their ‗Black African‘ counterparts concerning the language barriers – this 
was largely because of their quicker integration into the UK systems, with 
particular reference to ‗accent‘. When the respondents which expressed their 
agreement that there was a challenge along generational lines were analysed, it 
was noted that most of these responses came from those with the lower 
qualifications (particularly the male owner managers).    
 
5.4 Contextual Influences: The Impact of the ‘Credit Crunch’ on BACEs  
The timing of this research coincided with a period of decelerating economic 
growth with other research indicating that SMEs as a whole were 
experiencing greater difficulty in accessing finance, particularly debt finance 
from banks (Fraser 2009; Cowling et al., 2012). It therefore offered the 
researcher an opportunity to assess the adaptability of BACEs to the credit 
crunch and to evaluate how decisions about seeking bank finance were 
affected. It is notable that small businesses would normally face tougher 
challenges and therefore, BACEs are expected to face even steeper barriers.   
The questions asked of the BACE firms related to  their immediate concerns 
about their business‘s survival   as a result of the ‗credit crunch‘; the 
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respondent BACE owner managers were asked if they were experiencing 
further problems in terms of raising external finance and what the nature of 
the problems were. They were also asked about the coping strategies adopted 
for managing the impact of the economic recession on their businesses.  
5.4.1 Findings and Analysis   
Table 18 below groups the various themes and counts that emerged from a 
computerised Nvivo analysis of respondents answers to a number of 
questions. Eight key concerns were identified. The framework designed 
compared the generational and gender groupings which also formed the 
‗Nodes‘ created using Nvivo.  
Table 18: Reasons cited by the BACE respondents as the main concerns of 
‗Credit Crunch‘   
 (Nvivo text 
searches)  
Dominant  
Issues*  
Significant 
Counts**  
  
Repeat  
Freq. in  
Cases**  
(Tn=30)  
%    
1st Generation  
  
2nd/3rd Generation  
T(male)=12  T(Female)=7  T(male)=6  T(Female)=5  
      n  %  n  %  N  %  N  %  
1
  
No  
Government  
Support  
28  93.3 
%  
11  91.6
%  
7  100
%  
2  33.3
%  
0  -  
2
  
Cash flow 
Problems  
27  90.0 
%  
12  100%  6  86%  6  100%  3  60%  
3
  
Survival  25  
  
83.3 
%  
7  58.3
%  
5  71.4
%  
5  83.3
%  
3  60%  
4
  
Business 
Rates & Tax 
Brakes  
18  60.0 
%  
 9   75%   3  42.8
%  
 4  66.6
%  
 2   40%  
5
  
Down size 
option  
17  56.6 
%  
  
8  66.6
%  
4  57.1
%  
4  66.6
%  
4  80%  
6
  
Government  
Cuts  
11  36.6 
%  
11  91.6
%  
3  42.8
%  
6  100%  5  100%  
7
  
Business 
Growth  
9  
  
30.0 
%  
4  33.3
%  
6  86%  2  33.3
%  
3  60%  
8
  
Risk of 
Closure  
7  
  
23.3 
%  
9  75%  3  42.8
%  
2  66.6
%  
1  20%  
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Notes :   
• Dominant Issues = Computer generated themes that were repeated most via ‗Text 
Queries‖   
• Significant Counts = BACE firms counted with similar themes/issues raised 
Repeat statements/emphasis  
• Tn= Total case counts=30  
• n = cases in each category  
  
Almost all (28) of the BACE firms suggested that the lack of government 
support for small businesses was the biggest challenge that affected them. 
They felt that the business rates and tax implications could have been reduced 
to provide the most vulnerable businesses with a buffer zone. One of the 
BACE firms with particular difficulties accessing business finance had 
resorted to leasing of heavy-duty equipment for survival. A respondent had 
the following to say:  
  
“The small businesses really are facing higher challenges and really cannot 
see the benefits of any government incentives. (He shows the researcher 
some invoices over time) these invoices increased over time in at least over a 
2 year period. At the initial period, you get this discount figures 
(supposedly a tax break or business rate incentive) and then the next 
invoice has an increase that cancels out the initial discount…listen it‟s a 
mess! We also constantly have to battle with bailiffs who chase up business 
rate payment without considering the income/cash flow of the business. That 
is really why some businesses have closed down because of having to deal 
with the Inland Revenue departments. The system does not give allowance 
to periods of economic crisis to encourage the businesses to stay in trade.”   
BD – 26/9/08  
Clearly, a tax break and/or business rate discounts over sustained periods 
could have provided some cushion to the harsh climate. About two-thirds of 
all the owner managers interviewed referred to the business rate as a 
‗strangling experience‟ to their businesses.  
The same BACE respondent also stated:  
“For me, one of my problems is the business rates and tax implications! The 
government does not offer any assistance to ensure that businesses can 
survive the Credit Crunch. My business rely on my clients that run small 
firms, therefore, if they struggle, I also struggle. The Credit Crunch has 
affected a lot of my colleagues businesses; I‟m hanging in there really” BD – 
26/9/08  
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But another respondent agreed with this:  
“There are really no tax breaks or business rate weavers, so the government, particularly 
this government, are not caring enough. I also think that the business support agencies 
themselves are struggling to retain their grant funding and folding up how could they 
advise and support BACEs?”  DD – 7/10/08  
  
Twenty seven (27) of the BACE respondents suggested that cash flow was 
another (2nd most referenced issue) major challenge posed by the credit crunch. 
The credit crunch was a concern for many small firms of which BACEs were 
not an exemption. However, many were not seeking growth finance but simply 
adopting ‗survival strategies‘. Given the circumstances affecting small firms 
generally, ethnic orientation, personal characteristics and human capital 
variables were significant in coping with the economic recession.  
The third most mentioned issue/problem facing the interviewed BACEs was 
the adoption and consideration of a survival strategy. Twenty five (25) of the 
BACE owner managers indicated that they were reducing costs, evaluating 
their cash positions by reducing optional expenditure and trying to ‗hang in 
there‘. A respondent stated:  
  
“It‟s not just the small firms or the ethnic ones that face difficulties, I think 
all businesses do face challenges, it‟s just how businesses manage and 
strategise. From my contact with colleagues and partners still running 
businesses, what they now do is to look at survival strategies. I don‟t think 
many ethnic businesses seek growth, particularly if the sectors in which they 
operate are fragile”   DD – 7/10/08  
There were some accounts which suggested that ‗generational‘ and ‗gender‘ 
characteristics may have some bearing on the views expressed. For example it 
appeared that the 2nd/3rd generation BACEs were least concerned or 
threatened with closure, 20% compared to 75% of the 1st generation BACEs 
who felt most threatened by closure. When the gender categories were looked 
at carefully, the female 2nd/3rd generations expressed less concern about the 
four (4) main problems that were dominant across all the BACE firms. It is fair 
to suggest that generational factors, attitudes and stereotypes appear to 
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influence the actions and decisions adopted in managing the impact of the 
‗Credit Crunch‘.   
Again, the 1st generation BACE firms (particularly the male owner managers) 
recorded the greater concerns about tax and business rate issues, lack of 
government support and cash flow problems. The stratification approach 
helps to focus on the gender and generational variables and to confirm that 
there are significant issues/personal characteristics other than qualification 
such as cultural orientation of UK born BACEs and their immigrant cohort. 
This aspect is further explored during the interviews with the provider side – 
lending banks. Some aspects of consensus amongst the BACE respondents 
relate to the impact of the government cuts which affect communities and 
create a ripple effect across all sectors of community-based businesses.  
A second generation female respondent made these observations:  
  
“The Governmental approach to the delivery of public sector – budget 
cuts..... eventually affect all sectors of businesses/communities, even the 
large ones. Here, ethnicity really has little bearing, except of the fact that the 
level of knowledge of the business owner may play a part on how options 
and strategies for survival can be planned. The saying that it‟s the „survival 
of the fittest‟ applies. I however feel that BACEs and small businesses 
generally require specialist business support and breaks from taxes and 
business rates to enable these businesses survive. It will be interesting to 
research into the business failure rates in these times of uncertainties”  SW 
– 11/3/10  
  
There was a consensus of opinion amongst most of the BACE firms 
interviewed about the credit crunch as it was seen as an inevitable challenge 
affecting all sectors and that virtually no one was immune to it. The 
worsening economic situation is increasingly telling on all small firms and 
that growth was not an issue for consideration for many BACEs. Apart from 
facing day to day cash flow difficulties, it would appear that small business 
owners were finding it increasingly hard to secure finance.   
Another respondent also said:  
“The issue right now is not about accessing additional finance, as many 
colleagues would agree, but trying to develop my marketing strategy and 
cash flow. I am considering recycling my cash flow to stay in business, even 
if the profit margin is minimal, I can still stay afloat. Invest in other areas 
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(venture capital – friends; the investor will be required to give 3 months‟ 
notice to reclaim capital injection into my business). Marketing strategy – 
also looking at new products and customer base. But I must say that the 
Government are not doing anything to assist small businesses as they claim 
in the press and political rallies.” AO – 20/5/10  
  
What seems to be happening as the consequence of the recession has brought 
about austerity measures, causing BACEs to become more innovative and 
starting to consider alternative and informal approaches to operation and 
income generation. BACE owner managers (particularly the 2nd and 3rd 
generations with higher qualifications) were beginning to see the challenges 
as an opportunity to divert emotive perceptions into positive energy by 
exploring alternative business strategies.  
The literature review on the impact of the ‗credit crunch‘ was sparse at the time 
of undertaking this study and only just beginning to emerge. This study did 
coincide with a time of economic recession which appears to have impacted 
virtually on all business sectors. Arguably, small businesses are likely to be the 
worst affected by virtue of the inherent characteristics of small businesses 
rather than the owner managers personal orientations.   
There is now a good deal of evidence from recent studies (e.g. SQW & CEEDR,  
2013; Cowling et al., 2013) of the impact of the recession on SMEs in general. A 
Greater London Authority (SQW, 2013) study was commissioned to review 
current supply and demand for different types of finance and to identify the 
size, scale and type of funding gaps for SMEs in general. The study found that 
‗debt finance‘ was the main gap (amongst others) in finance facing SMEs in 
general. It also recognised that the ‗credit crunch‘ has made bank finance more 
difficult to access.   
It was also evident in the report that small firms were adopting ‗survival 
strategies‘ (as supported in some findings for this thesis). Some of the ways 
small firms were coping with the economic down-turn was by re-financing, 
down-scaling on staff and seeking alternative finance (other than from banks). 
Some of the alternative sources include investment funds and Enterprise 
Capital Funds which are still ‗unpopular‘.  
 151  
  
The report concluded by justifying a new publicly-backed finance initiative for 
SMEs in London and also provided recommendations to the GLA on potential 
areas of intervention. The research now enables the GLA and partners to 
inform the use of £25 million of ‗Growing Places Fund‘ money to support SME 
finance. What this study did not highlight was the ‗proportion‘ of Black 
businesses and the funding gap estimates/projections, however it highlights 
that it was more difficult for SMEs in general to secure bank finance due to the 
more stringent terms and conditions by the banks as a result of the ‗economic 
downturn‘. It is reasonable to suggest that small firms in general, irrespective 
of their ethnic characteristics, were bound to face stiffer competition in the 
already harsh economic environment. The recent studies indicated above, 
looked at the broader SME businesses in London and therefore the extent of the 
impact on specific BACEs was not evidenced.  The findings  from the 
interviews for this thesis, shed more light on the position that, although ethnic 
businesses play a vital role in the UK economy with over 10, 000 Black-owned 
enterprises, they are 20% more likely to falter in their first 4 years of trading 
compared to white-owned businesses (The Open University, 2008).   
Also, Black businesses are more likely to be more vulnerable to credit denials 
and the credit crunch undoubtedly would be expected to compound this 
possibility. The reason stated for this relates to the volatile nature of Black 
businesses which are more vulnerable to credit denial and more likely to 
default on their loans or exceed their overdrafts (Barclays-Webcast, 2012; 
Fraser, 2009).  
5.4.2 Summary: The Credit Crunch & Key Issues for BACEs   
Three major themes stood out from the results of interviewing 30 BACE owner 
managers. These focus on what they felt were the biggest challenge(s) and 
negative experiences they faced as a result of the recent economic down turn. 
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Table 17 ranks eight key issues but the three key issues are looked at:   
 The main problem was that most of the BACEs (27) interviewed felt that 
the government was not doing much to assist vulnerable businesses by 
virtue of their sizes, sector aggregation and other characteristics which 
increase the propensity for disadvantage in accessing debt finance. The 
example stated was that the stifling effect of tax and business rates 
could be reduced and/or pegged at a low rate to enable vulnerable 
businesses absorb the impact of low cash flow and in effect ‗ride the 
storm‘ until things improved.  
 Cash Flow issues were another major challenge for majority of the 
BACE owner managers interviewed. This was the second prevalent 
problem for businesses as their customer base continued to drop. 
Businesses that were concentrated in the traditional supplies (such as 
hair and beauty supplies) sectors were the most affected. The impact of 
the cash flow challenges threatened survival and led to reluctant staff 
cuts, down scaling of operations and continually reducing overheads to 
the barest possible limit.   
The customer base for BACEs in these sectors is predominantly serviced 
by low income earners within the ethnic minority populations in their 
respective communities in London. The Small Enterprise Research 
Team (SERT) customer  quarterly surveys continue to show a 
progressive fall (as at the 3rd QTR of 2011) in sales and employment for  
the sectors which contributed to falling overall demand and spill-over  
concerns of the credit crunch impact. The findings in this study 
supports Gray‘s (2008 - webcast) postings in Business Studies series 
which stated that ―many of the smaller firms have shown in the past to be 
very resilient in recessions...‖ this is true in the case of many BACE 
respondents interviewed.  He also said:  ―...they cut costs, reduce capacity 
and shed staff.......they keep their businesses ticking over, waiting for a change 
in fortunes for a recovery”.  
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Survival action was the third most dominant theme that emerged from the 
interviews as a way of ‗riding the storm‘. A majority of the BACE respondents 
(83%) stated that ‗staying in business was critical and more important than 
seeking finance for growth or expansion‘.  One respondent said:      
  
“It‟s not just the small firms or the ethnic ones that face difficulties, I think 
all businesses do face challenges, it‟s just how businesses manage and 
strategise. From my contact with colleagues and partners still running 
businesses, what they now do is to look at survival strategies. I don‟t think 
many ethnic businesses seek growth, particularly if the sectors in which they 
operate is fragile” AA – 9/2/11  
 
Interestingly, the 2nd and 3rd generation entrepreneurs were least concerned 
or less threatened with the consideration of closures than their 1st generation 
counterparts. One explanation for this may mean that the owner managers in 
this category were more confident and sought alternative strategies to survive, 
it was also evident that those with higher and financial academic 
backgrounds/qualifications were more innovative in sustaining cash flow by 
reducing overheads where possible.  
When the gender categories were disaggregated, it was slightly noticeable that 
the female 2nd and 3rd generation entrepreneurs were the most confident in 
‗seizing‘ opportunities for innovation and growth despite uncertainties. One of 
the reasons for this has been earlier suggested and this refers to the lifestyles of 
female (especially younger entrepreneurs) who seek smaller finance and often 
work on part time basis, inferring that they are likely to encounter similar 
experiences and or rejections to their male counterparts.  
  
5.4 Research Objective 3:  The ‘business support gaps’ identified in this 
study  
The funding, delivery and applicability of business support form a key part of 
this research, particularly the gaps and policy interests in London. This 
research objective was to consider and explore how existing business support 
services and their utilisation in London met the needs of BACEs.   
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This study draws attention to the views, experiences and attitudes of the 
BACE owner managers interviewed on the subject. The culturally specific 
issues that may influence the effectiveness and take-up of these services are 
explored in some detail. Text narratives of the responses are the main 
technique adopted in presenting and analysing the ‗soft data‘ collected; some 
of the key issues included:  
  
1. the thoughts of the BACEs, concerning the usage of business support  
2. the sources and types of support that the BACEs used for businesses 
advise  
3. whether respondents thought there were gaps in support and their 
views on the value and relevance of the support services sought  
4. BACE views on the policy dimensions for remedial action.  
Nvivo was used to conduct a ‗query search‘ which tracked the main themes 
and responses. The results were grouped based on three key headings; level 
of education, cultural orientation, generational and gender characteristics. The 
aim was to identify which of these personal characteristics best explains the 
views stated by the owner manager respondents.  
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Table 19a: Generational & Gender Relevance: Business Support & Advice    
  
(NVivo text 
searches)  
Dominant 
sources*  
Significant 
Counts**  
   
Repeat  
Freq. in  
Cases**  
(Tn=30)  
%    
1st 
Generation 
  
  
2nd/3rd Generation  
T(male)=12  T(Female)=7  T(male)=6  T(Female)=5  
      n  %  n  %  n  %  n  %  
Accountants  30  100%  12  100
%  
7  100%  6  100
%  
5  100%  
Bank Manager  23  76%    
10  
  
83%  
  
4  
  
57%  
  
5  
  
83%  
  
4  
  
80%  
Business 
colleague/  
Family  
  
11  36%  11  91%  3  42%  2  33%  3  60%  
Solicitors  22  73%  8  66%  7  100%  2  33%  4  80%  
Government  
Support  
Agency  
(including 3rd 
sector 
organisations 
.e.g. Business  
Link, Business 
Angels, LA 
enterprise 
agencies etc.)  
9  
  
30%  4  33%  6  86%  2  33%  3  60%  
  
Table 19a above presents the results obtained from the BACEs when asked 
about where they could obtain advice – i.e. testing how aware they were of 
the available sources, but table 19b below actually looks at the actual usage. 
Accountants were the most mentioned (all 30 respondents mentioned 
accountants as a possible source). This probably came about because of the 
statutory requirement to submit company accounts to the Companies House. 
The bank manager (23) was the second most referenced source, whilst 
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solicitors (22) and business colleague/friend/family (11) were the 3rd and 4th 
referenced respectively.   
The generational and gender characteristics did not indicate any significant 
variations in the tendency to seek advice from the main sources referenced 
during the interviews. The key result that stood out points to a very high 
proportion of the 1st generation male BACEs who relied more on business 
colleagues, friends or family compared with their 2nd and 3rd generation 
counterparts.   
  
Table 19b: Actual usage of business support and advice as a function of 
Educational Attainment  
Table: Awareness & use of support providers in a 12 month period  
  
  1st Degree and less  
N=11  
Post Graduate Degree 
and over  
N=19  
Total Cases  
(30)  
  Aware  Usage  Aware  Usage  Aware  Usage  
Bank Manager  
  
7  63%  4  36%  19  100%  16  84%  26  87%  20  67%  
Solicitor  
  
3  27%  1  9%  13  68%  8  42%  14  46%  9  30%  
Accountant  
  
11  100%  7  63%  19  100%  15  79%  30  100%  22  73%  
Business  
Colleague/Family 
or Friend  
10  91%  8  73%  17  89%  5  26%  27  90%  13  43%  
Government  
Support Agency  
(including 3rd 
sector  
organisations e.g. 
Business Link,  
Business Angels,  
LA enterprise 
agencies etc.)  
7  63%  2  18%  16  84%  5  26%  23  77%  7  23%  
  
Table 19b above shows some interesting findings; most notable is the general 
underutilisation of statutory and mainstream support agencies in London. 
Usage of Government sponsored (publicly funded) agencies recorded the 
lowest at 23% across the various variables assessed – qualification, generation 
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and gender of the BACE owner managers. Despite a high awareness (77%) of 
the existence of the government sponsored agencies such as Business Link, 
the LDA etc., when the educational attainment of the cases was looked at 
more carefully, there were no significant differences in the actual usage of 
these sources of business support and advice.   
However a higher (73%) proportion of those BACEs with lesser qualifications 
relied on informal sources – business colleagues, family or friends for 
support. This may explain some of the ‗knowledge gap‘ effects referred to in 
chapter 2, and the misinformation they might obtain from these sources. At 
the other end of the spectrum those with higher and relevant qualifications 
tended not to use the informal sources of advice that much, 26% of these 
respondents using these sources. Accountants were the most used support for 
obvious reasons as earlier indicated. But the usage did not relate to actual 
business planning and financial projection purposes, but rather, a matter of 
compliance with the legal requirement for annual accounts.  
The interviews with BACE owner managers identified several weaknesses of 
the business support system in London. For example, there were some 
suggestions that business support arrangements for Black businesses remain 
fragmented and did not meet the specific needs and challenges of BACEs. 
Some extracts from the interviews speak volumes:  
“I can relate to the possibility that Black business owners do not use business 
support services sufficiently mainly because there are certain perceptions or lack of 
specialist support advice available. There is also a possibility that the business 
support service providers do not advertise their services enough therefore the 
owner managers are unaware of the opportunities available concerning business 
support, some may even think they have to pay for these services if unaware that 
the funding for these facilities are financed from the Government departments.” 
AA – 5/2/11  
  
“I think this is about the „perceptions‟ we were talking about earlier and the 
lack of confidence and explorations. There is also a problem of lack of 
relevant support speciality – meaning the support agencies do not have 
relevant advise that meet the needs of the ethnic minority businesses, so the 
word that go around is that the business support agencies were not set up or 
resourced to service ethnic minority businesses particularly. I really believe 
that the government should encourage ethnic minority businesses to set up 
 158  
  
and run these support agencies themselves.... I think the Pakistani and 
Indian communities do this very well” MG – 26/5/11  
“One clear reason, that I have been told by some of my clients is the fact that 
most of the established business support agencies are not knowledgeable of 
the specific needs of the BACEs, in terms of culture, lack of adequate 
collateral, qualification and what you refer to Ade, as Human Capital...” HB 
– 14/6/11  
Another explanation cited by some BACEs is the lack of confidence and 
negative attitudes about the providers of business support it is the same 
attitudinal characteristics which also creates ‗discouragement‘ as in the case of 
seeking finance as earlier detailed. A respondent said (see below) that some 
BACEs do not seek business advice because they lack knowledge of the 
benefits offered and this has been supported by the human capital variables 
measured in earlier parts of this section. The perceptions also play quite a key 
role on the views of some BACEs concerning the set-up of publicly funded 
support provision as one that simply fits a ‗tick-box‘ exercise.  
The respondents were also asked how they thought the business support 
services could be better utilised and accessed by BACEs. A number of crucial 
points were raised and many of these have a direct bearing on policy 
implications and the redistribution of government funding plans for public 
funded support services concerning BACEs. The following excerpts allude to 
some of the crucial points raised:  
  
“But from the Government points of view, more needs to be done about 
understanding the specific needs of the specific ethnic groups that face 
difficulties. I‟m also not sure the Government puts in enough resources into 
this area. In China, community banks exist particularly for small 
businesses, and these are monitored by the Central Government, this idea 
can be explored here in the UK.”  AO – 23/4/10  
  
“As suggested, I think BACE- led business support agencies need to be set 
up, I also think the Government should monitor banks and rate them on how 
well they engage and make business finance available to BACEs”      AO – 
23/4/10  
  
A particular firm owner, one of the highly qualified BACE interviewed, 
indicated that there were some tangible benefits on offer by specialist support 
 159  
  
provision such as Enterprise Agencies, as these have a better understanding 
of the needs of local businesses within the communities within which they are 
situated. He said:  
  
“I do not think it‟s a legislative issue. I think the business supportive system 
has all the credentials, but possibly requires them to diversify their strategy. 
This could include on site observations, small business group courses 
whereby those from various businesses share their experiences in the 
presence of those who could offer guidance.....”  B0 – 8/12/09  
  
It appears that ‗financial education‘ has been identified as a remedial 
approach for policy makers to reduce the information gaps existing between 
the demand, lending institutions and the business support systems. The 
research objective was to review, analyse and seek explanations about the 
support gaps and resulting low take-up of business support amongst BACEs 
that would enhance their chances of accessing finance. The BACE owner 
managers interviewed suggest that public and private sector funded business 
support programmes are perceived as being inadequate in meeting their 
needs. The focus and justification of this research objective was to evaluate the 
policy implications that will promote and enhance the utilisation and 
adaptability of ‗generic‘ support services for BACEs.   
5.4.1 Summary (Business Support)  
The findings draw attention to the views, experiences and attitudes of the  
BACEs. Table 8b ranks the range of business support and advice sources used. 
This was further disaggregated along generational and gender 
variables/categories. The following are the headline findings:  
1. All the BACE respondents (30 cases) used an accountant at one point or 
another during the business operation. This is as a result of the statutory 
requirement to submit company accounts to the Companies House. In 
many cases, the BACEs did not actually maximise the range of services 
offered by the accountants in areas such as business planning and cash 
flow projections to enhance their business proposals to the banks. The 
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reason for this was not readily clear, but some suggested that the 
professional fees charged for professional services were too high. It can be 
inferred that in some cases, BACEs did not invest adequately in 
professional support services. It can also be said that the BACEs who were 
‗investment –shy‘ were prone to being misinformed because of over 
reliance on informal sources of support and advice.  
2. The bank managers were the second (23 cases most referenced source for 
business advise approached, whilst solicitors (23 cases) and business 
colleagues/friends or family were the 3rd and 4th sources referenced. Some 
of the success rates arising from the utilisation of bank business support 
utilisation are explored in the next discussion section relating to views, 
experiences and accounts from the ‗provider‘ side.  
3. When the generational and gender characteristics were analysed, there 
was little evidence to suggest that these variables did influence which type 
of business support source(s) were utilised. However, the 1st generation 
male BACEs relied more on the ‗informal‘ sources of support and advice – 
business colleagues, friends or family member.  
When the qualification levels of the BACE case studies were analysed as a 
function of which source(s) were approached/utilised against just being 
aware of the source(s), some interesting findings were noticeable. Usage of 
government sponsored (public funded) agencies recorded the lowest usage 
at (7 cases) irrespective of the qualification levels attained, generational and 
gender variations. The reasons for this were not immediately noticeable, 
nonetheless, an unusually higher proportion (22 cases) of BACEs with lesser 
qualifications tends to use unconventional sources – business colleagues, 
family or friends for advice. On the other end of the utilisation spectrum, 
those BACEs with higher human capital tend not to use informal sources of 
advice.  The underutilisation of formal sources of business support does 
exist, even though many were aware of the range of support sources 
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available within the public and enterprise agencies. The explanation for the 
underutilisation cited by the BACE respondents in many cases suggested 
that the support services offered by the statutory/public sector providers 
were ‗unsuitable‘ and did not meet their specific needs.   
It either means that, the business support providers were not reaching the 
BACE communities in an effective manner or that the BACEs themselves 
were not ‗looking out‘ enough for help and advice.  
 
4. Negative perceptions tend to ‗cloud‘ the decision-making and thought 
process of a small but significant proportion of BACEs, this means that 
they do not seek the help, information and advice of professional business 
support services enough or at all in many instances. Another issue is the 
aversion to paying for professional advice and assistance. Many BACEs do 
not wish to pay for professional support services when desirable.   
5. There were also strong indications from the BACE respondents 
interviewed who suggested that the methods of marketing and 
communications strategy of the support providers were weak and did not 
reach the BACE communities adequately. There were positive views from 
some of the highly qualified respondents desired for a more targeted 
approach of reaching BACEs.   
  
6. A high proportion (25) of all the BACE respondents felt strongly about the 
absence of ‗specialist support‘ providers because the ‗generic‘ support 
provisions do not ‗engage‘ BACEs adequately neither do they satisfy the 
unique needs that are peculiar to these groups. A ‗one size fits all‟ of the 
existing generic support services has come short of delivering the 
specialist support services for BACEs.    
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5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presents and discussed the findings from the BACE 
perspectives whilst investigating the personal attributes and attitudinal 
tendencies of the group and how these impact on their chances of 
accessing and securing debt finance in London. The underlying issue is 
that, many BACEs see their ethnicity in many ways as a mitigating 
circumstance and therefore, express certain attitudinal behaviours that are 
triggered by a number of ‗individual attributes‘ such as human capital, 
past experiences and the knowledge gap of the finance market and 
processes. However, a small but significant proportion of the BACE 
respondents interviewed tend to mask their entrepreneurial failures with 
the ‗alleged‘ discrimination by the lending institutions, notable, the banks. 
The next chapter (six) looks at the perspectives of both the bankers and 
business support agencies (including the third sector support providers) 
detailing the views they (the banks) have about the BACEs relating 
seeking and securing debt finance.  
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CHAPTER 6: PERSPECTIVES OF THE BANKS & BUSINESS 
SUPPORT ORGANISATIONS:  PRIMARY RESEARCH 
FINDINGS (2)  
6. 1 Introduction  
This chapter consists of two main parts: firstly it presents and discusses the 
results of the interviews with five High-Street banks in relation to their 
procedures and practices for processing business finance applications and 
their interactions with BACEs in particular. The reason for this approach was 
to see if the attitudes of the BACE owners about the barriers they faced in 
securing business finance from formal sources would be verified or refuted. 
Secondly, the importance and contribution of various business support 
providers including various public, private and third parties are examined. A 
framework for policy intervention is explored and some comparative views 
(American perspectives) are considered with a view to adopt good practice 
and make some case for future developments of the themes that emerged 
during the interviews and subsequent discussions/analysis.  
For the purpose of this chapter, ‗Supply Side‘ is referred to as five selected 
High Street banks and the business loans or business development managers‘ 
accounts from the in-depth interviews presented and discussed. The literature 
review of the supply-side (chapter 2) showed a number of key points to 
explore concerning the interrelationships between the ‗demand‘ and 
‗provider‘ sides. It was felt that having consulted the selected BACE owner 
managers‘ views, it was desirable to obtain the corresponding views of the 
‗provider‘ sides with a view to ‗triangulate‘ divergent opinions in a way that 
helps bring together information which adds value to the body of knowledge. 
Before the findings are discussed, it is necessary to set a context for the 
judgements relating to ‗loans application; which the banks have to make. 
Firstly, from an economic point of view, the findings from the respondent 
lenders (bank managers) interviewed suggested that discrimination was 
irrational when discriminations were alleged. The report (Fraser, 2009) 
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presents empirical findings that there are longstanding concerns about access to 
finance amongst SMEs due to capital market imperfections. One of the key reasons 
for these imperfections is that finance providers may find it hard to assess the 
creditworthiness of small firms due to information asymmetries.   
The relevance of information gaps between the BACEs and the lenders have 
been discussed in the previous chapter. This problem could result in viable 
businesses failing to receive adequate credit i.e., credit-rationing. However, 
the empirical relevance of credit-rationing is questioned by some authors 
(Parker, 2002) and recent empirical evidence suggests the majority of small 
firms are well supplied with finance (Fraser, 2009). Developments in lending 
technologies may be partly responsible for this apparently healthy situation. 
Developments in small business credit scoring have reduced the costs of 
lending to small firms and improved the accuracy of risk assessments (Bank 
of England, 2004; Berger et al, 2005).   
6.2 Supply Side Findings  
Face-to-face, in-depth interviews with five purposively selected high street 
bank managers from London formed a key part of the field work. The 
objectives were:  
1. To investigate the knowledge, attitudes and practices of the supply 
side in dealing with BACEs; in the application and use of bank loans 
for business finance.  
2. To consider the ‗loan processing‘ systems and how this may affect 
the success rates of BACE finance loan applications  
3. To ascertain the level and extent of the ‗knowledge 
gaps/information asymmetry‘ existing between the ‗demand‘ and 
providers‘.   
The semi-structured interviews (see interview template attached as appendix) 
was designed as open questions that were semi-structured, they were focused 
on testing whether loans managers were aware of the barriers faced by 
BACEs. The interviews largely probed into the practices of business loans 
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decision-making processes and the criteria adopted in dealing with 
applications from BACEs.  
  
Findings are presented as extracts from interview notes and discussed using a 
narrative approach where some of the data are ‗produced in the form of 
narrative accounts‘.   
6.2.1 Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in dealing with BACEs  
6.2.1.1 Ethnicity Monitoring  
Four of the five responses from business finance loans processing managers 
interviewed suggested that the ethnicity of applicants was  not monitored, 
implying that there was no basis to assess, evaluate or judge application 
outcomes based on personal profiles. A bank manager said:  
  
“...really, we do not monitor ethnicity, and I don‟t think many other banks 
do so by default.....I think the critical relevance is to capture the relevant 
economic data (collaterals, risk factors and financial information which will 
aid the processing of the application –  Bank A”  
  
 The significance of the above statement imply that, the absence of obtaining 
‗personal information‘ may mean that the relationship history and interaction 
with the BACE applicant is lost, and therefore increasing the possibility for 
the bank to lose out on a good business case. The researcher assumes that 
monitoring of ethnicity may have helped local decision making, by 
considering other personal factors such as the knowledge of the ‗customers 
history‘ with the particular branch. The value and benefits of ‗bank 
relationships‘ are often lost as decisions are made centrally, negating the 
influencing autonomy of the local branch. On the other hand, there is also a 
danger that qualitative (as opposed to quantitative), financial data could be a 
source of prejudicial decisions being taken. There is a possibility that the 
initial clearing/preliminary assessment of loans applications could potentially 
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be biased due to the experience and/or prejudice of the loans manager.  
Evidence to support this premonition is difficult to obtain as information 
sharing is quite difficult to obtain from the banks due to the ‗confidentiality 
and privacy ethos‘ binding the banks.   
What is clear, is that, the lack of soft data can give rise to information 
asymmetry (Fraser, 2008), because of some of the reasons stated above, an 
adverse decision could be arrived at inadvertently. An alternative explanation 
is that diversity monitoring could provide a ‗level-playing field‘, in the sense 
that the processing manager has an opportunity to consider the 
disadvantage(s) the firm owner may have such as language barriers and to 
redress these.   
The argument that has been presented in chapter 2 about computer-based 
assessments is relevant here. The ‗soft data‘ referred to relates to some 
personal and or relationship attributes peculiar to particular groups, many of 
these – education, experience, talents etc. are not recorded information and 
hence can be easily missed. One respondent (DV), a start-up and small 
business manager at a local branch in Brent informed the researcher that the 
bank only evaluates loans applications based on prescribed processing formulae 
which takes account of the ‗risks‘ and ‗collateral ‗ potential of the business 
owner. Respondents were asked whether the business type and personal 
attributes in terms of qualification, banking relationships and other 
nonfinancial information offered any value to the loan processing criteria. 
Two providers (Bank ‗A‘ & ‗B‘) both agreed strongly that these were very 
relevant for local decisions to be made without over reliance on centralised 
processing.   
  
“...the subject of qualification, type of business and other non-formal 
attributes such as skills are quite useful in making local decisions on loan 
processing for small amounts of advancement...such as amounts not 
exceeding £30 - £35K for start-ups” (Bank B)  
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The other view obtained from Santander and HSBC does contrast in the sense 
that, almost all applications were processed centrally and therefore, losing out 
on the more qualitative, and relationship knowledge of the owner managers:  
  
“...more recently, branch managers have lost the autonomy to make 
decisions due to the more stringent criteria prescribed as a result of the 
economic down-turn. In effect, it is possible then to presume that the 
understudy groups may lose out in the customer relationships built over 
long periods.....this often provides a much needed verifications of the track 
records (Bank D)”  
6.2.1.2 Sector Relevance  
All the five business loan processing managers interviewed suggested that the 
sectors within which many BACEs operate are usually risky. They concentrate 
in traditional markets such as personal services, arts, cultural industries and 
services targeted at closed communities. The respondents (providers) claimed 
that the bank, by choice, do not treat BACEs differently to other business loan 
applicants based on sector variables, but as a function of risk evaluation and 
economic terms. The banks admitted that the ‗retail‘ sectors were much risky 
propositions due to the ‗entrapment‘ within the local communities:  
  
 “...to be perfectly honest, the communities served are very enclosed and 
therefore restricting access, personnel and skills....this means that 
sustainability is restricted and therefore, in economics terms, present a very 
significant risk for investment and profitability (Bank B).”  
  
This finding can also be misconstrued to mean that, BACEs which congregate 
in retail businesses are more likely to have low human capital as previously 
explored and discussed in the previous chapter.  Bank ‗A‘, ‗B‘ and ‗C‘ 
concurred that lower educational or management qualifications do not 
directly inhibit the chances for securing finance. However, the skills and 
financial knowledge, in terms of presentation of ideas, cash flow and business 
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growth strategy are a clear disadvantage for these groups. Nearly all the bank 
personnel involved in the processing of business finance loans agree that 
sound business planning, cash-flow and security availability, helps the banks 
in making informed decisions. The following statement supports the views 
about relevance of qualification to chances of securing finance:  
  
“….qualification is not really the main issue........experience and knowledge 
of the business market……is of greater significance” (Bank A)  
  
 Based on the BACE findings discussed in the previous chapter, it can be 
suggested that, the notion of perceptions of discrimination by some BACE 
may be due to the impact of ‗knowledge gaps‘ between the ‗demand‘ and 
‗supply‘ relationships.  When economic variables are considered, it can be 
argued that the banks decisions are mostly unbiased due to ‗assessment 
procedures‘ they have to comply with.   
The researcher‘s view, however, is that, applying a blanket approach to 
processing business loans application may pose some difficulties for BACEs. 
This is because, by virtue of the ‗riskiness‘ and ‗size‘ of the Black business, 
they are naturally disadvantaged concerning access to bank finance (BBA, 
2002). Even though, the providers make a legitimate claim to the fact that 
business decisions were solely based on ‗risks‘ and ‗business economic 
factors‘ rather than personal characteristics of the applicant, a respondent 
bank manager said:  
  
“...the basic and fundamental objective for us is to ensure that risk is 
managed and proposals for obtaining finance must be decided based on 
merits and most importantly, making profits...this is a difficult position to 
explain, but is this not what the investment is designed for?...at least from 
the banks perspectives. (Bank E)   
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Another bank manager made a reference to how the educational attainment 
can influence the decisions of some BACEs, in terms of ‗choice‘ and ‗location‘ 
of their businesses; he said:  
 
..I was talking earlier on about education and ability to explore other business 
types….rather than the usual, micro-scaled business where most of the local 
traders concentrate (Bank C)  
  
The problem here is that the ‗provider‘ attitude towards processing a business 
case is defendable, whilst the ‗demand‘ sides see this from a different 
perspective.  BACEs feel that the failure to secure formal sources of finance 
has a bearing on the unique characteristics of the owner manager – ethnicity; 
and to a lesser importance - type of business; generational effects; gender; size 
and human capital; and other defining personal attributes that create a 
disadvantage situation (North, et al. 2007; Deakins, 2007).  
There is a divergent view from the provider-demand interrelationships that is 
unclear; the sector relevance has been described by the ‗social clusters‘ or 
‗ethnic enclaves‘ within which many BACEs trade. The banks, particularly 
argue, that the ‗risk‘ elements are the main issues, but the demand sides 
interpret this opinion adversely. The relevance of the sector is arguably 
unclear; the views held by both parties are tenable, but subjective to 
reasoning.  
Empirical data obtained is insufficient in making assertions that the practices 
and evaluation of loan applications by the banks can be seen as 
‗discriminatory‘. This disagreement in opinion is further explored in the next 
sub-section, looking at the interrelationships between the banks and the 
BACEs.  
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6.2.1.3 BACE-Provider Interrelationships  
A business relationship manager interviewed referred the researcher to a 
newsroom archive and referenced a Bank of England report in 2002; excerpts 
from these are shown below:    
  
.......lenders believe that the businesses of small firms are risky because of the 
business types they operate. Lenders do not understand the communities of 
these groups enough, particularly those of the immigrant entrepreneurs 
....largely BACE‘s. Some banks operate a system of „brokers‟, who were 
usually from the ethnic minority communities (Bank of England, 2002). 
These brokers consist of a range of professionals and other intermediaries 
such as accountants, solicitors, insurance brokers as well as ethnic minority 
community leaders. In these sorts of arrangements, there is evidence that 
brokers were used as explicit forms of learning and entry into the BACE 
markets.   
This is quite an interesting reference to the investigation into how the banks 
utilise the relationships, particularly for those BACEs that have built a 
verifiable track record with the banks. Some of the findings that emerged 
during the interviews with the purposely selected BACEs suggested that, 
despite the lengthy periods of banking history with some of the banks, there 
still seem to be disproportionate barriers in accessing finance, despite ‗good, 
bankable propositions‘. This position is supported by findings from a 2008 
study (Deakins et. al, 2008), which looked at the general SMEs (Black firms are 
included in the findings) and set out to identify if there was a ‗finance gap‘.  It 
is often the case that Black businesses are included in the SME findings and 
this poses a degree of uncertainty because the real issues for BACEs are often 
generalised with the SME findings. This problem has been identified in 
several aspects in the literature review chapter. Deakins et al., (2010) 
suggested that there was evidence that some categories of these firm owners 
may face greater difficulties or exhibit certain circumstances in which it may 
have been difficult for bank managers to apply standard decision- making 
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models, i.e. via computerised assessments of business loan application at a 
central point without face-to-face assessments.   
When the respondent banks were asked how the lender-borrower relationship 
influenced decision making, a mixture of responses was obtained. Responses 
were largely attributed to the impact of the local centralised systems of 
processing applications. Furthermore, the shift towards centralised decision-
making in the banks (even prior to the financial crisis) could well have 
disadvantaged BACEs. This has become more of a problem in recent times 
owing to the effect of the ‗global economic downturn‘ and the ever increasing 
pressures on lending banks. A respondent loan manager said:  
  
―...the relationships with BACEs, especially the older ones, used to be an 
important criterion and decision making requirement. (Bank A)  
  
When the researcher probed further, seeking explanations...the respondent 
expanded:  
...for example, any customer (irrespective of the ethnic orientation) with over 
10 years of banking history, usually was not (until recently) required to 
undergo rigorous credit checks as the history of performance and credit 
worthiness was easily evaluated.(Bank A)  
  
Another supported this position:   
  
“..recently, I would say in the last 6 – 7 years, the requirements to employ 
computer-based credit check and referencing has overridden the discretions 
of local managers in evaluating risks and financial burden that may ensue 
following business loan offers...really, the current climate affects all 
businesses....but I would agree that, historically, some...I mean very small 
proportions of BACEs that I have dealt with do have a good chance in 
securing business finance based on the history they have banking with 
us.(Bank B)”  
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The responses from all the five banks were almost similar, clearly, the 
consensus was that historically, prior to 2005, the relationships with local 
business development managers and the BACE was a positive consideration 
in evaluating credibility in terms of ability to ‗pay back‘ loans, and therefore, 
lowering the supposed barriers.  Furthermore, this point suggests that 
personal relationships developed at the local branch level can be especially 
important in the case of BACEs in overcoming the kinds of barrier that they 
face.   
It was impossible to review documentations and this was a clear limitation in 
obtaining ‗real time‘ information by inspecting records due to ‗data 
protection‘. Most of the respondent bank managers interviewed (and two in 
particular: Bank A  and Bank C) referred the researcher to the publications site 
of the Bank web site where reports were accessible, but still, limited 
information relating to monitoring and comparison of applications, outcomes 
and success rates of BACEs compared to other ethnic firms were unavailable. 
Most of the major banks interviewed were ‗cagey‘ with information, limiting 
access to relevant information. The advent of computerised processing of 
business loan applications has taken away the autonomy of local branch 
managers, therefore missing out on the benefits of the relationships with the 
BACEs and increasing the information gaps.   
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Table 20:  Comparison of the bank‘s decision making structures 
  
Bank  Decision Making   Observations  
Bank A  Previously, mostly 
centralised, but now  A 
small measure of Local 
inputs from Business  
Development Managers  
One of the more sophisticated 
banks in considering relationship 
history as key factor. Business 
liaising managers assigned to 
applications and therefore 
recommendations to central office 
enhances outcomes.  
 
Bank B  
Mostly Centralised, limited 
local input  
Computer-aided, interrelationship 
banking critical  
Bank C  Historically, local 
discretion prevalent, but in 
more recent times, Limited 
Local discretion (smaller 
loans), larger loans decided 
centrally  
Local branch managers have 
reasonable autonomy/powers to 
recommend offers, client 
history/record pertinent in the 
decision making outcome (i.e.  
credit scoring)  
Bank D  Predominantly centralised, 
following merger  
Computer based assessment  
  
Bank E  Shift to centralisation,  
previously local discretion 
predominant  
Shift to Computer based 
assessment  
  
  
6.2.1.4 Credit Scoring & Loan Processing  
 Credit scoring and collaterals security (BBA, 2002) are two key elements 
involved in the processing and assessment of business loan applications.  
Credit scoring refers to centralised decision making points, usually detached 
far away from the applicant. Credit scoring is a form of transaction lending 
which has grown in importance for micro business lending since the mid1990s 
(Allen et al, 2004; BOE, 2004). Credit scoring involves the development of 
statistical models, using large samples of data on past borrowers, to predict 
the probability of default. Applicants‘ data can be fed later into the model to 
arrive at a credit score which then forms the basis for lending decisions. Some 
of the implications for BACEs, are that, the application of a blanket scoring 
system indirectly and unwittingly creates an ‗uneven playing field‘ for them 
due to the ‗size‘ and ‗market imperfections‘. Credit scoring has a long history 
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in consumer lending but its application to micro-business loans is relatively 
recent. Fraser (2008; 2009) noted that the limited data availability on small 
businesses (not just BACEs) can arise to poor ‗predictive power‘ of the credit 
scoring system.  
 As a result of this, the local discretion of the branch manager is increasingly 
becoming non-existent. During the interviews for this thesis, it was not very 
clear if the local decision making was any better than a centralised method, as 
records were not available for review, due to data protection reasons.  All the 
bank respondents interviewed were asked what they believed were the most 
rated reasons for BACE difficulty securing loan finance, all the five managers 
indicated that several factors were often noticeable from periodic reviews of 
applications, but the three key reasons that were dominant related to credit 
scoring, collaterals and business planning‟ in that order.  
The banks agreed that the recent economic-down turn has made it more 
difficult for the local branches to exercise discretions and that the impact of 
this was the inability of the banks to use local knowledge gained from 
relationships with existing customers.  Credit scoring has now become the 
absolute minimum requirement for all banking and financial institution to 
undertake when customers seek credit facilities or loan advancement. This 
takes away the customer-banking relationship totally. A respondent attests to 
this view:  
  
“...there is a clear shift away from the historical „performance scoring or 
behaviour scores generated from internal analysis of the customers banking 
history. This approach was evident a decade ago, but recently, all banks are 
forced to apply more complicated computer-aided scoring and decision- 
making. I will agree that, inevitably, your study groups may suffer even 
greater disproportionate disadvantage....but to be honest, this is out of the 
control of the bank and really, some degree of government or financial 
standard intervention might be a better remedy. (Bank C)  
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6.2.1.5 Collaterals & Security   
It was not possible, during the interviews with the selected banks to review 
application results and or notification letters, which, presumably would detail 
the security requirements for each proposals. However, three of the banks, the 
more established ones including Banks A, B and C all gave estimated ratios of 
equity to loan requirements as follows:  
  
(Equity: Loan)     Bank A: 50:50 / Bank B: 40:60 / Bank C: 30:70  
  
These options were arrived at based on other variables such as total 
advancement sought, the value of the business plan, the robustness of cash 
flow and other macro and micro variables stipulated by a computer-based 
analysis, considering risks, inflations, interest rates etc. Because the banks 
interviewed did not have ethnicity monitoring reports, it was not possible to 
ascertain the degree of variation in success rates of BACEs concerning 
equity/loan ratio of borrowing. Some explanations were cited concerning 
some ‘Asian‘ firms who often had access to ‗family business‘ or co-operative 
‗equity base‘ which some banks found acceptable as a form of unorthodox 
guarantee. A respondent loan manager said:  
  
“....from experience, we have noticed that some small Asian starters had 
access to family wealth, many that are traced to family chains of enterprise. 
In many cases, these equity offerings were „gifted‟ which means the 
entrepreneur did not have to pay this back. So therefore, the bank accepts 
this as a positive equity and this greatly enhances the chances for the Asian 
business starter to secure sufficient finance. (Bank A)”  
  
 On the other hand, BACEs seldom have similar networks that could offer 
these sorts of informal guarantees due to limited social networks available to 
them (Berry, 2006). In cases where a BACE could raise collateral via third 
parties (including personal loan), these sources are seen as added debt and 
liability which further affects credit ratings/scoring (Fraser, 2007).   
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6.2.1.6 Business planning  
The impact of business planning on the success of business loan application is 
critical and all the banks indicated that this was relevant in evidencing the 
cash-flow potential of the business proposal. Banks A, B and C particularly 
claimed that huge investments had been expended to ensure that 
entrepreneurs (start up and growth) receive adequate support with 
developing and projecting cash flow.  Sadly enough, many BACEs and similar 
small firms of other ethnic backgrounds do not take up these provisions of 
impartial and expert financial resources and support facilities. It was also 
evident talking to the respondent banks, that some BACEs with lesser human 
capital attainments are less likely to use professional services with claims that 
they are too ‗expensive‘.   
This is consistent with other findings (Dhaliwal, 2006) on the use of business 
support, showing that better qualified entrepreneurs tend to make greater use 
of the services available than those with low qualifications. What can be 
deduced from this view is that the respondent bank manager‘s position 
suggests that there is an association between the level and type of 
qualification of BACEs and their ability to produce good business plans. The 
experience cited by all three banks mentioned above suggest that human 
capital in terms of relevant financial qualification (cited in chapter 5) play an 
important but not a determinant role in presenting business loan proposals.  
Many proposals from BACEs do present very good business planning as these 
groups on the average attain higher qualifications than their peers from non-
ethnic backgrounds. But surprisingly, there are still significant numbers of 
failing outcomes from loans application. This cannot be corroborated as 
records were not made available by the banks during the interviews when 
asked. When the question about financial education and its relevance to the 
chance of a successful application for finance by the BACE was asked, all the 
respondents agreed that one of the reasons attributed to the alleged 
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perceptions of discrimination resulting from unsuccessful application has to 
do with ‗financial literacy‘. One of the bank managers said:  
   
“....given that we notice there is a lack of understanding or a suspicion of the 
banking sector, the requirement of financial information can be seen as a 
barrier, particularly for those with limited knowledge of the significance for 
these information and the use of them by the bank.... (Bank B)  
  
Another respondent said:  
  
“..some owner managers who have advanced qualifications in finance and 
related subjects do have a greater awareness of the significance of business 
planning, cash flow projections and risks mapping.....these are very crucial 
factors needed to assess loan application (Bank E)  
  
These responses confirm previous findings in research (Bank of England, 
2000; OCED, 2004); these studies concluded that the issue of financial literacy 
and capability is emphasised. During the interviews with selected BACEs 
(presented in part 1 of this chapter) some owner managers, particularly those 
with lesser human capital queried the relevance of business planning and it is 
not surprising that many of those who held this opinion often recorded poor 
successes in accessing external finance.  
6.2.2 Knowledge gaps between ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ sides  
A number of themes emerged during the literature review – information 
asymmetry (the phenomenon attributed to the lender when partial or missing 
information exists about a prospective BACE and this resulting to ‗finance 
gap‘) and the ‗knowledge gaps‘ of the BACE themselves as a result of low 
human capital as discussed in depth in chapter two. These terms are used 
interchangeably as one is a cause of the other, but have distinct meaning and 
interpretations (these terms have been covered in the literature review chapter). 
A number of propositions have emerged during the in-depth interviews with 
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the BACEs and the literature searches which lean towards the notion that 
information asymmetry is the fundamental cause of any of the widely reported 
finance gaps affecting BACEs. This implies that bank managers lack 
information about BACEs (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).   
This literature presents a theoretical argument which suggests that bankers 
may restrict credit due to insufficient information, but in practice, bank 
managers may accept limited information if the local branch manager could 
exercise local discretion based on relationship knowledge. Arguably, the 
information unevenness problem has been made worse by the increasing shift 
from localised decision making processing of loans applications to 
centralisation in bank lending decisions involving rigorous credit profiling for 
all applicants.   
The contemptuous view is that, why should the effects of information 
asymmetry be any more a disadvantage for BACEs, than it is for other EMBs in 
the same sector. Therefore, the notion that, problems arising from information 
gap between the ‗demand‘ and ‗supply‘ side is open to subjective 
interpretations is a reasonable statement.   
The existing ‗information gap‘ between the principal agents (demand-supply), 
causes a problem for both agents, because of the possibilities for misinformed 
opinion between them. The consequence of this is that, decisions may be based 
on insufficient or imperfect information (Fraser, 2009). That is to say, a viable 
business case may have been missed because of either missing information or 
absence of adequate information. Some of the broad questions explored and the 
resulting responses are presented below based on generalised themes that 
emerged as possible impact of the lack of information or opportunities to 
enhance applications from BACEs at the local decision making level.  
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Table 21: Respondent Bank Views on Adverse Selection   
  
Bank Possible reasons 
resulting to ‘adverse 
selection’  
Comments/references from interview 
B No basis to validate 
financial history 
 
 
 
“..when dealing with young 
entrepreneurs(irrespective of their ethnicity), 
those with very short banking history, there is no 
practical means to check this apart from the credit 
scoring ...but I think some cases may have been 
otherwise suitable business plan, but the 
centralised decision making cancels out this 
opportunity...unfortunately...” 
C Some BACEs not 
forthcoming with 
verifiable financial 
information 
“...in many cases, applicants are not open about 
the risks of their proposals and often times, we 
have to probe rigorously to meet our risk control, 
but in some cases, this creates misinformation 
and subsequently affecting real cases based on the 
„tick‟ exercise in assessment forms that are fed 
into the computer systems....the difficulty of 
course is that , at the other end, where the 
applications are processed, there is no 
opportunity to „negotiate‟ or add other 
information that are available when the local 
branch manager meets with the applicant...” 
A BACEs business sector 
profiles, the risks and 
communities served 
adds a significant risk 
to the outcomes of 
application  
....as you probably know, we are a pioneer in the 
reporting of work and improvement strategies to 
encourage BACEs in developing their 
businesses....in actual fact, we have recorded the 
most success in offering BACEs business loans 
both at start up and growth....but really, the 
sector types that most of the entrepreneurs, 
especially those in the inner cities congregate are 
scores as „high risk‟...but this is not to say that  
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Bank Possible reasons 
resulting to ‘adverse 
selection’  
Comments/references from interview 
  the business proposal was weak, but the economic 
sustainability for these sectors is the main 
problems.....also the lack o\f information of the 
„recipient market of local services and goods may 
pose a problem in securing finance... 
 
E Advent of ‗Centralised 
Decision Making‘ 
“...the information gaps between the bank and the 
aspiring entrepreneur, including those already 
trading is the lack of adequate understanding of 
the requirements for lenders to process loans 
applications.....many see negative outcomes as 
being discriminated against, but in reality, there 
are risk controls enshrined into our processes 
 
 
In general terms, the five banks‘ responses mainly agree (with some little 
variations) that, banks do normally rely on past financial performance and 
history as an indicator of the future performance and ability to repay loans. It is 
evident from the in-depth interviews that younger BACEs (in terms of number 
of years of trading and/or relationship/ time with their banks) may suffer the 
most difficulty in securing debt finance. This was corroborated during the 
interviews with some BACEs during the first phase of the field work. New 
BACEs expressed fears of not ‗having a chance‘ in securing debt finance 
because of lack of verifiable track record. The researcher infers that they are 
probably no different from most (if not all) new firms in this respect.  
The characteristics of some of the BACEs in terms of the community they serve 
pose some challenges to the ‗information gathering and risk profiling‘ 
approaches employed by the bank. For example, one manager (Bank A) 
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suggested that the sector types and communities served are ‗closed‘. What this 
means is that some BACEs that were locked into ‗ethnic enclaves‘ are serviced 
by ethnic businesses only and thereby restricting their growth potential. The 
concern for the lender is that the affected BACE being locked into a particular 
market will limit the growth potential of the business.  What was not clear 
during these discussions was whether some of these cases were after all, good 
business cases as recorded cases was inaccessible during the interviews and the 
manager declined to elaborate on this aspect when probed, citing 
confidentiality.  
In another discussion/interview, there were concerns that many BACEs 
(particularly the younger ones) did not approach the banks; therefore, the 
claims of difficulties cited by many of the demand side were not justifiable.   
One other key finding from the lender‘s perspective was the fact that, in many 
cases, the BACEs do present good business proposals, but the problem of 
centralisation worsened the chances of the BACE to secure finance.   
At least 3 of the big High Street banks interviewed agreed that the ‗local 
relationships‘ developed over time with the BACEs and the communities 
within which they operated were somewhat lost by the increasing use of credit 
scoring and centralisation of the decision making process. The economic crisis 
has made this even worse. There seem to be a consensus by lenders that the 
lack of ‗qualitative information‘ feeding into the decision stages (computer-
based) is a big issue for all applications.   
It only means that BACEs, by virtue of the ‗inherent characteristics‘ of BACEs, 
financing relate to the attitude and objectives of the owner-manager such as the 
‗Human Capital‘ – in terms of financial education, experience and sector 
attributes; their inability to provide strong collateral all seem to compound the 
chances for successfully securing debt finance. The claims of discrimination by 
some BACEs are unfounded, the following supports this view:   
Firstly, the human capital factor is very critical to the approaches employed by 
the BACE which means that those with higher and relevant educational 
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tendency have good financial skills to explore options, appraise requirements 
and therefore able to meet the qualifying criteria. On the contrary, those with 
lesser or no financial education tend to congregate in the ‗traditional sectors‘ 
which are seen as ‗risky‘ propositions by the banks (Ram et. al, 2002; Hussain & 
Matlay, 2008). All the banks surveyed claim that ultimately, decision to grant 
debt finance application hinge on economic appraisals rather than diversity 
orientation.   
The second main theme that seems to emerge is the impact of ‗insufficient 
information‘ which in many cases can result in good, bankable cases being 
turned down. Examples of the lack of ‗soft-data‘ – personal information which 
is absent in application forms was cited earlier. This is consistent with other 
research (Deakins et. al, 2008; Lean & Tucker, 2001;Ram & Smallbone, 2001)) in 
the field, therefore, there is a need to begin to focus on the policy dimensions 
needed to ‗bridge‘ the widening gap which is made worse by the increasing use 
of computer-based decisions on applications.   
The loss of ‗personal touch‘ in terms of local bank /relationship manager 
powers seem to be a bigger issue which the lenders feel is largely responsible 
for the ‗perceived‘ barriers and ‗negative attitudes‘ exhibited by many BACEs. 
For example, there are some ‗informal information‘ such as knowledge of the 
relationship manager about the BACE business in areas such as lack of formal 
or advanced education on the part of the applicant BACE, in these cases, the 
local manager can refer the applicant to an ‗in-house‘ business adviser, waiving 
consultancy fees where the business proposal is promising, but lacking in 
presentation and financial projections.   
The local input can make all the difference as the relationship manager can 
support and recommend alternative scoring approach for selected cases. The 
Bank ‗A‘ and ‗C‘ loans processing managers interviewed concurred to this, and 
that the recent practices do not favour this approach any more due to the 
stringent conditions the lending banks now have to comply with.   
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6.2.3 Policy dimensions: Bankers Perspectives  
All five business development bank managers interviewed were asked how the 
specific barriers suffered by the BACEs could be redressed. The responses are 
summarised in the table below:  
Banks Remedial 
Suggestions/Policy 
intervention  
Comments/references from interview 
Bank B -Establish more BACE 
support groups as 
partners with the banks 
-Expanding 
Communities served to 
enhance ‗risk‘ profiling 
by consumer relevance  
“.... BACEs are seen to have very little social capacity 
compared to other ethnic minority firms, the reasons 
may have to do with the mistrust they may have within 
their own business circles....I think they need to expand 
their market place and engage other ethnic groups to 
expand their horizon... 
Bank C Sam e as above, in 
addition, application 
processes can be 
processed using ‗clearing 
agencies‘ with specific 
knowledge of BACEs 
policy initiatives to 
embed these in 
processing applications 
“...i think setting up of support systems that are run 
and managed by BACEs themselves  will mitigate the 
„information gaps‟ we have discussed earlier....this 
specialist groups will receive training, guidance and 
monitoring from the banks, the idea is that information 
will flow in a two-way traffic which would improve the 
knowledge of both the demand and supplier sides 
ultimately....” 
Bank A -Promote ‗alternative 
funding sources 
-Improve local 
‗databases‘ of BACEs 
-Creation of BACE 
databases accessible to 
financial services 
-Promoting financial 
education 
-Take-up of specialist 
support offered by 
bank(at a minimal cost) 
“....the more disadvantaged groups by virtue of the 
attributes which make small firms „risky‟ should be 
encouraged to seek alternative sources of finance such as 
micro-finance initiatives which require less stringent 
eligibility criteria. It appears that there may be 
overreliance on debt finance.... 
...availability of a localised databases of EMB‟s is an 
area that research has repeatedly suggested, but really, 
very little has been done in that regard...perhaps, BACE 
advocacy groups cam commission such projects and 
lobby the London Development Agency for a national 
database that will inform financial assessments... 
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Banks Remedial 
Suggestions/Policy 
intervention  
Comments/references from interview 
Bank D -Enhance links with 
BACE 
communities/consumers 
of services and goods, 
-Exploring alternative 
funding sources  
-Availability of 
monitoring data by the 
LDA with clear links and 
accessibility to financial 
planning 
-Educating BACEs on 
lending criteria and role 
of external controls. 
“...High Street banks sometimes appear to be quite 
detached from BACE communities, and the reasons, in 
my opinion are to do with the sectors and communities 
within which they operate... 
“....many times, I feel that some small firms make wrong 
choices by seeking debt finance to either start or grow 
their businesses, this is because the minimum qualifying 
criteria in areas of equity, credit scoring and lack of 
financial education is the first hurdle that is often failed. 
I think, seeking alternative sources such as social funds, 
community initiatives and similar non-formal sources of 
finance may be suitable, but of-course, the 
underutilisation of appropriate advice and/or 
misinformation on both the demand and supply side is 
evidently a serious matter to look at from the policy 
perspectives... 
   Bank E -BACE Database 
-encourage use of 
alternative funding 
-Mentoring Schemes 
managed by BACEs 
(bank funded) 
“...lack of information of the sectors of aggregation of 
BACEs can be seen as an area to explore in some 
details...centralisation of decision making processes is a 
huge disadvantage to small firms as the scoring indices 
are very small and tagged as „risky‟.....the fact of the 
matter is that the banks cannot base loan applications on 
sentimental logic as the computerised systems are 
designed and configured to evaluate risk and 
profitability, if these two conditions are not met, there is 
no room for manoeuvre... 
...i think, better information exchange between the 
demand and supply of finance is a key gap in the chain, 
both parties have a duty to improve this...but off-course, 
a wider policy development ... 
A number of progress paths have been identified by the respondent business 
loans managers interviewed as presented above. Some discussions and 
implication for policy around some of the key views from bankers based on 
some of the quotes itemised above are discussed in the concluding chapter.  
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Whilst Chapter 7 will discuss in some detail, the implications of these findings 
to this research, some headline proposals suggested by the banks for ‗bridging 
the gaps‘ between the BACEs and finance providers are summarised below:  
  
1. The communities within which the BACEs congregate needed to be 
expanded, as this may further ‗spread risk‘ profiling in terms of 
market failures and maximisation of social capital which have been 
suggestively low for the group.  
2. The banks suggested that there was scope to ‗fortify‘ the links 
between the ‗demand‘ and ‗provider‘ relationships, particularly 
concerning ‗behaviour profiling, attitudes and potentials‘ which 
currently are computer-generated within the loans processing.  
3. The continued shift from localised decision making to centralised 
decision making has further alienated local branch managers from 
the process, therefore, losing those ‗informal and useful knowledge 
of the BACE‘s business attributes, qualities and aspirations. A very 
strong and present case for failed bankable proposal. Two of the five 
banks surveyed indicated that the centralised decision making did 
not entirely eradicate the links with ethnic minority communities 
(Banks ‗A‘ and ‗C‘) and the building of trust, which is dependent on 
experience, knowledge and perceptions of importance. These 
discretional tendencies are still being exercised, but at a lesser 
capacity than in the last decade or so. This is attributed to the 
changing global economic challenges, which, invariably would 
impact more on the vulnerable business owner manager.  
4. Three of the five banks concurred that lack of a unified database of 
BACEs in general is a critical factor in the impact of evaluating 
tendencies, attitudes, social capital and most importantly, business 
behaviour linked to the characteristics of the specific owner manager 
across the various sectors within which they operate. A government 
led initiative to build a database of the micro and macro financial 
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information required for ‗risk‘ mapping, taking into account the 
unique characteristics peculiar to small firms might be a worthwhile 
project to embark upon. This approach would engage the BACE 
representative specialist, the banks and an intermediary to facilitate 
and quality assure the project.   
5. It was also suggested that advocacy support and intermediaries that 
are specially focused on servicing the disadvantaged groups was 
desirable. Bank managers are well aware of the importance of 
intermediaries for getting new business in ethnic communities. More 
so, to bridge the information gap that exists between the demand and 
provider sides. Examples within the Asian communities were cited 
and that the BACEs could adopt these approaches.  
6. A new area which emerged during the interviews with the Banks 
relate to the divergence between policy and practice concerning 
relationships with external organisations including professional 
support agencies (this is looked at in some detail in the next sub-
section). There is growing concern that many support agencies were 
being abolished by the present government. This is not surprising, 
given the recognition of variable quality across different support 
agencies, relationships and relevance of the services offered did not 
meet the needs of the BACEs. On the other hand, it is arguable that 
many BACEs underutilise the available services anyway.  
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6.3 Intermediary Perspectives - Business Support Gaps  
6.3.1 Introduction  
 The final aspect of this chapter presents the findings relating to support 
provisions gaps concerning access to finance for BACEs particularly from 
commercial banks. It also looks at the relevance of the third sector business 
support services to the financial needs of BACEs and considers possible policy 
implications.    
During the outset of designing the field work for this research, it was strongly 
felt that interviewing a number of third sector business support providers in 
London would be a useful approach to investigate the availability of specialist 
skills and services designed and targeted to meet the needs of BACEs. It 
became obvious that collating a list of business support providers that services 
BACEs was not a straightforward task. This was because there was a plethora 
of organisations – public sector (those funded directly by the government) and 
the third sector organisations (voluntary organisations that seek funding from 
the public sector bodies-LDA, Business Link) in London.   
It became apparent, from discussions with many of the voluntary sector 
support organisations that were unable to evaluate their effectiveness in terms 
of meeting the needs of many of the BACEs because of lack of systematic 
monitoring of success rates for the BACEs supported in securing finance from 
banks. The approach then was to rely more on the public sector intervention – 
largely, the London Development Agency which has, in its last three years of 
existence, moved towards consolidating the fragmented third sector 
organisations, by realigning its core responsibilities of building the capacity of 
small business growth and improving access to finance.  
The aim was to consider the appropriateness of the LDA‘s role at the time, 
given that it was the main agency responsible for economic and business 
development in London at the time of the empirical research for this study was 
undertaken. Parts of the aims were to retrospectively evaluate and analyse the 
‗relevance of the LDA to policy effectiveness targeted at the BACEs‘. The logic 
for this change in method was to find solutions to the poor utilisation of 
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business support provisions by BACEs. Furthermore, almost all the five banks 
interviewed highlighted the needs for BACE specialist support and policy 
framework as fundamental to bridging the widely reported ‗information 
asymmetry‘ between the demand and provider agents. The LDA service 
realignment with the Small Business Service (SBS) mainly through Business 
Link for London (BL4L) provided the most relevant, accurate and verifiable 
findings and overview of the numerous third sector performance and activities 
relating to BACE support outputs. This realignment was under the then 
Labour regime who decided to bring Business Link under the control of the 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in 2005.   
6.3.2 London Development Agency (LDA):  Findings  
The LDA is the Mayor of London‘s agency for business and jobs. It is the main 
economic development body for London and plays a pivotal role in supporting 
the growth and development of viable businesses. It commissioned a ground 
breaking research in 2002 to determine the business development and growth 
needs of Black and Minority-owned businesses to London economy. One of the 
key findings related to issues and gaps relating to business support services 
concerning Black entrepreneurs specifically.   
In November 2005 and again followed up in the spring of 2008, the researcher 
had extensive interviews with a senior officer of the London Development 
Agency (LDA). The officer was a Senior Enterprise development officer within 
the policy and procurement division shared his views about the barriers faced 
by all Black and Minority – owned Enterprise as a whole, which includes the 
BACEs. Three key themes were explored in depth and these are presented in 
turn.  
6.3.2.1 Role of LDA and Support Provisions   
The role of the LDA in ensuring the support provisions were adequately 
targeted at meeting the identified needs of BACE formed the focus of review in 
retrospect. The respondent indicated that the LDA has a significant role to play 
in addressing the issues relating to absence of specialist business support 
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provisions for BACEs. He stated that the LDA was part of a network of key 
organisations which he referred to as ‗mainstream‘ which influence or provide 
business support across London boroughs. He referred to them as a ‗London 
Business Support Network‘. He stated that:  
  
“...the LDA is in the process of taking sole responsibility for Business link for  
London (BL4L), funded by the business support agency the Small Business  
Service (SBS) of the Department for Trade & Industry (DTI), the reason for 
this is to have a greater control and monitoring of the efficacy of business 
support service delivery by government funded third sector organisations 
such as the East London Small Business Centre (ELSBC)......, LDA 2008  
  
This response suggests that the proliferation of private sector and third sector 
organisations was a disadvantage in monitoring how effective the business 
support services offered were and therefore leaves a big gap in the needs 
assessment, data collation and ability to ensure that policy measures are 
effective. Having said this, just two years thereafter this interview, the 
government announced that the LDA was to be abolished and assimilated into 
the Greater London Authority (GLA) as part of the current government‘s 
strategy to make efficiency savings. The shift of the LDA‘s responsibilities to 
the GLA may make it more difficult to achieve the rationalisation of support 
provision.  This means that the BACEs could lose their voice in a much larger 
group of the SME umbrella. Prior to the current position, the LDA felt that the 
business support service provision could be better evidenced by aggregating 
mainstream support provision and reducing the third sector groups.  
The timing of this research therefore appears to coincide with the restructuring 
of the governmental body responsible for business support service provisions, 
leading to a period of uncertainty. It is therefore difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of the proposed rationalisation of support provisions in London. 
Perhaps, in a few years, following the GLA takeover of the LDA and affiliated 
organisations, further research is desirable to ascertain the effectiveness of the 
intentions. But at the time of conducting the field research, the role of the LDA 
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was seen as a ‗big brother‘ to foster a link between BACE‘s and the ‗cocktail of 
business support provisions‘.  
  
6.3.2.2 BACE- Focused Support Organisation  
The LDA sees these third sector groups as critical to bridging the gaps between 
the demand and provider sides as a ‗way forward‘ action. For example, the 
respondent agreed that the relevance of dedicated BME-owned support 
organisations was critical, but that there were large shortages of these in 
London. The LDA development officer said:  
  
“...to be honest, it is clear that there are scarcity of specialist support 
organisations in London, not in terms of numbers but certainly in terms of 
targeted  advice and support to Black-owned businesses based on needs... 
LDA, 2008”  
  
“One other fact is the lack of co-ordinated data on local Black businesses and 
their characteristics. There is long history of calls for more information that 
will enable business support providers deliver targeted support, very few 
specialist support services have these...... LDA, 2008”  
  
Even though, there is a growing recognition of the need to develop a robust 
database of the attributes of BACEs, certainly around the sector types – there is 
wide acceptance amongst researchers that BACEs congregate in certain 
business sectors which make them risky – creative industries such as music 
and fashion are deemed to be more risky for bank investment, social networks, 
advocacy agencies, training resources and other subjects that , in all would 
provide the third sector support providers with ‗rich‘ resource bank. Perhaps, 
further research is desired to achieve this.   
Interviews with four of the five banks certainly has clearly identified this and 
expressed willingness to collaborate with the relevant governmental body to 
commission such project. The challenge is the unstable situation (changes in 
Government funding commitments) in consolidating the fragmented third 
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sector business support organisations. Perhaps the timing of this research can 
serve as a real opportunity to heighten awareness and stimulate debate.  
 
6.3.2.3 The relevance and effectiveness of the ‘third sector’:   
Business support provisions  
The respondent (LDA) reaffirmed that improving access to formal sources of 
finance for BACEs in a targeted manner has always been a priority for the 
third sector business support providers. The third sector organisations sprang 
up in the late 1980s due to the lack of progression or opportunities in the 
employment market for the Black working age population and the increasing 
barriers that the BACEs faced in the open market securing external or debt 
finance. A senior officer of LDA gave some reasons for the resurgence of third 
sector, he said:  
  
“Ade, I referred you to the Research commissioned by LDA which confirmed 
that BME-owned business, particularly those operating in traditional ethnic 
markets such as goods and services delivered to such communities are 
particularly affected....what then happens is that BME support agencies 
began to form with the single aim to provide the specialist support and advice 
to this groups...but then, funding for these valuable advocates continued to be 
a challenge and today, very many of these enterprise agencies have folded 
up...” LDA, 2008  
  
The above statement also suggests that the void being filled by the third sector 
was triggered by the lack of specialist services targeted at BACEs and other 
ethnic EMBs. The LDA respondent was asked what he felt was the role and 
importance of the private sector support provisions. He suggested that they 
played a complementary role to the public sector providers such as the 
Business Link for London (BL4L).   
He recognised that the private sector includes the High Street banks, other 
financial institutions and sources of equity and venture capital including 
business angels. He agreed that there is an increasing funding gap for these 
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sectors and expressed concern about the possible impact the absence of these 
‗third sector‘ organisations would mean to the BACEs.  
   
He had this to say:  
  
“Really, there is still significant cause for concern that the demand side, 
mainly BMEs lack awareness and knowledge of the availability of business 
support and the lack of utilisation of mainstream support services remain one 
of the main reasons for failing to access debt finance...” LDA, 2008  
  
From the LDA monitoring reports of value for money, there is now a real 
danger that underutilisation of support services is part of the reason the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) continue to explore ways 
of consolidating business support services and subsequently reducing funding 
for these. This refers to the support simplification programme initiated by the 
previous government.  
There is some suggestions from this research (having spoken in depth with 
both demand and provider sides) that support from some mainstream financial 
service providers was increasingly becoming ‗detached‘ – not in terms of 
access for BACEs but in terms of ‗relevance to the specialist needs‘ of some 
ethnic minority businesses.    
At this juncture, there are still some unanswered questions; how relevant are 
the specialist support enterprises offering support and advisory services to 
BACEs? The answer is ‗patchy‘, but there is  strong evidence emerging that the 
issue is not just that of under –utilisation of business support services and 
advise, but an equal absence of ‗good‘ and specifically nurtured advice to meet 
the needs of BACEs. During the interviews with the ‗demand side‟, one 
respondent supported this proposition, that many business support services 
for Black businesses remain fragmented and lacked government backing.  
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A BACE respondent said:  
“I can relate to the possibility that Black business owners do not use business 
support services sufficiently mainly because there are certain perceptions or 
lack of specialist support advice available. There is also a possibility that the 
business support service providers do not advertise their services enough 
therefore the owner managers are unaware of the opportunities available 
concerning business support, some may even think they have to pay for these 
services if unaware that the funding for these facilities are financed from the 
Government departments...AA, 2010”  
  
Another also said:  
  
“I think this is about the „perceptions‟ we were talking about earlier and the 
lack of confidence and explorations. There is also a problem of lack of relevant 
support speciality – meaning the support agencies do not have relevant advise 
that meet the needs of the ethnic minority businesses, so the word that go 
around is that the business support agencies were not set up or resourced to 
service ethnic minority businesses particularly. I really believe that the 
government should encourage ethnic minority businesses to set up and run 
these support agencies themselves.... I think the Pakistani and Indian 
communities do this very well.......DD, 2010”  
As part of assessing the effectiveness of business support to BACEs, the 2005 
LDA- research identified significant gaps relating to the consequence of the 
proliferation of voluntary sector support organisations. Two main issues 
emerged:   
Firstly, there is the lack of database due to the fragmentation and secondly, the 
lack of appropriate funding initiatives to support the work of specialist 
supports providers. The next chapter looks at the aspects warranting further 
research and offers suggestions and recommendations to add value to the 
debate.  
One of the emerging themes that have become clear from the interviews with 
the selected BACE owner managers and the banks is the proposition that 
specialist needs of BACEs are best met by specialised support organisation. 
The discussions with the LDA senior official concurs that this is in fact the case. 
This has led to a series of BACE focused interventions over almost two 
decades, resulting in specialist agencies proliferation. But the question is ‗how 
effective has the delivery of support services to the target groups, or rather, are 
BACEs utilising these services to the maximum potential? This question 
remains to be explored in future research.  The LDA agree that Enterprise 
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Agencies referred to as ‗Third Sector‘ organisations do provide a valuable 
range of services to London‘s SMEs which often complements mainstream 
public sector programmes.   
  
The LDA respondent said:  
  
“Actually, what I refer to as the third sector organisation comprises 
enterprise agencies such as „One London‟. Hope you know that this was 
formed as a result of a merger between Greater London Enterprise and 
London Enterprise Agency in 2001.....others are the East London Small 
Business Centre (ELSBC) or those that focus on a specific borough, such as 
the Business Enterprise Centre in the London Borough of Hammersmith and 
Fulham...”  
  
Nevertheless, the LDA officer suggested that the 2005 research conducted 
identified several weaknesses with the existing business support provisions for 
BACE-owned businesses. For example, there is some sense that business 
support arrangements for these groups remains fragmented. Because of the 
plethora of agencies and organisations has led to business support agencies 
chasing the same funding programmes and providing similar services with 
varying quality.  
6.3.2.4 Government/LDA ‘Long-Term’ Strategies for ‘Policy Intervention’   
One of the key themes explored was to assess how the government/LDA was 
setting up ‗long-term‘ strategies to use ‗policy intervention‘ for addressing the 
challenges faced by both the ‗demand‘ and ‗provider‘ sides concerning access 
to business finance. The timing of presenting the findings relating to the LDA‘s 
long-term strategies and views of adopting policy interventions in improving 
the accessibility of BACEs to debt finance from formal sources of funding is a 
challenging one. The reason for this was the imminent take-over of LDA by the 
Greater London Authority at the time. This would certainly have been the case 
by the time this dissertation is complete.   
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However, looking in retrospect, the LDA respondent interviewed supported 
by the numerous reports and secondary information studied suggested that a 
number of measures were considered as part of on-going development of 
BACE business support in London.   
Academic authorities in this area (Ram et al. 2001) have presented various 
findings and recommendations relating to the efficacy of Ethnic Minority 
Enterprise policy instruments. This research complements the perspectives and 
themes that emerged with a specific view on how the well-founded themes 
relates to BACEs as a specific segment of the wider EMBs in London. The more 
specific question for this research is to focus on how relevant generic support 
services are to BACEs and to ascertain if indeed there is a lack of 
specialised/tailored support for these groups as suggested during the 
interviews with the ‗demand side‘. The next subsection of this chapter (6.3.3) 
addresses the question of to what extent generic support does address the 
needs of BACEs with regards to accessing finance and whether they did have 
specialist needs which aren‘t covered by the generic support.  
The LDA‘s position is weakened to a degree because of the imminent changes 
that will see the department marginalised and abolished. However, the LDA 
authority interviewed emphasised the ‗inadequacy of existing database‘ 
relating to the BME enterprise community (Ram et. al, 2001).  The referenced 
study acknowledged that even where data was said to exist, ‗it appeared to be 
vague or indirect in that it was effectively drawn from the census, simply 
describing the size of the ethnic minority population in London.‘    
  
This thesis explores the case for the need of a specific group of the wider BME 
business entrepreneurs – BACEs. The implications for policy development are 
profound and require further investigation. The LDA and the BL4L agree that 
‗policy agendas‘ need to begin to separate the strands of the BMEs into specific 
policy dimensions targeted in a way which begin to create ‗specificity‘ of needs 
and solutions.   
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The lack of quality data is now a recurrent theme in expert reviews on the 
efficacy of policy in practice. Some of the discussions with the senior LDA 
respondent identified 5 key areas as clear needs for targeted policy 
intervention:  
1. lack of information on the real nature of BACEs characteristics  
2. need for new strategies for establishing and developing a robust 
database to bridge the ‗information  and knowledge gaps‘ existing 
between the demand and provider sides  
3. concerns about the quality and relevance of advice, support, 
mentoring and training for ‗third sector enterprises‘ offering business 
support and advise  
4. Disaggregating BACEs from the wider SME groups – this relates to 
the ‗specific cultural needs‘ of some BACEs. For example, there are 
some characteristic disadvantages created by ‗ethnic enclaves‘ that 
had been discussed earlier  
5. Lack of clarity for Central Government initiatives ; focusing policy 
intervention to sensitise self-help groups within the disadvantaged 
communities in question - BACEs   
6.3.3 Enterprise Agencies  
The research question concerning Enterprise Agencies (EA) was to evaluate 
how effective voluntary sector support providers met the specialist business 
support needs of BACEs and to evaluate the role of policy in meeting the 
unique business support needs of BACEs. The earlier part of this subsection 
focused on the Government sponsored support organisation whose roles 
included policy development and monitoring. Some arguments emerged 
during the interviews with the ‗demand‘ and ‗supply‘ sides which suggested 
that governmental business support agencies such as the LDA and BL4L may 
not be equipped to meet the business support needs of particular groups of 
entrepreneurs, as defined by ethnicity, gender, age etc.   
 The third sector is seen as complementary to the wider policy focus and this 
section of the thesis presents the findings of a detailed desk-top review and 
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interview of specialist selected enterprise agencies. The desk-top review of 
some BME-led specialist organisations was to investigate the scope of areas 
supported, practices, testimonials to the utilisation and relevance, outcomes 
and gaps assessments. Secondary data obtained from CEEDR who had 
conducted a scoping research for the LDA on access to finance on SME was 
also reviewed.   
Findings of the five purposely selected third sector providers studied by 
CEEDR were referenced and three of these were interviewed with a view to 
evaluate the relevance and/or absence of specialist business support functions 
and specialist services offered. Appendix (i), summarises and compares the 
range of key functions of the enterprise agencies discussed. The discussions 
that follow, on one hand, assesses the relevance and range of ‗targeted‘ 
services BACEs are reported to desire and on the other hand, to balance the 
argument on whether BACEs adequately utilise the range of services.  
 
Appendix 1 compares the range of services designed to meet the specialist needs 
of BACEs and also identifies some of the weaknesses or absence of services. As 
part of assessing the effectiveness of business support services on BACEs, this 
research looks at the relevance of dedicated business support agencies for 
BACEs. Whilst many other similar organisations have ceased to operate – North 
London Business Development Agency is one of them, the reason for closure is 
lack of funding. The BBV and the HBDA are examples of well set-up voluntary 
sector organisations that offer BACEs an excellent range of ‗targeted‘ services.   
Usage of these is a question that needs further research as indications from the 
interviews with the selected BACEs are that the entrepreneurs do not use these 
services enough. Some of the reasons and explanations have already been 
presented in the earlier sections.   
From the table, two key gaps were identified: Firstly, the lack of ethnicity 
monitoring makes it difficult to quantify and disaggregate the proportion of 
BACEs within the wider SME groups accessing the services. Much research 
(CEEDR, 2009, LDA, 2005, Ram, 2001) concurs that lack of adequate database for 
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BACEs is a clear problem to inform policy development. Secondly, a number of 
local enterprise agencies (HBDA) have developed best practice approaches and 
initiatives and have therefore made significant contributions to the development 
of BACE owned businesses in the local areas.   
Many of these enterprise agencies have a good track record of facilitating or 
handholding BACEs to raising finance and securing small loans (CEEDR, 2009). 
The question therefore is to ascertain the usage levels and the appropriateness of 
the range of services on offer, rather than presenting aspects of the business 
support policy framework. The next chapter discusses the policy implications 
across the three principle players (demand, provider and intermediaries) 
associated to the difficulties relevant to access to finance for BACEs. The 
concluding chapter also reveals the need for more qualitative research to explore 
whether, and to what extent, alternative and new perspectives on supporting 
Black businesses are desired.  
To answer the later question, the next sub-section highlights the differences 
between specialist support provisions compared to the mainstream (referred to 
the strategic body support provisions). Ram and Smallbone, (2001); CEEDR 
(2009) amongst many other expert researchers (Bennett, 2005) in their work for 
the SBS provided elaborate facts and theories that show the importance of 
specialist provisions for meeting the needs of the BACEs. It was clear, from the 
Bennett (2005) report that specialist support organisations were best set up to 
reach and engage with BACEs. Three specialist enterprise agencies (see appendix 
for questionnaire format adopted) were interviewed based on the premise to 
locate knowledge of business support within the BACE support providers. The 
focus for this was to ascertain whether there were needs not met within the 
generic/mainstream support services applicable to the wider SMEs. The key 
issues/findings are detailed.  
6.3.4 Mentoring & Referrals by Enterprise Agencies  
Questionnaire extracts obtained from CEEDR provided useful insider views of five (5) 
Enterprise Agency (EA) interviews. The findings formed part of a 2009 scoping work 
that informed a report (North et al., 2010) to the LDA on SME access to Finance in 
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London. The author, with CEEDR permission used the interview extracts to assess the 
role of EA‘s in enhancing EMB chances for securing external finance. However, it is 
worthy to note that the 2009 scoping work focused generally on SMEs, but the 
locations of the EAs (inner cities) provided some information pertinent to BACEs.  
Advisers offering BACEs advice about external finance needed to have a good 
understanding of the needs and skills/knowledge gaps of the BACE. The 
CEEDR report (2010) suggested that the five interviewed business advisors 
indicated that referral by enterprise agencies made it easier for SMEs to obtain 
external finance. Again, there is a difficulty in discerning the proportionality of 
BACEs included in this projection, but the logic is that many small firms of 
BACE are included. The report stressed that enterprise agencies play a 
mentoring role which helps to build up confidence in small business owners, 
providing them with awareness of the sources of finance available. They also 
provide guidance to small businesses including introduction to finance 
providers, including accompanying business owners to meetings, and 
handholding them through the application process. One of the questions asked 
by the CEEDR Interviewer (IE) was to find out from the EA how referral from 
them enhanced the business owner manager in obtaining external finance.  The 
following quotes illustrate are some illustrated responses:   
  
“If they have a mentor it makes life a lot easier for them. It builds up confidence in 
them. It also gives them greater understanding of sources of finance.” PBC, 
01/10/08  
  
“Referral is very important. Organisations such as ours have a greater 
understanding of what they need. We understand their requirements and will steer 
them in the right direction. We effectively get them ready in terms of giving those 
interviews skills.”  
BBV, 30/9/08  
  
“Referral makes it easier to a large extent. We prepare them. We work with a 
number of banks. We help businesses to identify sources of funding. We help them 
with their business plan. We coach them. We support them in many ways 
including handholding.” HBDA, 1/10/08  
  
“I think it makes it very easy. We have good contacts with big banks and with 
middle management. We introduce businesses to these contacts. Referral is quite 
seamless.” BBV, 30/9/08  
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Referrals to the finance provider were matched to the needs of the business 
entrepreneur and these were not exclusive to high street banks only. The 
following institutions/referrals were mentioned by the interviewed advisors: 
One London, The Princes Trust, the Scarman Trust, Phases in Business, Lottery 
Funds, and the LDA.  The business advisors indicated that they rarely referred 
firms to equity finance such as venture capital organisations and business 
angels. Their reasons were captured in the following quotes:  
  
“We have referred businesses to three or four venture capitalists and business 
angels, but it didn‟t work out. They wanted control of the businesses concerned. It 
is also important to point out that entry requirements are very stringent.” HBDA, 
1/10/08  
  
“They are only useful when large sums of money are required; not small amounts of money such 
as £30,000 often required by small businesses.” CBV, 23/09/08  
  
  
  
6.3.5 Enterprise Agencies Accounts – How effective are mainstream business 
support provisions.  
The focus for this aspect of the research was to establish if the 
generic/mainstream business support services were insufficient for the needs of 
BACEs. Some indications by the LDA was that this might have been the case 
following the 2005 research commissioned to determine the business and 
developmental support needs of BMEs. The justification for the LDA led 
research was that a large proportion of BME-owned businesses perceive that 
they were not receiving sufficient support from mainstream business support 
agencies and organisations. There were some suggestions from the findings of 
the research (LDA, 2005) that the mainstream support services may not be 
entirely beneficial or not effective in meeting the needs of the BACEs. Therefore, 
it was desirable to get further accounts from a few select enterprise agencies 
servicing BACEs particularly. The main finings/themes that emerged that were 
peculiar to the research question is itemised below.  
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6.3.6 Existing Business Support Framework  
There was a consensus of views from the BACE interviewed (chapter 5) that the 
current arrangements were ‗inconsistent‘ and therefore were ineffective in 
meeting the needs of black businesses. For example a respondent claimed that 
BACEs may not utilise mainstream support services enough and in many cases 
(at all):  
  
“From experience, I know many BACEs do not engage support services adequately 
because they feel they were of no value in them or that they were not willing to pay 
for professional services....”(DH, 2007)  
  
The respondent showed me some scripts of feedback questionnaire collected at 
one of the Black Business Observatory events in London where Black business 
owners showed a degree of ‗ignorance‘ towards the role and benefits of LDA:  
  
―Dealing with the LDA is like dealing with Goliath – try and call them on the 
phone...it‟s very off-putting...they are too big, too powerful...faceless and almost 
like „a one way street‟....they don‟t make themselves available....they only contact 
you when they have a conference where in many cases there are not less than 350 
people in a massive hall.... (DH, 2007)  
  
What is obvious is that some BACEs certainly feel detached from the structure 
of bureaucracy and the regulatory complexity of the public sector giant (LDA). 
It can be inferred that the structure and processes existing are inaccessible and 
unsuitable for this user groups. Another excerpt cited says:  
  
“The way support services are structured, positioned and funded has meant that 
people are not only excluding themselves but the structure also excludes them...the 
structure comes with a lot of red tape ...over centralisation...Now the business 
model they are adopting will make things even more difficult....” (AA, 2008)  
  
It is assumed that the continued amalgamation of the public sector controls on 
business support alienates BACEs even further, but there is no evidence to 
support this as it is early days to make judgements on the abolition of the LDA 
for example.  
6.3.7 Effectiveness of Standardised Business Support   
It is common knowledge that business support services for the wider SMEs are 
generic in nature regardless of the ethnic orientation of the business owner. 
Subsequently, the extent to which the ‗blanket approach‘ may help move 
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forward the debate in terms of strategic relevance is considered doubtful. A 
BACE respondent said:  
  
―The approach is pretty much a one size fits all...support provision is not 
customised based on any thorough evaluation and understanding of the needs of 
Black businesses, the stage of entrepreneurship development with the Black 
community, capacity development needs in terms of enabling infrastructure, skills 
and competences” (BO, 2011)  
  
The underutilisation of business support is indicative of the argument that a 
customised or specialist support framework is desired. One of the logical 
reasoning to this line of thought is that mainstream support services appear to 
be top-down and the disengagement of the end users may be seen as a strategy 
lapse or failure. A BACE respondent indicated how difficult it was to access the 
LDA and that the only engagement channel fostered was the marketing of 
conferences that were so large. In such events, it was not possible to positively 
engage and involve BACEs in any constructive way. The sort of dialogue and 
activities that can effectively identify and design ‗specialist support services‘ 
were far-fetched and therefore detaching Black businesses from the essence of 
these mainstream support services.  
6.3.8 Ethnicity & Cultural Relevance  
It is possible that one of the self-made effects of the aggregation of ethnic 
BACEs in concentrated communities can be blamed for the disregard of 
‗cultural relevance/awareness‘ in mainstream support services. Most of the 
enterprise agencies respondents felt that the mainstream provision was not 
tailored to address cultural needs of the BACE owner manager rather than there 
being any relevance to the social group itself. There were balanced views 
relating to the effect of the ethnic and or cultural orientations. Some of the 
respondent EA suggested that some ethnic groups with limited qualifications 
were more likely to be oblivious of appropriate supports for their businesses at 
various developmental stages.  
  
“.....Ethnic groups with lack of/or low education are not likely to know what is out 
there. Take for example, a new arrival or refugee will not know about sources of 
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finance in this Country. People with English as their second language are also 
likely to struggle with raising external finance” BBV – 30/09/08  
  
He also adds:  
  
―....but I think that the problem of raising external finance depends on how 
entrepreneurial you are rather than ethnicity...‖BBV – 30/09/08  
  
―..I have clients who have been to five organisations but did not get much 
assistance...they‟ve got only mental business plans and nothing written on 
paper...and may not understand the terminologies used on them....we (the 
specialist / LDA respondent) use Africa proverbs, phrases etc. to communicate 
technical information. When they approach the mainstream providers a couple of 
times those providers quickly give up on them...classify them as timewasters and 
move on to other people because they cannot take more time than was allocated in 
the contract....” BBV –  
30/09/08  
  
  
It is obvious that cultural idiosyncrasies (in terms of behavioural attribute, style 
and method of communication which is peculiar to ‗ethnic enclaves‘) seem to be 
an ever present issue for BACEs as reported in many aspects of this thesis.  
Therefore it seems that a specialist business support provider is able to offer the 
BACE with value-added support than the ‗checklist‘ approach offered by 
mainstream provisions. Ethnic enclaves as a phenomenon have been described 
in some details in chapter 2. In the analytical context and significance of this 
important term, some elaboration here is necessary.   
The American case study does not in any way represent a worldwide view, but 
the authors study and review of the American perspectives of BACE owners 
suggests that there are some reconcilable similarities to the UK perspectives and 
characteristics of the study group. The discussions about the untapped assets of 
ethnic enclaves to inform policy development regarding business support are 
useful. The theory of social capital and the formation of BACE networks create 
the social foundation of ethnic enclaves. Massey (2010) describes how migrant 
networks provide immigrants entrepreneurs with social capital that can be 
transferred to other tangible forms. As immigrants tend to cluster in close 
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geographic spaces, they develop migrant networks—systems of interpersonal 
relations through which participants can exchange valuable resources and 
knowledge.   
Immigrants can capitalize on social interactions by transforming information 
into tangible resources, and thereby bridge the ‗knowledge gaps‘ amongst 
entrepreneurs. Information exchanged may include knowledge of government 
assistance programs and helpful NGOs which can offer specialist business 
support that is not available in mainstream support services as the UK scenario 
suggests. To contribute to policy intervention, adopting the American system 
by stimulating social connections, ethnic enclaves can generate a pool of 
intangible resources that can help to promote and bridge the gaps in specialist 
business support in the UK.  By providing a policy framework for co-ethnics to 
create and lead on potentially beneficial relations, ethnic enclaves can assist 
members in seeking and accessing business finance by overcoming the 
knowledge gaps.    
6.3.9 Financing Specialist Support providers  
During the in-depth interviews of the ‗supply ‗sides, all of the five High Street 
banks were involved in some sort of pledge into funding initiatives targeted at 
BACEs and the wider BMEs. The challenge, it seems is the accessibility and 
awareness of this to the BACEs. One of the main challenges for BACEs is the 
‗knowledge gap‘ that has been covered in some detail during the literature 
review and empirical research.   
The review of secondary data, information on policy, practices and procedures 
of the third sector providers of business support further re-affirms the evidence 
that there are indeed several initiatives that can be maximised by the BACEs. 
The problem of underutilisation, lack of innovation and adequate exploration of 
the market place can be attributed to some of the failings in securing 
appropriate funding. A debateable view was that funding support and 
accessibility for SMEs generally have not been altogether favourable to BACEs.   
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There is apparent over-centralisation in how these are managed and a more 
sensitive view is the lack of ring-fenced funding regime set aside for BACEs. 
The lack of funding for specialist business support providers is seen as a huge 
gap in the policy intervention to meet the needs of BACES. For example, the 
ability of the specialist support providers is hampered by the increasing 
funding shortages. A respondent from an inner London EA said:  
“The government are commissioning the wrong providers, who are not producing 
the goods. Secondly, the people who produce the goods are funded to fail because 
they fund you for the projects that don‟t fund the support mechanism that goes 
with it......”  
The model for funding business support at the recipient level has meant that the 
service providers are not capacity-built to deliver quality and targeted service  
BACEs need. Some EP described such limited, short-term funding as largely 
‗funding to fail‘. The respondent officer also said:  
“If you fund an organisation to fail, it is bound to fail. If you fund it to succeed, it 
will succeed....Ok, there is an increase in number of specialist support providers to 
the Black business community but how well funded are they?‖   
6.4 Underutilisation of Business Support  
Narratives and accounts of the specialist support providers revealed a more 
positive disposition compared to the reported literature review which some 
providers consider as a ‗red herring.‘ An interesting discourse here was that 
specialist providers did not believe that take up rate of business support is low. 
This clearly contrasts with reported policy dimensions. The proposition 
emerging here is that BACEs do not utilise mainstream providers because of the 
various reasons discussed above and therefore it does not imply they were 
underutilising such services. This bares credence to the stand point that BACEs 
would approach sources that offered specialised support and advice which was 
amiss with mainstream support agencies. A provider stated:  
―....depends on who you talk to ...we have about 200 Black businesses on annual 
basis that come here to access services...you go to those people providing general 
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advise, they may have the same number but how many of those are Black 
businesses?...yes they are accessing support services if you pitch at a certain level, 
at a certain taste, with certain meaning. I was delivering a workshop one night 
about 9pm in an African-Caribbean restaurant and it was packed full. I noted that 
some of the attendees used the platform to transact business...you tell me, which of 
those government organisations hold workshops at such venues and at that time?... 
you see what I mean?...we take the service to them...that is the cultural 
appropriateness I was talking about....”  
Another said:  
“..Look at the degree of connection or disconnection between the service provider 
and the recipient. The type of service these client groups like to access is not being 
supported the way the big government services are being supported...”  
 
6.5 Summary – Intermediary & Support Organisation Perspectives   
In summary, the customer experience in the use of targeted support services 
has been very encouraging for users of some voluntary sector business support 
providers. It is clear that some challenges exist based on literature and accounts 
of some BACEs, provider and enterprise agencies. The argument lingers 
though; the reported absence of specialist support provision is not entirely 
backed up with convincing evidence when balanced against the attitudes and 
practices of some BACEs in terms of usage, innovations and risk aversion to 
investment in innovative and/or specialist support services.   
However, it is fair to infer that the central theme that emerged from the 
accounts from the enterprise agencies, specialist providers and the LDA seem to 
suggest that mainstream support service provisions is probably not adequate to 
meet the unique business support needs of BACEs. The rather cynical view of 
observers is that BACEs do not utilise business support services enough, whilst 
this is true to an extent, accounts of specialist support providers disagree with 
this proposition. Therefore, the argument is to seek to find a balance in the 
argument with a view to move the debate forward. However, the researchers 
view does add credence to the evidence of insufficient specialist business 
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support provision which is the central focus for the research questions. The 
policy implications and way forward is explored in some detail in the 
concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS  
This thesis has looked at three interrelated agents identified as key players 
associated with the debate around the disproportionate barriers facing BACEs in 
accessing and securing external business finance in London. The three agents are 
the BACEs (the focus group) referred to as the ‗demand side‘; the High Street banks 
referred to as the ‗provider side‘ and an interface between the ‗demand-provider‘ 
linkages.  
The methodology adopted the use of both primary and secondary data sources to 
investigate the research objectives identified. The predominant methodology was 
the qualitative technique for obtaining information from all three agents, combined 
with some analysis of a large secondary data set (LABS) in order to provide a 
quantitative context for the more qualitative primary research. The adoption of this 
approach helped to bring together new perspectives and findings to add new 
meanings to some aspects of the research topic and on-going debate concerning 
alleged discrimination by some BACEs in London.   
The main proposition under investigation is the commonly held view that BACEs 
face disproportionate barriers when seeking finance from formal sources (when 
compared with other small firms with similar features apart from ethnicity). To 
investigate this proposition, the research focused on a number of key personal 
attributes and behaviours of BACE owners that might help to explain why they face 
these barriers. The findings are summarised around the four research objectives 
identified at the onset of this study, focused on:   
  
1. The influences of different aspects of human capital on the difficulties 
of BACEs accessing external finance.  
2. The influence and relevance of cultural factors and generational 
differences  
3. The attitudes of BACEs towards external business finance.  
4. Identifying business support gaps and usage among BACEs  
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7.1 Gaps in Literature   
This review looked at documented research about the experiences, attitudes and 
practices of BACEs with regards to the barriers they face when seeking external 
finance. The lack of adequate data on BACEs has been highlighted as most research 
in this subject area concentrates on the wider SME groups and only a handful of 
studies look at BACEs specifically. The experiences of BACE owner managers in the 
UK whilst seeking finance are varied and the nature of the problems they face are 
quite complex. It is also clear that the evidence presented in the literature reviewed 
suggests that banks and other finance providers have to recognize that the needs of 
BACEs are not solely related to economic factors, as cultural and other 
characteristics also need to be integrated in the decision-making processes.   
BACEs themselves have a role to play in improving their access to external sources 
of finance and this is partly a matter of ensuring that they consider the full range of 
sources of finance available to them. There is a view which suggests that some 
BACEs tend to associate business failures with perceptions of discriminatory 
practices by the lending banks. However, the literature reviewed concluded that 
there was no tangible evidence of discriminatory practices from the banks (Fraser, 
2005, 2008; BBA, 2002; Dhaliwal, 2006) to uphold some of the views held by some 
BACEs. Therefore, the focus for further developing literature in this subject area 
includes some of the followings themes:  
1. BACEs as a specific category of a wider group are not particularly 
disadvantaged in accessing business finance when compared to other similar 
groups (Fraser, 2009); however, there are suggestions that some specific 
business sectors experience disproportionate barriers because of the type of 
businesses and the relative shortage of human capital of the owner 
managers.  
2. Banks who base their judgements purely on business profiling claim that 
risky sectors/activities like the ones which many BACEs are found in are 
‗too risky‘ for investment and profitability. However, literature also suggests 
that the knowledge banks have of EMBs is relatively poor, which means that 
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the BACE groups are the least captured in their plans to ensure that all SMEs 
are adequately supported in growing the UK economy.   
3. Literature appears to suggest that many well qualified ethnic minority 
individuals enter self-employment because they experience discrimination in 
the labour market and supposedly face promotional barriers and the ‗glass 
ceiling‘ effect. It is unclear, how much information is known about BACEs 
with respect to the subject of attitudinal failings which affect business 
development.   
The gaps found in the review of literature can be associated to lack of sufficient 
qualitative research and lack of insider accounts from the specific BACE category of 
SMEs.   
7.2 Summary Findings & Implications    
7.2.1 Human and Social Capital  
The human capital in terms of academic qualifications attained by BACEs 
influenced many of the decisions and experiences the business owners faced when 
seeking external finance. The findings of this study suggests that the shortage of 
human capital in terms of the type and levels of education of the business owners, 
coupled with their choice of finance, were significant factors affecting their 
probability of securing external finance. From the bank managers‘ perspectives, the 
qualifications of the business owner  was not a determining factor on whether or 
not an application for funding would be successful; in actual fact, this information 
was not required by the banks. It was notable that the quality of the applications 
and the presentational skills of the owner-managers could influence the banks 
decision. It was also notable that there were some ‗knowledge gaps‘ about the loans 
eligibility and processing criteria amongst a small but significant number of the 
BACEs, particularly amongst those owners with lower qualifications. The banks 
suggested that the inability of some BACEs to identify and seek an appropriate type 
and amount of finance, commensurate to their needs and affordability, was a clear 
reason for the difficulties some of them faced.   
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It is however worth noting that there were some BACEs, irrespective of attaining 
higher qualifications still felt they would face discrimination in seeking finance 
because of their ethnicity.  There was no evidence to support this view as it was 
impossible to review ‗real life‘ applications from the banks to ascertain this claim 
during the field work. The bank managers were only prepared to talk about the 
difficulties that small firms in general experience as they do not particularly collect 
data on specific ethnic groups. Interviews with the banks  highlighted that, many 
small firm owners with ‗financial skills‘ and management experience in  finance 
subject areas were more forthcoming and articulate with presenting a good business 
case and were more likely to meet the stringent bank requirements and loans 
assessment conditions.  Other research (Scott, 2008, Hussain & Matlay 2006) supports 
the argument that financial skills shortage is a gap for SME‘s in general.  
 
7.2.2 The influence of Cultural Factors and Generational Differences on Attitudes  
The evidence from this study suggests that cultural and generational factors 
influence the attitudes, behaviour and experiences of BACEs in terms of accessing 
external finance.  The experiences of where BACEs were trained (academic 
attainment and development) contributed to their beliefs, confidence and views 
about seeking external finance. Another critical influence on attitudes is the ‗ethnic 
enclaves‘ created, inadvertently by the nature of many BACE business locations and 
the sectors/activities that they specialise in which make their businesses ‗risky‘ for 
debt financing. An interesting observation is that the businesses rooted in these 
communities have higher rates of failures due to lack of finance for growth and 
innovation (BIS, 2011 - webpage).   
 Again, the relationships and informational effects is a key explanatory factor that has 
emerged. Some BACEs trading in deprived communities that are characterised with 
‗risk prone‘ (in economic terms) businesses often nurture attitudes of discrimination. 
This is because of the experiences of ‗business failures‘ attributed to the ‗nature‘ of 
their businesses that are anchored within ‗marginalised markets‘. The alternative 
explanation is the low ‗human capital‘ attainments in some cases, which limits the 
business growth options for these kinds of business.   
 212  
  
It is worth noting that the alleged discrimination by these groups can only be 
regarded as their perceived view as no evidence emerged during the interviews with 
the banks and intermediaries to support this notion. Many respondents indicated 
that a culture of deprivation creates a lingering ‗feel factor‘ of ‗defeatism‘ because of 
their backgrounds, experiences and other deep-rooted beliefs of racial bias in certain 
aspects of life. This study probed further and found that there is an increasing 
‗positive shift‘ away from these ‗enclaves‘ that eventually eradicates such 
perceptions, invariably linked to the recognition and significance of human capital 
attainments.  
 There were also small pockets of ‗gender‘ variability in the explanatory factors 
which emerged; for example, female 2nd and 3rd generation BACEs were slightly 
more inclined to dismiss the view that discrimination by the lending banks exists. 
Their male counterparts, especially the 1st generation entrepreneurs had a contrary 
opinion on this, because they suffered a relatively higher barrier because of their 
lesser understanding and integration into the systems. It is then possible to infer that, 
the generational factors play a small but significant part in influencing the attitudes 
of BACE owners alongside some other factors, such as cultural orientation.  Many 1st 
generation respondents interviewed indicated that their past experiences settling and 
growing up in some deprived areas of London‘s inner city as immigrant 
entrepreneurs (such as in Lambeth and Southwark) leaves them with deep-seated 
memories of racial bias, prejudice and disadvantages which can play on their minds 
when seeking and accessing public services. These feelings of racial bias causes many 
of the Black business owners to limit their scope and confidence to expand and grow 
their businesses, leading them to become easily discouraged and not bothering to 
seek finance and support.  Therefore, these categories of BACEs are more likely to 
fail or record minimal success rates when they do try.   
When the human capital and social capital attainment of some BACEs were analysed, 
it transpired that even some of the highly educated respondents share these views, 
which inevitably influences their attitudes, behaviours and having an adverse effect 
on their confidence levels. These ‗deep-rooted‘ feelings of ‗unjust‘ past experiences 
do obscure the judgement of some BACEs and therefore widens the barriers they 
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think they face. It is therefore possible to infer that the difficulties they perceive in the 
market place may be seen as ‗irrational‘. Knowledge about the impact of ‗cultural‘ 
and ‗generational‘ factors on the ability of the BACE group is limited , however some  
studies (Collard et al., 2001; BoE, 2000; CEEDR, 2005; CEEDR, 2008) has reported that 
SMEs in general exhibit discouragement from seeking external finance.  . The 
‗discouraged borrower‘ concept is described as the reluctance of the firm owner in 
approaching ‗formal sources‘ of finance owing to certain personal characteristics 
and/or past experiences, and as such the BACE ‗feels‘ it would be futile to make an 
attempt to seek finance.  
7.2.3 Impact of the Credit Crunch  
The literature on the impact of the ‗credit crunch‘ is only just beginning to emerge in 
recent years, but even so there is limited previous research on the impact on BACEs 
as most studies have focused on the effects on the wider SME community. This study 
did coincide with a time of economic downturn which impacted on all business 
sectors in London, irrespective of size. The features of small firms in general, 
irrespective of ethnic connotations, predispose them to facing stiff competition in the 
competitive economic environment. The findings highlighted the difficulties facing 
all businesses, particularly smaller firms. As expected, Black businesses appear to be 
more vulnerable to credit denials, not just because of their personal characteristics 
(such as ethnic orientations per se), but because of the peculiar nature of small firms 
in general including  ‗size‘, ‗sector choices‘ and some of the factors already discussed.  
In the case of the finance providers themselves, they are compelled to respond to the 
increased regulatory requirement imposed on them, which means that small firms 
would inevitably experience further difficulties as a result of these changes. 
Interestingly, this study showed that many of the respondent owner managers 
showed resolve in coping with the effects of the credit crunch, whilst a small but 
significant proportion suffered losses and considered closing down their business.  
 This is not peculiar to BACEs but applies to small firms generally. Interviews with 
the banks suggested that the effects of the credit crunch applied virtually to all 
business sizes, but at varying proportions commensurate to size and scope of the 
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business. For example, technology and manufacturing firms were less likely to suffer 
as much as those in retailing and personal services. The interviewed bank managers 
however admitted that business loan applications had fallen sharply and that 
relationships with EMB firms in particularly had further worsened. This position was 
supported by some of the few surviving third sector business support providers who 
said that BACEs now found it more daunting to approach the banks, with many 
being more concerned with seeking advice on how best to survive. Three major 
themes stood out from the accounts from the 30 BACE owner managers. These 
included what they felt were the biggest challenges resulting from the impact of the 
recent economic downturn.  
1. Tax Breaks; The most referenced problem was that most (over three quarters) of 
the owner manager respondents felt strongly that the government are doing very 
little to assist vulnerable businesses. The most frequently mentioned example 
given by the respondents was the stifling effect of tax and business rates which 
they felt could have been reduced and/or pegged at a lower rate to enable 
vulnerable businesses absorb the impact of a low cash flow and in effect ‗ride the 
storm‘ until things improved.  
2. Cash Flow; was another major challenge for most of the BACE owner managers 
interviewed. This was the second most mentioned problem for businesses as their 
customer base began to diminish. Businesses that were concentrated in the ‗ethnic 
enclaves‘ were the most affected. The impact of the cash flow challenges 
threatened survival and led to reluctant staff cuts, down scaling of operations and 
continually reducing overheads to the barest possible limit. The customer base for 
BACEs in these sectors is predominantly serviced by low income earners within 
the ethnic minority populations in their respective communities in London. The 
Small Enterprise Research Team (SERT) customer  quarterly surveys continue to 
show a progressive fall in sales and employment in these sectors which 
contributes to falling overall demand and spill-over  concerns of the credit 
crunch. Gray (2008) stated that ―many of the smaller firms have shown in the past 
to be very resilient in recessions...‖ this is true in the case of many BACE 
respondents interviewed.  He also said:  ―...they cut costs, reduce capacity and 
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shed staff.......they keep their businesses ticking over, waiting for a change in 
fortunes for a recovery‖.  
3. Survival action; was the third most dominant theme that emerged from the 
interviews as a way of ‗riding the storm‘.  Twenty-four (24) of the BACE owners 
stated that ‗staying in business was critical and more important than seeking 
finance for growth or expansion. Interestingly, the 2nd and 3rd generation 
entrepreneurs were least concerned or less threatened with the consideration of 
closures than their 1st generation counterparts although the reasons for this were 
not clear cut. There was some suggestion that the immigrant entrepreneurs 
exercised more caution and were unable to network effectively to find more 
clients.  As a result, reduced cash-flow threatened their credit ratings further 
because they were not meeting their financial commitments. Interestingly, it was 
noticeable that the female 2nd and 3rd generation entrepreneurs (i.e. those born 
and/or raised in UK) appeared more confident in ‗seizing‘ opportunities for 
innovation and growth despite uncertainties. This further confirms the slight 
advantage they have by virtue of their UK orientation compared to the 1st 
generation immigrant entrepreneurs.   
7.3 Supply Side Perspectives   
 Interviews with the five selected banks focused on finding out what their views 
were concerning the alleged barriers facing BACEs and whether or not BACEs might 
be disadvantaged by the way decisions on loan applications were taken within their 
banks. The other aim was to find out what their views were for ‗bridging the 
informational gaps‘ between them and the BACEs.  
1. Centralised Decision-Making Processes   
The results obtained from the interviews with the banks suggested that the 
centralised decision-making processes for loans applications might have posed a 
significant barrier for some BACE business case proposals. Some of the respondent 
bank managers suggested that relationship lending based on trust and track record 
may have improved the applicants scoring, but the detachment of the relationship 
manager from the centralised application process may sometimes lead to the possible 
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refusal of the loan application. This study suggests that the crucial factor in 
determining the effects of localised decision-making processes depends largely on 
individual bank manager practice and knowledge of the BACE business and owner 
manager.   
The continued shift away from localised decision making to centralised decision 
making has further alienated local branch managers from the process, therefore, 
losing those ‗informal‘ and useful knowledge of the BACE‘s business attributes, 
qualities and aspirations. This appears to be a response by the banks to the financial 
crisis and the need for much tighter credit rationing. Two of the five banks surveyed 
indicated that the centralised decision making did not entirely eradicate the links 
with ethnic minority communities and the building of trust, which is dependent on 
experience, knowledge and perceptions of the individual processing bank manager. 
These discretional tendencies are still being exercised, but to a lesser extent as more 
and more decisions are made centrally by computerised and automated systems.   
2. Information Resource on BACEs  
The absence of a robust intelligence/database on BACEs was acknowledged by the 
banks as a major problem, as was also the case for most support agencies. This 
resource gap limited access to useful data about this group. The lack of (or 
incomplete information) about the unique factors influencing BACEs makes the 
processing and scoring of loan applications more difficult, leading to finance-gaps as 
earlier suggested. Banks and business support agencies should consider focusing on 
information capture (including sensitive data such as ethnicity) that can help build 
their understanding of the factors that may put the BACE applicant at a 
disadvantage. Three of the five banks agreed that lack of a unified database of 
BACEs in general is a critical limitation when considering personal attributes (where 
necessary as they often would not require these). The banks suggested that there was 
scope to ‗fortify‘ the communication links between the business customer and the 
bank. There were also suggestions that BACEs were more likely to be frustrated with 
the perceived bureaucracy involved in making a finance application, preferring 
informal relationships and a minimum paperwork instead. In addition, the 
reluctance of the bank to talk to potential business customers until they have 
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produced viable business proposals deters many keen BACEs from progressing with 
making an application.    
3. Banks & Grassroots Engagement  
There were some noticeable gaps in bank managers‘ knowledge of the needs of 
BACE businesses and their awareness of cultural issues for these groups. Not 
surprisingly, those banks that had a fair representation of loans processing or 
business development managers of African or Caribbean origin had a better 
understanding and subsequently fostered good banking relationships with 
customers, whereas the opposite was the case in some banks with solely white 
and/or Asian managers.   
It was also suggested that advocacy support and intermediaries that are specially 
focused on servicing the disadvantaged groups were desirable. Bank managers are 
well aware of the importance of intermediaries for getting new business in ethnic 
communities, as well as helping to bridge the information gap that exists between the 
demand and provider sides. Examples within the Asian communities were cited as a 
possible model for the BACE community. It was clear from some of the interviews 
that some bank managers had very little or no links with the BACE communities and 
therefore, building and developing trust was likely to prove to be a considerable 
challenge.   
4. Ethnic Enclaves  
The relevance and impact of ethnic enclaves has been highlighted in several aspects 
of this thesis. Market failures have been associated with ethnic enclaves where there 
appears to be an over-reliance on co-ethnic customers. Some of the possible 
explanations for this claim can be attributed to the business owner‘s inability to 
access finance. There are a number of explanations already suggested earlier 
including the ‗discouraged borrowers‘ effect as a consequence of ‗attitudes‘.   
Other reasons are as a result of the risky nature of small businesses and to a larger 
extent, lack of innovation. These factors may inevitably limit the chances to seek 
formal sources of finance and therefore, limiting the potential to move out of the 
‗marginalised markets‘.   It was also evident from the interviews with some BACE 
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respondents (chapter 5) that there was a need for banks to engage actively and take 
positive steps in penetrating these marginalised communities.   
 
7.4 The Gaps Identified in Business Support Sources and Usage      
The objective was to review, analyse and seek explanations for the reported low take-
up of business support amongst BACEs. The business support providers are referred 
to as ‗intermediaries‘ within the context of this research, because they are seen as a 
possible interface between the ‗demand‘ and the ‗supply‘ sides in the market for 
business finance. The findings from this study suggest that both public and private 
sector funded business support programmes are perceived as inadequate in meeting 
the specialist needs of BACEs. Furthermore, abolition of the LDA for example, makes 
the gaps in business support more apparent.    
Part of the research objective for this study during the in-depth interviews and 
review of secondary data was to evaluate whether BACEs engaged business support 
adequately and to ascertain which aspects of the existing business support policy 
framework met the specialist needs of BACEs as there is a view that existing ‗generic‘ 
support services do not satisfy the desired expectations of their users.   
All the BACE respondents (30) interviewed used an accountant at one point or 
another during the business operation. This was as a result of the statutory 
requirement to submit company accounts to the Companies House. In many cases, 
the BACEs did not actually maximise the range of services offered by the accountants 
in areas such as business planning and cash flow projections to enhance their 
business proposals to the banks. The reason for this was not readily clear, but some 
suggested that the costs charged by professional services were too high. It can be 
inferred that in some cases, BACEs did not invest adequately in professional support 
services as much as other ethnic minority entrepreneurs did.   
The use of bank managers (22 respondents) was the second most referenced source 
approached for advice, whilst solicitors and business colleagues/friends or family 
were the 3rd and 4th most common sources referred to.  When the generational and 
gender influences were considered, it was concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to suggest that gender or generational factors influenced the choice of 
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business support source(s). However, the 1st generation male BACEs relied more on 
the ‗informal‘ sources of support and advice – business colleagues, friends or family 
members.  
When the level and type of the qualification attained by BACEs was analysed in 
relation to the source(s) of support approached/utilised, some interesting findings 
were found. Usage of government sponsored (public funded) agencies recorded the 
lowest usage (6 respondents), despite the higher qualification levels attained by the 
group. What this suggest is that, those entrepreneurs with higher qualifications are 
no more likely to use public support than those lacking qualifications or lesser levels 
of attainment.  
 Notably, there was a high level of awareness (23 respondents) of the government 
sponsored support agencies such as the Business Link and the Small Business Service 
amongst those with higher qualifications. The underutilisation of formal sources of 
business support does exist, even though many were aware of the range of support 
sources available within the public and enterprise agencies. The explanation for the 
underutilisation cited by the BACE respondents themselves in many cases suggested 
that the support services offered by the statutory/public sector providers were 
‗unsuitable‘ and did not meet their specific needs. There seems to be some gaps in 
the understanding of the availability of many of these support services; it either 
means that the business support providers were not reaching the BACE communities 
in an effective manner or that the BACEs themselves were not ‗looking out‘ enough 
for help and advice.  
The subject of ‗attitudes‘ was revisited and it emerged that this factor tended to 
‗cloud‘ the decision making of a small but significant proportion of BACEs resulting 
in the discouragement in seeking the help, information and advice of professional 
business support services. Many BACEs do not wish to pay for valuable professional 
support services despite recognising that they could be beneficial to the business.    
7.5 Contribution of the LABS Review  
Chapter four (4) presented the findings and analysis of the 2007 data set of the last 
London Annual Business Survey (LABS). This review compared some of the 
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findings and interpretations of the preceding years (2003 – 2006) surveys. The LABS 
was the annual survey of private sector businesses in London that was undertaken 
by the London Development Agency and Business Link 4 London (BL4L) since 
2003, the last one being in 2007. The survey findings were based on six ethnic 
categories including Black-owned businesses and therefore provide a unique 
secondary database for use in this research. The LABS 2007 dataset analysis 
identified four key themes that were further investigated during the interviews 
with the three principal agents.   
The LABS review helped to corroborate some of the empirical research findings 
relating to the ‗demand side‘. Some of the findings from the primary research which 
were similar to the LABS review are grouped into four areas below, whilst a 
number of divergent views were equally identified: 
1. The survey analysis supported the notion that BACEs were relatively 
qualified than their counterpart small firm owner managers, and this was 
consistent with other studies (Fraser, 2007; Nwankwo et al., 2013). The 
challenge with the LABS survey was that the questionnaires were not 
designed to identify the types and levels of the qualifications attained by the 
respondents. The methodology adopted for the primary research helped to 
probe further during the in-depth interviews to identify the levels and type 
of qualification‘s attained by the BACEs.   
  
2. The variations in the range/value of finance invested related to ‗size‘ of the 
firm rather than the owner manager ethnicity. This is consistent with the 
primary research findings in chapter 5 of this thesis and other studies too; 
many of these have already been cited in the literature review chapter of this 
thesis. The point of divergence in the comparison of the LABS review and 
with the primary research relate to the variations in the ‗sources‘ of finance 
sought rather than the ‗values/amounts‘. For example, many of the BACEs 
interviewed had an over reliance on bank loans whilst the LABS review 
identified alternative sources of finance such as credits, cooperative, family 
wealth. The implication for this is that BACEs need to be able to appraise the 
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appropriateness of the type, amounts and sources of finance required, and in 
so doing, refusal levels might be minimal. This is because the level of ‗risks‘ 
are curtailed when smaller levels of loans/funds are sought. 
3. The LABS 2007 analysis also highlights the ‗discouraged actions‘ of some 
Black owner managers and the possible effects from this. The issues and 
implications for the 'discouraged borrowers‘ is a topical one for this research 
and this phenomena is supported by the similar findings that emerged from 
the primary research, as in the case of many referenced literature. Over half 
of the Black owned businesses surveyed (LABS 2007 dataset) did not seek 
bank finance as reported in other studies (Fraser, 2005; 2009). Therefore, the 
alleged ‗discriminatory practices‘ by the lending banks towards Black owned 
businesses are largely unsubstantiated. It was also evident that, Black owned 
businesses underutilised alternative sources of finance, such as social funds, 
government grants and other community focused finding initiatives. The 
reason for this can be attributed to the ‗knowledge gaps‘ of the finance 
market place and/or lack of innovation.  
4. The discussions around ‗attitudinal behaviours‘ is central to the argument 
presented throughout this thesis. The LABS survey treated this concept as a 
‗feel factor‘ (which can also be interpreted as perceptions). There were some 
justifications evident from the findings that supports the view that the 
qualifications attained (not necessarily the types or levels, as these were not 
captured) had a direct bearing on ‗attitude‘ in trying to interpret actions and 
behaviours towards seeking debt finance and utilisation of business support 
by Black owned businesses. The LABS result analysis only provides 
indicative evidence to make this observations, but not sufficient to make 
generalisations. However, the in-depth interviews carried out as the 
alternative approach compensated for the weaknesses of the adopted 
methods of the LABS.  
  
The LABS analysis therefore served as a ‗sounding board‘ for the research objectives 
of this study; added to the justifications of the preferred choice of methodology and 
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builds on themes that emerged from the literature review findings in chapter two. 
This secondary data review phase served as a reference for gauging the ‗extent‘ of 
the reported barriers faced by BACEs concerning access to finance in a large survey 
of London businesses – the focus for the empirical research.   
Some learning experiences from some of the‘ limitations‘ of the quantitative 
methodology adopted for the LABS empirical work also helped in the 
consideration and design of a ‗mixed methodology‘, which adds originality to this 
study. For example, the surveys (LABS), on its own were not effective methods to 
adequately cover many aspects, which otherwise, were achieved utilising 
qualitative techniques.  One of the weaknesses of the LABS exercise was that, it 
did not capture many underlying reasons or factors which influenced ‗cognitive 
behaviour‘ or ‗attitudes‘ of respondents.            
One of the original features of this research design was the adoption of an approach 
which drew together information and insights from three key agents to provide a 
way of comparing and differentiating the various opinions, perspectives and 
insider accounts obtained from the in depth interviews. The model below is a 
pathway considered for triangulating the ideas, themes and lines of arguments 
analysed and presented in this concluding chapter.  
 
Figure 7:  Triangulation Pathways  
 
(Source: Author)  
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Fig. 7 above, maps out the interrelationships between the three key agents 
considered in this study. The specific themes that emerged from the empirical work 
was referred to in chapter three as they fall under the three key subjects – demand, 
supply and intermediaries. The middle point signifies the connecting themes (i.e. 
areas where there seems to be agreement amongst the three key players). Whilst 
this research seeks to extend and improve upon past work, there are some new and 
emerging issues of disagreements. The interpretations presented and discussed in 
this exploratory study so far show that the three principal agents are 
interdependent on one another and the absence of any of the three from this 
research would provide an incomplete picture. What this means is that overcoming 
the barriers of accessing external finance are reliant on changes to the practices of all 
three agents as  none is perfect and all have their shortcomings.   
The actions of all three agents are influenced by the same factors: firstly, 
‗information gaps‘ in terms of what information is known about the other agent – 
this appears to be a key problem which invariably influences how each agent relates 
with the other. Secondly, the ‗perceptions‘ arises from the ‗knowledge gap‘ between 
them. In other words, the void caused by this gap determines and/or influences 
how one agent views the other. That is to say, when the information/ knowledge 
gap reduces, the perception that one agent has of the other becomes more positive.  
Thirdly, the interaction between the agents can be affected by the impact of 
‗external stimuli‘ such as the introduction of computerised loan application 
processes, the credit crunch and the government‘s ‗tightening up measures‘ 
affecting  banking activities. For example, conditions for assessing credit ratings is 
becoming increasingly stringent and the parameters for evaluating ‗risk‘ has 
become increasingly difficult for small firms particularly. These stimuli are largely 
out of the agent‘s control. This point is significant in inferring that the claims of 
discrimination or unfair treatments claimed by the BACEs were not proven and can 
be said to be ‗irrational‘. However, it is also fair to presume that rationality may be 
deemed possible within the limits of their knowledge and understanding.    
There are also certain areas of agreements which emerged during this study. For 
example, the absence of a robust ‗database‘ for BACEs is commonly seen as a 
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disadvantage and often a barrier when presenting statistics and therefore, limiting 
policy development. Statistics for BACEs are often aggregated within the broader 
SME groups, making it impossible to evaluate and measure representativeness. The 
scarcity of qualitative research to further improve on existing knowledge is another 
aspect that emerged as areas of concern and therefore creating a void about those 
personal attributes which might have been used in enhancing loans processing as 
‗positive‘ action. However, financial risk management approaches do not consider 
or use these ‗soft data‘ within centralised processing of application.   
Having suggested some ‗push and pull‘ factors that could be useful in explaining 
some of the reasons and views limiting the understanding and actions of the 
demand-provider perspectives, it is necessary to consider a few factors that  brings 
the divergent views to a ‗centre point‘. 
Knowledge gap of the market place; attitudinal behaviour influencing perceptions 
and the human capital attainments appear to be some of the major issues influencing 
all three agents‘ views and actions. These factors can be influenced and or changed 
positively by policy instruments and increased awareness between the three 
principal agents by further research. Some of these factors are peculiar to the 
individuals such as cultural and life influences that influence behaviour, these are 
subjective measures and very abstract in nature. Perceptions are a function of 
experience but these can be balanced with increased knowledge and education. 
Whilst the intermediaries are designed to be unbiased, their functions are hampered 
by a number of external stimuli that can only be controlled and/or managed by 
policy changes. For example, business support gaps are influenced by wider 
government policies in public service cost savings strategies. The withdrawal or 
underfunding of public sector business support services a significant impact on the 
quality and scope of business support services.   
7.5.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
The debate about the difficulties experienced by BACEs is an on-going issue, 
attracting continuing attention within academia, policy developers and the business 
entrepreneurs themselves. This study extends new thinking which uses a new 
methodology to concurrently investigate three principal agents (demand, supply and 
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intermediaries). Some of the key findings have been presented and discussed in 
chapters five and six. Some of the salient findings that has not been adequately 
featured in previous studies concerns the failure to take account of the distinctive 
nature of BACEs as a separate entity, rather, they were often lumped together with 
the ethnic minority groups. This study was able to look at the BACEs as a separate 
entity and therefore was able to conceptualise new themes for ‗triangulation‘ in a 
way that brings together consensual themes; such as the significance of the human 
capital attainment of the BACE owner manager and how this influence their 
attitudes, which in-turn explains some of the reasons BACEs face disproportionate 
barriers when seeking formal finance. Other studies tend to dwell on ‗numbers‘ 
rather than ‗persons‘ and this means that findings do not eke out the real issues 
BACEs face because of the ‗statistical insignificance‘ of the population (BACEs) 
within the wider SME population. This study, hopefully, begins to encourage further 
studies to look at the BACEs from a holistic perspective so that the real issues can be 
addressed and supported. 
The ‗constructs‘ (human capital relevance, attitudinal behaviours, culture, ethnic 
enclaves and the impact on access to finance) that emerged from literature were 
looked at in some depth by using these as parameters of investigation during the in-
depth interviews. It was found that these constructs had a direct impact on the 
perceptions of the BACE owner managers which consequently affected their chances 
to secure external finance. Many researchers (referenced within the body of the 
discussions) tend to lump BACEs within the broad SME categories, therefore 
skewing the real issues affecting this group. The novel approach for investigating the 
three key/principal agents in this study puts the BACEs in a distinctive 
category/group, and therefore, throws up real issues and areas for further research.  
 
It is evident that there is no real evidence to make sweeping generalisations claimed 
by the BACE community themselves that, there exist ‗discrimination‘ in the market 
place, but rather, the key finding that is important and new is that studies that 
investigates the difficulties black businesses face in accessing external finance 
requires a systematic assessment of some personal attributes of the group to be able 
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to find meaningful solutions for policy development and to effectively reduce the 
reported barriers. The findings from primary research is that of ‗self-made‘ 
awareness based on attitudes, culture and human capital shortfalls as determining 
factors which exacerbate the barriers or challenges they face in accessing formal 
sources of finance. It is often a ‗blame culture‘ for entrepreneurial failures rather than 
discrimination in the system at the levels claimed by many BACE owner managers. 
 
7.6 Policy Implications & Recommendations  
An important objective of this study was to discuss the role of policy development 
and to evaluate the divergence between policy and practice on factors affecting 
access to finance for BACEs. There is growing concern that many business support 
agencies and enterprise agencies have been abolished by the government as part of 
its drive for public services efficiency savings, and that alternative options are 
limited. Whilst there are gains from these cost-cutting actions, it does create further 
gaps in the provision of support services to small businesses, particularly those that 
face the most difficulties such as BACEs. The following focus on some policy 
implications and recommendations:  
1. Given the heterogeneity of the EMB community and the specific features 
studied in this research, it is important for policy makers to develop support 
systems in conjunction with the banks. Evidence from this study suggests 
that some BACEs, for several reasons already explored and discussed, are 
more likely to be rejected when applying for bank loans. For some, once 
established, are more likely to experience business failure resulting from lack 
of business finance. Experts in the policy research subject areas (Smallbone, 
et. al., 2003; Ram & Deakins, 1995) have led the way and recommended 
policy instruments that have sought to improve access to finance relating to 
SMEs and EMBs generally, but the efficacy of the recommendations is yet  
to be appraised. Some of the pioneering work recommended a number of 
guidelines for future policy, including the significance of diversity within 
mainstream provision; the need for an engagement strategy; improved 
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access to finance; promotion of sectorial diversity (positive action) and better 
evaluation systems for loans processing. The continued reporting of the 
barriers faced by BACEs remains largely a problem. The reason for this 
perhaps may have been due to a failure for existing business support 
mechanisms and the existing financial institutions (Banks) to implement 
many of the interventions recommended by experts. It is necessary for policy 
makers to reconsider and re-integrate its strategy with the sparse 
mainstream and specialist support provisions that exist currently. A re-
engagement strategy is desired in a way that engages a wider representation 
of the BACEs which currently appear to be relegated, by their own volition, 
to the ‗ethnic enclaves/communities‘ already discussed. Specialist support 
services are most effective when representatives of the user groups (BACEs) 
are empowered and involved.   
2. Chapter six presented many instances which suggest that a large proportion 
of BACEs showed a tendency to be reliant on informal sources for financial 
advice. The provisions and access to impartial expert financial and business 
advice increases the chances of the entrepreneurs securing appropriate 
finance, but the lack of investment and confidence on the side of some 
BACEs is still a problem. The Government should consider subsidising 
professional fees of specialist services available to disadvantaged BACEs, 
particularly those trapped in marginalised communities.   
3. The impact of negative perceptions (as a result of low human capital) and 
misinformation between the BACEs and banks is a significant factor to note. 
There should be a ‗joined-up‘ approach involving BACE representative 
business support organisations, even though the lack of a database of these 
organisations is a major problem. The financial institutions and the 
government need to create networks targeting and supporting ethnic groups.  
This initiative(s) should be geared towards dismissing perceptions and 
propagate good practice amongst the principals - (banks) and BACEs (Client) 
relationships. There is evidence from this study that the BACEs attitudes 
towards the problem of accessing external finance have tended to accentuate 
 228  
  
the extent of the difficulties involved (Fraser, 2007). The consequence of this 
is that external finance is not sought enough with businesses suffering from 
the discouraged borrower effects which can become a self-inflicting 
disadvantage. Therefore, targeted education (especially relating to finance 
and management) and specialist business support should be offered to 
reduce disengagement from formal sources of finance.  
4. The significance of human capital attainments (in terms of type and levels of 
qualifications) of BACEs has been highlighted in this study. The evidence 
that inadequate financial literacy appears to impact on the extent of which 
BACEs can appraise the appropriate source of finance is also clear from the 
findings. Ram & Deakins (1995) recommended many positive steps for 
entrepreneurs to raise awareness for the forms of finance available that were 
suitable for marginalised groups such as BACEs. There is evidence from this 
study that many of these resources are underutilised and therefore, 
government and support providers should continue to propagate these 
efforts to ensure that a high level of financial and management skills 
acquisition is available  to BACEs.   
5. Positive Action for Development – Banks‘ Perspectives  
The supply side provided some insights into the positive actions that were 
needed to redress the ‗informational effects‘ identified by all three agents as 
a key issue. Table 21 below annotates the development and policy 
development work already being adopted by the respondent banks.  
 
Banks Suggestions/Policy 
intervention  
Comments/references from interview 
Bank A -Establish more BACE 
support groups as 
partners with the banks 
-Expanding Communities 
served to enhance ‗risk‘ 
profiling by consumer 
relevance  
“.... BACEs are seen to have very little social capacity 
compared to other ethnic minority firms, the reasons 
may have to do with the mistrust they may have within 
their own business circles....I think they need to expand 
their market place and engage other ethnic groups to 
expand their horizon... 
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Banks Suggestions/Policy 
intervention  
Comments/references from interview 
Bank C -Promote ‗alternative 
funding sources 
-Improve local ‗databases‘ 
of BACEs 
-Creation of BACE 
databases accessible to 
financial services 
-Promoting financial 
education 
-Take-up of specialist 
support offered by 
bank(at a minimal cost) 
“....the more disadvantaged groups by virtue of the 
attributes which make small firms „risky‟ should be 
encouraged to seek alternative sources of finance such 
as micro-finance initiatives which require less 
stringent eligibility criteria. It appears that there may 
be overreliance on debt finance.... 
...availability of a localised databases of EMB‟s is an 
area that research has repeatedly suggested, but really, 
very little has been done in that regard...perhaps, 
BACE advocacy groups cam commission such projects 
and lobby the London Development Agency for a 
national database that will inform financial 
assessments... 
 
Bank D 
 
-Enhance links with 
BACE 
communities/consumers 
of services and goods, 
-Exploring alternative 
funding sources  
-Availability of 
monitoring data by the 
LDA with clear links and 
accessibility to financial 
planning 
-Educating BACEs on 
lending criteria and role 
of external controls. 
 
“...High Street banks sometimes appear to be quite 
detached from BACE communities, and the reasons, in 
my opinion are to do with the sectors and communities 
within which they operate... 
“....many times, I feel that some small firms make 
wrong choices by seeking debt finance to either start or 
grow their businesses, this is because the minimum 
qualifying criteria in areas of equity, credit scoring and 
lack of financial education is the first hurdle that is 
often failed. 
I think, seeking alternative sources such as social 
funds, community initiatives and similar non-formal 
sources of finance may be suitable, but of-course, the 
underutilisation of appropriate advice and/or 
misinformation on both the demand and supply side is 
evidently a serious matter to look at from the policy 
perspectives... 
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Banks 
 
Bank E 
Suggestions/Policy  
Intervention 
-BACE Database 
-encourage use of 
alternative funding 
-Mentoring Schemes 
managed by BACEs (bank 
funded) 
Comments/references from interview 
 
“...lack of information of the sectors of aggregation of 
BACEs can be seen as an area to explore in some 
 details...centralisation of decision making processes is 
a huge disadvantage to small firms as the scoring 
indices are very small and tagged as „risky‟.....the fact 
of the matter is that the banks cannot base loan 
applications on sentimental logic as the computerised 
systems are designed and configured to evaluate risk 
and profitability, if these two conditions are not met, 
there is no room for manoeuvre... 
...I think, better information exchange between the 
demand and supply of finance is a key gap in the chain, 
both parties have a duty to improve this...but off-
course, a wider policy development ... 
 
The banks engagement with the BACEs at various levels (strategic and 
operational) highlights the efforts being made by the banks to reach out to user 
groups. The aim is to change the perceptions of BACEs suggesting that the banks 
were not doing enough and in many cases perceived as being discriminatory 
towards them. The roles of intermediaries needed to be more responsive by acting 
as an interface between the ‗client – partner‘ relationships concerning access to 
business finance from external sources.  
Policy intervention should be considered from a multi-faceted dimension. Firstly, 
business intervention should be considered as an aspect of market intervention 
(strategic level) with the principal aim of helping to secure growth and 
sustainability for Black business in the UK. Secondly, BACEs themselves need to 
be accorded a more vital role in the advisory processes than is currently the case. 
The current arrangements suggest that where government-run business support 
providers are more responsive to bureaucratic structures rather than meeting the 
specialist needs of the entrepreneurs.  
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 Some respondents suggested that some of the government sponsored support 
providers – the LDA (now abolished); Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS); Business Link – are perceived to be dealing with businesses as a 
statistical count with a view to satisfy and secure grant funding without actually 
adding value to the business enterprise development in tangible terms. This 
notion is a testament to the ‗attitudinal‘ shortcomings that have been discussed 
in many aspects of this thesis. The many Government aided support agencies 
offer a great deal of support to all businesses, the issue for BACEs is that of 
‗underutilisation‘ and/or knowledge of the existence and relevance of the 
support services offered.  
7.7 Limitations and Areas for Future Research  
This study is not without its limitations, as has already been recognised in 
previous sections of this thesis. This study is a relatively small scale research 
based on 30 case studies of purposely selected BACE owner managers in 
London. It is therefore impossible to generalise the findings in this study to the 
wider population of London BACEs. Nonetheless, the findings presented and 
discussed provided useful insights into the perspectives of the principal agents 
studied (i.e. BACE owner-managers, banks and intermediaries). The new 
dimensions in the research design, the specificity of the select group and the 
three agent framework adopted for obtaining insider accounts were adopted to 
compensate for many of the gaps and challenges encountered such as lack of 
adequate data and previous research on this topic.   
Further research that focuses on BACEs in particular and ethnic minority 
businesses more generally is much desired. Research in the subject area of 
accessing external finance should be separated from the generic SME types, as 
existing information on many issues impacting on their accessibility to finance is 
submerged in the findings generalised about SMEs. As a result of this study, a 
number of areas are highlighted for future research:  
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1. Attitudinal Studies  
Measuring abstract concept such as attitudes is a challenging proposition. 
From this study, attitudes of BACEs have been reported to play a key role 
as an influencing factor in their self-image and how their behaviour 
predisposes them to encounter disproportionate barriers compared to 
other EMBs with similar features. Some perceive themselves as being 
discriminated against and use this to mask shortfalls in human and social 
capital attainments, which eventually manifest in business failures. 
 2. Managing Formation of Ethnic Enclaves  
The American history about evolution of immigrant entrepreneurs is well 
advanced, but the UK contexts require further focus. Whilst it is difficult 
and almost impossible to prevent formation of marginalised communities, 
further efforts can be made to educate the specific ethnic groups which 
tend to congregate in these marginalised communities.  This concept 
appears to be an area under researched with reference to the effects it has 
on the attitudes of BACEs as discussed in this report. Many references 
have been made to this factor as posing a significant negative impact on 
‗risk‘ appraisals for business growth and therefore banks may have to re-
vitalise their engagement strategies with these communities. Research 
should seek to develop effective support systems that encourage ‗break-
out‘ mechanisms away from these enclaves within Black communities; 
changing the landscape for profitable enterprise for marginalised groups. 
The contributions of Black businesses have been highlighted and 
therefore, the contributions to the UK economy cannot be taken for 
granted. The issues affecting this group need an enabling environment 
and certainly, the identity of the specific category within the wider SME 
requires separation for the issues and challenges they face to be tackled.   
3. Lack of a Database of BACEs   
The lack of a centralised database for BACEs poses a significant problem 
for providers of finance – High Street banks, who are unable to obtain full 
information including personal characteristics that may support or help 
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balance outcomes of ‗credit ratings‘ and other assessment indices when 
processing loans applications. One of the problems with this is the 
‗confidentiality ethos‘ and ‗codes‘ which appear to hinder progress in this 
area. Government policy needs more work in this area if a level-playing 
field is to help banks and business support services redress the challenges 
caused by information asymmetry relating to business finance. The 
existing information often relates to the wider SME and EMB groups, but 
the data for BACEs particularly is not easily accessible and this may be 
highly useful for developing effective policy interventions as suggested by 
Ram et al., (2003). Having said this, there could also be negative 
views/claims of discrimination amongst other (non-ethnic) groups.  
4. Funding for Specialist Business Support   
There is a scarcity of specialist support for BACEs and there is need for 
funding to stimulate BACE-led support establishments. There needs to be 
a rethink of setting up specialist business support organisations in the UK 
as there is clearly a need for this. It is evident from this study that very 
few mainstream business support services still exist, particularly those 
that specifically address the support needs of BACEs. Following the 
abolition of the LDA, there needs to be some research to appraise the 
impact of the gaps created as a result of the government‘s action. From 
this study and other research, generic support services do not meet the 
needs of BACEs, and in many ways, the lack of adequate BACE-led 
support organisations (the few that were available in certain boroughs 
such as Haringey and Hackney have closed down) have seen funds cut 
and have become non-sustainable. An engagement strategy at local 
government levels with the disadvantaged communities can create a 
much needed links between Black entrepreneurs with banks and policy 
developers.   
5. Audit and Cohort Studies  
A focused and comparative study of BACEs alongside a cohort of other 
EMB types on accessing different forms of external finance in the post 
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financial crisis period is needed. Access to finance has been the one major 
problem attributed to these groups in much research, but seeking 
explanations that can support and develop interventionist policy is sparse.  
There are limited ‗audit studies‘ to enhance the knowledge in this area 
and more research by the BACE representative groups themselves may 
provide new findings to explain and/or simplify the relationships and 
behaviours of BACEs.   
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9. APPENDIX 
  
:   
Appendix 1:  Enterprise Agency -  Functions and gaps amongst selected voluntary sector support provisions  
Enterprise 
Agencies  
Brent Business Venture (BBV)  
  
African Caribbean Business  
Support  
(ACBS)  
East London Small Business  
Centre (ELSBC)  
  
African Caribbean Business  
Network (ACBN)  
Haringey Business  
Development Agency  
(HBDA)  
Scope  -Business Support agency  
-1:1 advice, mentoring  
-sign-posting/ marketing  
-Advocacy & networking -
Influence regional 
policy/Training Services  
-offer essential advice & 
support  
-Free 1:1 support services  
-Business development 
network; Training; Brokerage 
services  
-BME-led business support  
organisation  
-  
Access/  
Eligibility  
-SME=<250  
-Trading for 6 months +  
-Potential client must allocate 
resources for growth; 
chargeable  
-Located in Northwest  
England  
-Owned, operated & 
controlled by Afro 
Caribbean origin  
-Strict eligibility criteria on 
lending. Business plan 
required & business must not 
be a subsidiary of another 
organisation  
- Owned, operated & 
controlled by Afro Caribbean 
origin  
-Chargeable services  
-Employees of BACEs  
-SMEs/BMEs  
-Flexible criteria  
  
Innovation  -Cultural Business Investment  
-Guarantee schemes -
Business planning for 
consolidation & expansion  
-Fund Raising  
-weak in this area  
-emphasis /service focus on  
networking & 
advertisement/PR -
Strong on advertisement  
-Marketing for profit  
-Low interest rates (5.5%) 
loans;  Raising finance & 
business loans;  
Free programme for London 
based BACEs to raise debt 
finance   
-Apprenticeships; subsidised 
training services(brokerage);   
Free skills analysis  
-Strong community  
presence via links with Local 
Authority regeneration 
initiatives & social enterprise  
Testimonials &  
User feedback   
  
-BBV on average see between  
40 -60 clients/month -User 
satisfaction systems in 
place. Positive feedback  
-Weak in this area -No 
systems in place to  
monitor satisfaction of users  
  
-Weak in this area -No 
systems in place to  
monitor satisfaction of users  
  
- Weak in this area -No 
systems in place to  
monitor satisfaction of users  
  
-Fair systems but an area for 
development; monitoring 
data unavailable  
Gaps/ 
Unique  
attributes  
-No ethnicity data/monitoring  
-Scope to enhance marketing  
& outreach strategy  
-Policy Initiatives(weak)  
  
- Policy Initiatives(Poor) 
despite advocating for  
regional policy changes for  
members  
  
-Fair initiatives on  
Environmental policy  
-Sustainable procurement -
Scope to develop and raise 
awareness on policy 
dimensions in general  
-Economic downturn 
straining government 
funding, hence activities 
affected -Fair policy 
Initiatives  
-Developed best practice 
approaches & initiatives;   
-Made significant 
contributions to the  
development of BACEs in 
the local area  
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 Appendix (2) Sample Interview Instruments (Demand, Supply & 
Intermediary)  
  
            (Questions Format: Open Ended) Demand 
                 Respondent Profile                                                                   Business Profile 
-Bank  Name  
-Managers 
Name 
 Business Department & Position 
Address  
 
 
Avge. No. Applications 
processed  
(in last 12 months)- Start-up or 
growth applications? 
Age Group 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
60+ 
 Experience: 
(No. of yrs 
in role) 
 Diversity Training Attended 
(in last 12 months) 
Interview Date  
 
Venue 
Time started  Time 
Finished 
  
Questionnaire 
Code/Serial 
No. 
 Method of 
recording 
Notes/Audio 
Tape/Video/Other 
 
 
   1
.     
Introduction: 
 Brief overview of meeting, key objectives or research/interview and themes to be 
explored 
Theme: Relevance of business sector, Qualification, Experience of BACEs and its influence on 
successful application for finance  
   
   
Build-up questions:  
 Managers Experience dealing with BACE applications/ Avge. Applications success 
rates/Any monitoring systems in place on ethnic orientation and/or success rates of 
applicants (in last 12 months)/ what category of lending is prevalent amongst BACEs 
– Small firms in general? 
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   2 
   
Theme: Bank perspectives/reasons for application failures 
o What are the prevailing reasons for BACEs application failures/Are these 
reasons peculiar with other ethnic groups/if yes, why?/Can these reasons be 
attributed to any ‗variation/characteristics ‗ discussed in (1) above? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
1. Proposals/business plans 
2. Collaterals – insufficiency, alternatives 
3. Qualification/experience/business sector 
4. Social network 
 
 
   3.     
 
Theme: Business loan application procedures/policies & practices/perceptions? 
   
   
Build-up: Seek managers’ opinion on the decision making processes and the effects of 
Centralisation approaches to decision making/how he/she relate this to the effect/impact on 
outcomes? 
 Does the bank have a dedicated team/procedures & policies targeted at small 
firms/BACEs/SMEs/BMEs? If no, what would the challenges be for BACEs if a blanket 
procedure/credit policy is applied? How does the Central vs. Local decision making 
processes impact on result of finance applications? /How much freedom does Managers 
have in the decision making process with reference to personal 
relationships/knowledge of the business? / How does the bank measure ‗perceived 
risk? /reasons behind basis of perceived risk? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
1. What are the effects of  the application of a ‗blanket‘ procedure to 
marginalised groups/equality implications 
2. What are the basis for Manager Discretion (i.e. when/how does a 
o Prompts/areas to explore? 
1. Success rates for EMBs? How is this measured? 
2. Generational effects? 
3. Size/gender variations? 
4. Lending categories prevalence – loans, overdraft, others?? 
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manager decide to make local decision instead of referring to central 
point? Useful to explore the scope for flexibility based on knowledge of 
the business 
3. Alternatives for collaterals/how credit scored? 
4. Get idea of equity requirements (what is ratio of BACE capital to debt 
finance/loan sought)? 
 
 
 
   4.     
 
Theme: Knowledge Gaps: with respect to Policies & practices/monitoring/developing 
partnerships  
   
   
Build up: What are the immediate concerns for the banks about the ‗lack of/insufficient 
information‘ of BACEs 
 What are the alternative ‘finance sources/types’ available to BACEs/small firms in 
general? /why are BACEs/small firms accessing these? / 
 Monitoring: at policy levels, what are the terms for monitoring? /what variables are 
monitored? 
 Knowledge gaps: How much knowledge (scale of 1 – 5; 1=low & 5=high) does your 
bank have of the needs of BACEs? /How does the bank develop the knowledge base of 
the BACEs? 
 Developing Relationships: How involved is the bank in Community Development 
Finance Programmes? /Are there any specialist initiatives targeted at BACEs? How 
accessible are these? /What particular challenges does the bank face in processing 
applications from BACE‘s? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
1. Find out what alternative finding sources available and how accessible 
are these to BACEs in  particular and EMBs in general 
2. Does the bank collect monitoring data (at both policy and operational 
levels)? If not, how can they make practices responsive to the needs of 
the BACEs/marginalised groups who may be at a disadvantaged 
position? 
3. How much scope does the processing manager (at local branch) have 
in using ‗discretion‘? /how much knowledge exit of the needs of 
BACEs? 
4. How much efforts/incentives/specialist training does processing bank 
manager have? 
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         (Question Format: Open Ended) Supply 
          Respondent Profile                                                                   Business Profile 
-Bank  Name  
-Managers Name 
 Business Department & Position 
Address  
 
 
Avge. No. Applications 
processed  
(in last 12 months)- Start-up or 
growth applications? 
Age Group 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
60+ 
 Experience: 
(No. of yrs 
in role) 
 Diversity Training Attended 
(in last 12 months) 
Interview Date  Venue 
Time started  Time 
Finished 
  
Questionnaire 
Code/Serial 
No. 
 Method of 
recording 
Notes/Audio 
Tape/Video/Other 
 
 
   1.  
   
Introduction: 
 Brief overview of meeting, key objectives or research/interview and themes to be 
explored 
Theme: Relevance of business sector, Qualification, Experience of BACEs and its influence on 
successful application for finance  
   
   
Build-up questions:  
Managers Experience dealing with BACE applications/ Avge. Applications success 
rates/Any monitoring systems in place on ethnic orientation and/or success rates of 
applicants (in last 12 months)/ what category of lending is prevalent amongst BACEs – 
Small firms in general? 
o Prompts/areas to explore? 
Success rates for EMBs? How is this measured?/ Generational effects? 
Size/gender variations?/ Lending categories prevalence – loans, overdraft, others?? 
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2 
   
Theme: Bank perspectives/reasons for application failures 
o What are the prevailing reasons for BACEs application failures/Are these 
reasons peculiar with other ethnic groups/if yes, why?/Can these reasons 
be attributed to any ‗variation/characteristics ‗ discussed in (1) above? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
1. Proposals/business plans 
2. Collaterals – insufficiency, alternatives 
3. Qualification/experience/business sector 
4. Social network 
 
 
   3.     
 
Theme: Business loan application procedures/policies & practices/perceptions? 
   
   
Build-up: Seek managers’ opinion on the decision making processes and the effects of 
Centralisation approaches to decision making/how he/she relate this to the effect/impact on 
outcomes? 
 Does the bank have a dedicated team/procedures & policies targeted at small 
firms/BACEs/SMEs/BMEs? If no, what would the challenges be for BACEs if a blanket 
procedure/credit policy is applied? How does the Central vs. Local decision making 
processes impact on result of finance applications? /How much freedom does Managers 
have in the decision making process with reference to personal 
relationships/knowledge of the business? / How does the bank measure ‗perceived 
risk? /reasons behind basis of perceived risk? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
5. What are the effects of  the application of a ‗blanket‘ procedure to 
marginalised groups/equality implications 
6. What are the basis for Manager Discretion (i.e. when/how does a 
manager decide to make local decision instead of referring to central 
point? Useful to explore the scope for flexibility based on knowledge of 
the business 
7. Alternatives for collaterals/how credit scored? 
8. Get idea of equity requirements (what is ratio of BACE capital to debt 
finance/loan sought)? 
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   4.     
 
Theme: Knowledge Gaps: with respect to Policies & practices/monitoring/developing 
partnerships  
   
   
Build up: What are the immediate concerns for the banks about the ‗lack of/insufficient 
information‘ of BACEs 
 What are the alternative ‘finance sources/types’ available to BACEs/small firms in 
general? /why are BACEs/small firms accessing these? / 
 Monitoring: at policy levels, what are the terms for monitoring? /what variables 
are monitored? 
 Knowledge gaps: How much knowledge (scale of 1 – 5; 1=low & 5=high) does 
your bank have of the needs of BACEs? /How does the bank develop the 
knowledge base of the BACEs? 
 Developing Relationships: How involved is the bank in Community Development 
Finance Programmes? /Are there any specialist initiatives targeted at BACEs? How 
accessible are these? /What particular challenges does the bank face in processing 
applications from BACE‘s? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
5. Find out what alternative finding sources available and how 
accessible are these to BACEs in  particular and EMBs in general 
6. Does the bank collect monitoring data (at both policy and 
operational levels)? If not, how can they make practices responsive 
to the needs of the BACEs/marginalised groups who may be at a 
disadvantaged position? 
7. How much scope does the processing manager (at local branch) 
have in using ‗discretion‘? /how much knowledge exit of the needs 
of BACEs? 
8. How much efforts/incentives/specialist training does processing 
bank manager have? 
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          (Question Format: Open Ended - Intermediaries) 
          Respondent Profile                                                                   Business Profile 
 
Respondent Name  Business Department & 
Position 
Address  
 
 
Domain: 
Business Support or Policy 
Development 
Age Group 
20-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
60+ 
 Experience: 
(No. of yrs 
in role) 
 Ethnicity 
 
Interview Date  
 
Venue 
Time started  Time 
Finished 
  
Questionnaire 
Code/Serial No. 
 Method of 
recording 
Notes/Audio 
Tape/Video/Other 
 
 
   1  
   
Introduction: 
 Set context for meeting, research objectives and themes to be explored 
Theme: Role of Local Enterprise & Support Services/agencies & BACE development 
and access    to services 
   
   
Build-up questions:  
 In the course of this research, a proportion of BACEs claimed that they were not 
receiving relevant support from mainstream business support 
agencies/organisations? Why is this? Do you agree/disagree, please comment. 
o Prompts/areas to explore? 
Success rates for BACE usage of Business Support Services?  
How is usage measured and monitored by LDA? 
How much knowledge of BACEs do support agencies have of the 
specific needs of this group? 
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2 
  
   
Theme: significance of third sector organisations (TSOs) meeting needs of BACEs 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
o What are the roles of LDA in complementing the ‗resource base’ of TSO? 
o One of LDAs research findings (Redefining London‘s BME-owned Businesses, 03/05) 
suggest that BME-owned firms face additional barriers & problems relating to adequate 
access & support from main stream support agencies: 
Why is this and what is LDA doing about this? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
Are there any policy areas targeted at this problem 
Is there any monitoring framework to control output of funded support 
providers 
Qualification/experience/business sector 
How significant is Business link for London (BL4L) and how relevant is the 
realignment of its management of the SBS 
 
   3.     
 
Theme: Gaps in business support for BACEs 
   
   
Build-up: The needs of BACEs are largely varying and complex due to the unique 
characteristics of the group. What are LDAs views of the available support and the low take-up 
of business support for this group? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
     Is there a failure on the part of the business support agencies (BSA) and why is this? 
Are there any known challenges for the BSAs reaching the 
BACE/marketing gaps? 
Is there any dedicated investment to meet specialist support provisions? 
How effective are these? 
Relevance of the perceptions of the BACEs? 
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   4.     
 
Theme: Effectiveness of specialist/third sector business support organisations – how 
relevant are they 
   
   
Build up: What are the immediate concerns for the LDA about the lack of 
funding/effectiveness/take-up of the third sector support organisations? There are 
reported mistrust by BACEs and missing gaps in terms of specialist support services – 
what measures are being put in place by LDA to revitalise the third sector business 
support service providers? 
 Some specialist/dedicated business support agencies for BME-owned businesses 
such as the North London Business Development Agencies and Wandsworth 
Enterprise Agency (amongst others) have ceased operating mainly due to lack of 
funding....what is LDAs position about this? 
 What are the alternative ‗third‘ sectors BME-led or focused enterprise organisations 
e.g. African Caribbean Business Network (ACBN) emergence able to achieve in 
meeting the needs of BACEs? How effective are these from LDAs strategic views? 
 Knowledge gaps: How much knowledge (scale of 1 – 5; 1=low & 5=high) does your 
bank have of the needs of BACEs? /How does the bank develop the knowledge 
base of the BACEs? 
o Prompts/areas to explore 
Find out about the regime of LDA funding of the third sector 
business support providers?  
Does LDA monitor delivery outcomes (at both policy and 
operational levels)? If not, how can LDA stimulate the effective 
usage of the third sector support provisions 
 
 
   5.     
 
Theme: Policy intervention for impacting on both the demand and  business support 
agencies  
   
   
Build up: BACEs continue to face barriers to business finance, growth and development – 
access to relevant and needs-led business support is one of the key issues; addressing 
these issues has naturally being the focus of considerable business/economic policy and 
service delivery interest for LDA. What further measures are being developed to ‗fill in 
the gaps‘ 
 What policy intervention/measure is developed to redress the sectorial factors and 
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perceptions among BACEs which are mitigates growth and development? 
 The BL4L reorganisation and the transfer of the business support contract to the 
LDA provide an opportunity for improvements to be made. How does LDA see or 
measure this? 
 Knowledge gaps: How is LDA looking to address the specific sectorial needs of 
BACEs – to improve available of specialist support and resources (including policy 
intervention) on both growth and traditional sectors such as food, catering, hair 
and beauty, retailing, building and construction, which characterise many BACEs 
(particularly in the inner-cities and those with low knowledge skill/human capital) 
 Developing Relationships: What measures are available to redress the gaps 
between the ‗demand‘ and ‗supply‘ sides? 
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Appendix 3: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS (SELECTED CASES)  
  
Research Question 1 – Result (Excerpts from interview transcripts)  
BACE-Unique  
Identifier/Tracker  
Does a relevant qualification, experience in the business sector influence 
access to business finance?  
 DB-Low  Human  
Capital/High  
Business  
Experience/Record  
I really don‘t agree to an extent that having a relevant management 
degree is relevant….. from experience, I believe you have to have some 
form of formal education, i.e. to be literate and be able to understand the 
basics for looking after your business requirements….. The matter of 
qualification is a bias factor in this matter and I also think it depends on 
the nature of your business too.  
  qualification in my opinion is required in certain businesses, in my area, 
I feel that the banks have an already made up mind that lending out 
money to a small business is not profitable and therefore, no matter how 
much information you seek, the chances are really zero  
EW  I could not agree more with this. In fact, I think it‘s a critical fact or an 
underlining factor responsible for how BACEs make decisions and go 
about considering take-up of banking finance as this is a very red-tape 
process and a ‗know-how‘ is desirable. I also think this is why many 
BACEs do not ‗try‘ to access bank finance, because of the work entailed, 
such as business planning and writing a strategy/developing a detailed 
cash-flow for example.  
  On the other hand, some people are very gifted and have natural business 
acumen. Having said that, accessing bank finance is a formal source and 
therefore requires a degree of expertise of the bank application procedures 
– there are no two ways about the fact that the knowledge base of the 
BACE is very handy.  
  
  
SD  I think that a relevant management qualification can only improve how 
you explore finance sources but ultimately, your experience + environment 
will play a big part in how you obtain finance....... I believe getting a 
qualification helps your profile in accessing finance. I do not think it is 
required to make a business successful. I think to a lender, it gives a 
professional impression of your business and you!  
SS  I would generally agree as acquiring a degree requires a level of planning 
and organisation. Often those with experience / qualifications have been 
groomed to produce business plans and strategy assimilation. However, 
those from a non academic background, have no fear, nothing to loose and 
possibly willing to go the extra mile or over and above the average to 
prove their business credentials / business planning skills............. I agree if 
the manager / owner don‘t have the knowledge it can create a finance gap 
as s/he understanding or capacity is less. This creates a disadvantage 
being a small firm requires a high level of knowledge, a die hard resilient 
spirit and good people skills. All these factors in my view encompass 
knowledge.   
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DH  Definitely, relevant qualification is quite relevant and by dealing with my 
clients, its clear that it‘s an added value to the way the entrepreneur 
develops and manage their business, including sourcing for business 
funds…. well, what the bank manager dealing with the loan application 
should be doing is evaluating the individual‘s business proposals and 
potential against the risks they would have to take rather than attaching 
value to the degree.  
FO/SW  
  
  
  
  
In my case, this was not an issue; the key thing was meeting the criteria to 
qualify for the small loan. The support agency who recommended me to 
the Bank had been quite helpful and I was well guided. The business plan 
detail was more relevant than qualification............ what I can say is that, in 
some business sectors such as technology, research or even engineering, 
it may well be applicable as the owner manager must satisfy certain 
standards in the UK, so this may well be important. But for me, it’s really 
not applicable.  
  
  
AA/DB/AO  
Advanced qualifications are never a major disadvantage when talking to 
Bank Managers! The experiences of local business loans manager in the 
inner city within where I offer mentoring and advisory services are largely 
from the ethnic minority backgrounds; therefore, they have a much better 
knowledge of the local businesses and the importance to stimulate social 
enterprises in the local communities. This may not be so in the areas where 
processing bank loan managers lack the knowledge about BACEs.    
AA-Well, for me the blame is more leaning towards the banks rather than 
the BACEs who may be disadvantaged in a number of ways such as 
communication, low knowledge or skills to develop business plan and 
having collaterals. In cases where the business loan applicant has a viable 
business proposal, the prospective landing bank should be providing extra 
support to nurture the idea, you just never know which of the ideas, no 
matter how crudely presented can turn out to be a very profitable venture 
for both the customer and the bank!....  
AO-Response: I did not feel that an excessive amount of business acumen 
or qualification was required; the emphasis was more on the affordability 
and collateral requirements being met. I would agree though that the sector 
within which I was entering was not that risky. I do agree that if I had not 
thought through the options  
I.e. seeking a bank loan rather than business loan, I may have had some 
challenges. I had also done my background research by speaking with 
similar business owner in the sector. My knowledge base and research 
ability definitely counted was useful here without a doubt.  
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BACE-
Unique  
Identifier  
Research Question (3): Result (Excerpts from interview transcripts)  
Issues around 'perceptions' and its influence on the ability of the BACE owner 
manager (OM) accessing business finance.  
DB/EW  
SS  
Low Human Capital/High business acumen/1st Generation-As you can imagine, 
my faith in the Bank finance sector is negative…look around in this workshop 
(DB asks interviewer to walk around and inspect the range of machinery in the 
workshop – about 6 heavy duty machines – different types and sizes of 
equipment ; some measuring about 12m long and 5M standing!)yet I was unable 
to access finance  
 
BACE-Unique  
Identifier  
Research Question (3): Result (Excerpts from interview transcripts)  
Issues around 'perceptions' and its influence on the ability of the BACE owner 
manager (OM) accessing business finance.  
   I secured these with my own savings and personal loan, some on HP and some 
on hire! These were the only way I could afford these and honestly, it works out 
better for the business……Business planning skills- As mentioned earlier on, I 
was unable to afford the high price of the professional service (accountant), so I had to 
develop this my self and with the help of colleagues… I strongly believe that the 
particular bank manager I dealt with was not helpful and relied heavily on information 
sent back from the head office, he could have relied more on the assessment at his office 
and used his discretion more…..  
  Discouraged borrower effect- well, in my own experience, I have had at least two 
separate attempts and both were not successful, so I really do not trust the bank 
sources  
DH/SS  
  
FO/AA/DB  
High Human Capital/ qualification, business success, Female, British born- EW- 
This is a really interesting area. 20 years ago, stereotyping was rife, but in recent 
times, we’ve moved on and the society has changed. The Bank Managers are more 
aware of the needs of these groups (BACEs). But there is still room for 
improvement. A lot of the banks are loosing out of feasible, profitable clients. 
Banks such as Halifax and HSBC now have more knowledge of BACEs. I would 
argue that the challenges are not as bad as it used to be and is more likely to be a 
perception issue rather than a reality to an extent.   
  
  
  
Business planning is very critical for showing the bank that the business proposal 
is a viable one, but again, the skills and costs for getting one done properly 
depends on the knowledge of the business owner and in most cases, paying for a 
professional service may not be affordable for small businesses generally.  
  Discouraged borrower effect- I had noted many people with sound business plans 
fail, so when I tried to start a business, I did not approach a bank. Being refused 
would have knocked my confidence  
  
  
  
Female/Average Human Capital-I felt no different, we discussed my business 
account, specifics requirements and I was given assistance with the VAT processes. 
I was treated as a valued customer.  
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BACE-Unique  
Identifier  
Research Question (3): Result (Excerpts from interview transcripts)  
Issues around 'perceptions' and its influence on the ability of the BACE owner 
manager (OM) accessing business finance.  
High  Human  
Capital/Direct 
experience 
with owner 
managers as 
accountant  
  
  
-From my view, I see a sense of injustice to some of the clients largely because of 
the knowledge gaps. For example, some of the small firms lack expertise in 
business planning and/or marketing, and yet, they do not invest in buying 
professional services. My argument then is that, these business owners are quick to 
blame the alleged discriminations they face in accessing finance, but the reality is 
that the right sources and information are not obtained, mainly due to the 
experiences they or other similar partners had. In some cases, these businesses do 
not even understand how to approach the banks and some do not even try  
  
  
AO/DH/AA  
High HC AO- I‟ve had a positive experience, largely due to the approaches and decisions I 
made on going for the best finance option for my venture. I think it’s for the BACE to 
take ownership of the process....... (AA) The experience and attitudes of some 
BACEs rely heavily on the decisions that are made or not made. Perception is in the 
mind and we have all being a victim, but I believe that over time, things have changed, but 
some people have remained in the past. This is not just the BACES, the loan processing 
systems and bank personnel too have blame in this.....  
  Racial discrimination is in the mind; therefore the loan processing managers must be 
professional and open with the BACEs to avoid a negative stereotyping. I know what this 
is suggesting. Again it has to be that some individuals have particular challenges or 
experiences with one bank, and then do not try anywhere else.  
  
  
BACE-
Unique  
Identifier  
Research Question (4): Effects of the Credit Crunch and BACE adaptability  
All  This is another problem! The recession affects every business, and even more the 
small businesses. The banks do not encourage small businesses to even try and 
really to be honest, it’s about surviving and looking at alternative options to 
market my products and recycle my finances. For me the biggest issue now is the 
business rate challenges and having to compete with the bigger businesses in this 
sector.   
DB/EW....  
  
  
Generally 
expressed by 
all 
respondents  
DB-Recently the government suggested that small businesses will get relief and 
discounts from business rates, but that again is one of the politics of the 
government, saying something and doing another.         
 The small businesses really are facing higher challenges and really cannot see 
the benefits of the incentives? (DB shows the interviewer some invoices  
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BACE-Unique  
Identifier  
Research Question (4): Effects of the Credit Crunch and BACE adaptability  
  
  
  
  
  
  
High  
HC/Female/Posit 
ive Experience  
  
over time) these invoices increase over time (last 2 years) at the initial period, 
you get this discount figure and then the next invoice has an increase that 
cancels out the initial discount…listen it’s a mess! We also constantly have to 
battle with bailiffs who chase up business rate payment without considering 
the income/cash flow of the business that is really why some businesses have 
closed down because of having to deal with the inland revenue departments. 
The system does not give allowance to periods of economic crisis to encourage 
the businesses to stay in trade.  
EW-This is a difficult one! The ‘Credit Crunch’ not necessarily directly affecting  
me as I have had a very good year! This may have been so because my businesses 
have not relied on excessive credit, or business loans. From experience of some of 
my colleagues, there is a shift in growing there business to survival. Those that 
had relied heavily on bank finance have suffered from the Credit Crunch and the 
effect of business failure is creating a ‘ripple effect’ on other businesses who are 
even more adverse to bank finance because of the instability of the economy.  
consensus  The Governmental changes to the delivery of public sector – budget cuts, 
eventually affect all sectors of businesses/communities, even the large ones. Here, 
ethnicity really has little bearing, except of the fact that the level of knowledge of 
the business owner may play a part on how options and strategies for survival 
can be planned. The saying that it’s the ‘survival of the fittest’ applies. I however 
feel that BACEs and small businesses generally require specialist business 
support and breaks from taxes and business rates to enable these businesses 
survive. It will be interesting to research into the business failure rates in these 
times of uncertainties!  
 
AA/FO/DH  Modernising the business model, HR and the possibility of their brand / product. 
Changing their market base, with other emerging markets. Had I had the finances 
I would have liked to open a bouquet in one of the BRIC countries – ideally 
Brazil.    
EW/DH/AO  For me, one of my problems is the business rates and tax implications! The 
government does not offer any assistance to ensure that businesses can survive 
the Credit Crunch. My business rely on my clients that run small firms, therefore, 
if they struggle, I also struggle. The Credit Crunch has affected a lot of my 
colleagues businesses; I’m hanging in there really  
 
EW/AO  Well, one of the saving grace for me is the fact that I have not committed too 
much to credit facilities, I suppose, this helps my survival, but I have had to 
down-size though and laid off staff, I only have part time staff, just two. As 
things get harder and cash flow gets bad, I will have to revert to a sole trader and 
lay off staff as I will be forced to so this to survive, its been really bad.  
DH/SS  There are really no tax breaks or business rate weavers, so the government, 
particularly this government, are not caring enough. I also think that the business 
support agencies themselves are struggling to retain their grant funding and 
folding up how could they advise and support BACEs?  
 263  
  
FO  The issue right now is not about accessing additional finance, as many 
colleagues would agree,  but trying to develop my marketing strategy and cash 
flow. I am considering recycling my cash flow to stay in business, even if the  
BACE-Unique  
Identifier  
Research Question (4): Effects of the Credit Crunch and BACE adaptability  
 profit margin is minimal, I can still stay afloat. Invest in other areas (venture 
capital – friends; the investor will be required to give 3 months notice to reclaim 
capital injection into my business). Marketing strategy – also looking at new 
products and customer base. But I must say that the Government are not doing 
anything to assist small businesses as they claim in the press and political 
rallies.  
FO  Well it’s different for individuals, but from the feedback I get from colleagues, its 
hard times and more businesses are packing up, you only have to research on the 
statistics, its scary! I suppose the credit crunch is a plague that has no bounds or 
respecter of people, it will affect every business sector, but the smaller ones get 
the most effect.  
AA  
 Business 
support:  
Provider/High 
HC  
There is a general reluctance on the part of Bank Managers to part with their 
money... Response: My clients are usually advised to be creative, honest and diligent in 
tackling the “credit crunch”.  There are excellent opportunities in the cultural foods and 
catering business for more BACEs, so seeking alternative markets/sectors sounds like a 
practical alternative to business closures.  
AO/AA/DH  Response: I think this period will pass, as it‟s a cycle of time, it‟s not the first time this has 
come around and people survived. However, many businesses are at a large risk of 
closure, as I have had to sell off mine as a result of the economic crisis – largely because 
the customer base continue to shrink and business rates are ever increasing, making the 
business unsustainable.  
  Seeking finance for me at this time is really not an option as I had to fold up, like many 
other businesses had to. The banks are more stringent and confidence is low....AO- I tried 
to expand the business initially, again by releasing further equity on my property, but I 
realised that the economy was still in a bad shape and had to sell the business just before 
the credit crunch really became so noticeable.  
Consensus  AO-Response: It‟s not just the small firms or the ethnic ones that face difficulties, I think 
all businesses do face challenges, its just how businesses manage and strategise. From my 
contact with colleagues and partners still running businesses, what they now do is to look 
at survival strategies. I don‟t think many ethnic businesses seek growth, particularly is 
the sectors in which they operate is fragile  
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BACE 
Unique  
identifier  
Research Question (5): Views and experiences of BACE to business support 
and policy tools and implications for the reported 'finance gaps'   
AO  I can relate to the possibility that Black business owners do not use business support 
services sufficiently mainly because there are certain perceptions or lack of specialist 
support advice available. There is also a possibility that the business support service 
providers do not advertise their services enough therefore the owner managers are 
unaware of the  
opportunities available concerning business support, some may even think they have to 
pay for these services if unaware that the funding for these facilities are financed from 
the Government departments.  
DB  The business support agencies have no real impact/powers to change the 
problems we face. There are some support providers such as the East London 
Forum for small businesses, business ventures, a not for profit social 
enterprise, business link…...you name them, I attend series of regular forums 
and advise session, but the support you get is really temporary, it does not 
have any lasting effect on the challenges faced. Some of the business support 
providers simply offer advice as a tick box exercise to secure funding 
themselves for survival! So my opinion is that the government should be more 
serious about ensuring that ethnic minority establishments tackle specific 
issues relevant to these groups.  
  get ethnic minority business representative to run specific support agency and 
report to the government or those who develop policies  
  ... I think policy should look at the ways the banks operate and ensure they can 
set quotas for providing finance to small businesses..  
  most of the business support agencies are not fully aware of the types of 
difficulties faced by particular types of business owners and the business types 
they run. For example, how can an Asian adviser offer support to African 
service type business? They would not understand the real issues faced? Again, 
there should be some specific ethnic groups support providers looking at like 
issues to be able to make this effective.  
  ...another challenge for us is the lack of togetherness between African and 
Caribbean customers and the businesses themselves. The Asian groups 
particularly have very strong family and business networks which make it 
easier to raise finance and access bank finance because of the large collateral 
they can raise as they have an advantage in the property market.  
  Then the government have to create enterprise banks that will target the small 
business community and this will create confidence and new jobs I think.  
EW/FO/SS  I have mixed feelings about business support as I’m unsure of how useful they 
are to BACEs. Because I have worked in the public sector, there is a lot of waste 
in the system and these are not targeted to sectors that need services. The 
business support providers such as business link have not impacted my business. 
There is also the question of whether the BACEs are actually accessing the 
business support services  
  There are just too many different micro support services that lack specialist 
skills and local knowledge of the smaller firms that actually need the service the 
most. Support groups must be designed involving the BACEs to service specific 
needs i.e. creating business mentors; to help BACEs with business planning, 
monitoring issues around access to finance etc.   
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  I am aware of a number of these business support providers – business angels, 
business link, business venture advisory services and a number of Local 
Authority small business grants and support services. But I am convinced that 
the accessibility to these support services are very poor for two reasons, one is 
the fact that the BACEs are not aware of them, secondly, the BACEs have no 
confidence/knowledge of the benefits they offer.  
 
BACE 
Unique  
identifier  
Research Question (5): Views and experiences of BACE to business support and 
policy tools and implications for the reported 'finance gaps'   
  EW- ...first the lack of knowledge or awareness of the various support providers 
and the second to a lesser significance is the lack of confidence from the BACEs 
points of view as not being able to obtain the appropriate support/advise.  
  Ew-The business support provider organisations should be streamlined and 
nationalised – one point of contact. This will allow closer monitoring and 
quality control  
  Low HC-SD-I’m really not very conversant of the organisations offering business 
support, but I have a few friends who has mentioned business angels and the 
business link in the past, but I have a feeling that they have not been that useful 
anyway.  
  Dh-A one strategy fits all to be discouraged, access to support should be 
customised to meet the needs and challenges of the whole spectrum  
  BACEs and EMBs should be funded to provide specialist support, mentoring and 
practical assistance to these groups.......   
Banks should also be funding specialist support providers based on regular 
monitoring and research findings, this can bridge the gaps between the demand 
and improve customer confidence  
  I do not think it’s a legislative issue. I think the business supportive system has 
all the credentials, but possibly requires them to diversify the strategy. This could 
include on site observations, small business groups courses whereby those from 
various businesses share their experiences in the presence of those who could offer 
guidance.    
Intermediary  .My clients certainly do not utilise these services well enough, but I question how 
relevant the advice given meet the needs of Black and Minority groups in the 
business sectors. I’m afraid; the credible support providers such as Business link 
for London lack the specialist skills that address the needs of the minority 
sectors.  
  I think, for the fact that the support/advise provided does not meet the needs of 
the businesses. I also agree that the BACEs may not use support services enough 
because some do not understand the benefits, in as much they are unable to access 
finance. I do often refer my clients for business advice and training sessions by 
some banks, but at least half of those referred do not take this up. I’m not sure 
why this is.  Perhaps you can find out during the course of your research?  
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Intermediary   One clear reason, that I have been told by some of my clients is the fact that 
most of the established business support agencies are not knowledgeable of the 
specific needs of the BACEs, in terms of culture, lack of adequate collateral, 
qualification and what you refer to Ade as Human Capital  
   I also feel that this problem should be equally shared by some of the banks as 
well. In some cases, the banks do not have adequate knowledge of Black 
businesses and therefore have a wrong judgement on allowing business finance.  
  FO- I think this is about the ‘perceptions’ we were talking about earlier and the 
lack of confidence and explorations. There is also a problem of lack of relevant 
support speciality – meaning the support agencies do not have relevant advise 
that meet the needs of the ethnic minority businesses, so the word that go around 
is that the business support agencies were not set up or resourced to service ethnic 
minority businesses particularly. I really believe that the government should 
encourage ethnic  
BACE 
Unique  
identifier  
Research Question (5): Views and experiences of BACE to business support and 
policy tools and implications for the reported 'finance gaps'   
 minority businesses to set up and run these support agencies themselves.  
 I think the Pakistani and Indian communities do this very well  
  But from the Government points of view, more needs to be done about 
understanding the specific needs of the specific ethnic groups that face difficulties. 
I’m also not sure the Government puts in enough resources into this area. In 
China, community banks exist particularly for small businesses, and these are 
monitored by the Central Government, this idea can be explored here in the UK.  
  As suggested, I think BACE- led business support agencies need to be set up , I 
also think the Government should monitor banks and rate them on how well they 
engage and make business finance available to BACEs  
  
  
